

Gender in Revolution: Do Societal Expectations of Gendered Behavior Affect a Revolutionary's
Participation and Leadership Strategy?

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Abstract: Societal expectations of male and female behavior surrounding aggression and violence dictate each gender's norms of anger expression. These social expectations may or may not extend to the political sphere as well. Specifically in the contentious politics of revolutions, are the revolutionary activities that women engage in more or less violent than men's? Does this change whether women are participants or leaders in the revolution? This study argues there is a difference between the way that men and women approach revolutionary tactics as participants and leaders. Through an experiment testing female and male revolutionary activity and strategy as well as a case study on the Arab Uprising of 2011 and the Muslim Sisterhood in Egypt, findings suggest that it is the framing of gendered behavior in a revolution affects how men and women act as both participants and leaders in revolutions which leads to the difference in their revolutionary behavior.

When we think of revolutionary action, we usually think of masses rising up in anger that will eventually fuel violence. However, this can be considered a masculine way of looking at anger expression, given common societal beliefs that men are more apt to express anger through violent means. Women may not express their anger in the same way because of social constraints surrounding female aggression¹, and this may change the manifestation of this emotion in the political realm. Thus, there may be gender-differences between men and women in revolt and their revolutionary tactics. Are the strategies women use in revolutions different than men? How do women approach revolutionary strategy? Are they more pacifistic or more violent than men, or are they the same? Does this differ within their role as participants in revolutions compared to holding a leadership position in the revolution?

There are competing answers to these questions. One is that there is no gender difference in revolutionary approach and that there are certain tactical choices that revolutionaries can make that either gender can and do employ. Another answer is that women play a certain revolutionary role when they are included with men in a revolution that is based off of stereotypical-gender behavior; namely, women organize protests or other events that are not as aggressive, while men are the ones carrying out these events, sometimes employing violent means. Women may also enact different revolutionary tactics when it is just women within a revolution. They may feel that they can act differently with other women because gender-based behaviors are not enforced

when they are just with women. This puzzling topic brings together questions about female political behavior, how women react in conflict situations, their expression of anger, and female leadership style.

This study argues there is a gendered difference between men and women's revolutionary strategy. Women are more likely to exhibit pacifistic and low-risk revolutionary behavior as participants. However, when it comes to leadership positions in revolutions, women assume a masculine leadership strategy typified by more violent and high-risk behavior. This theory therefore suggests that women act less aggressively as revolutionary participants and leaders as a whole than men, but more aggressively as revolutionary leaders than participants. Whether this behavior is inherent or not is not the source of debate — if it is due to the nature of the women or her socialization into those characteristics, it produces the same gendered revolutionary behavior. This applies to both same-gender and mixed-gender situations.

To determine whether or not this assertion is true, we must first examine the literature on female anger, women in conflict, political behavior, and leadership style. The theory of this paper will then be presented as to why women would act differently than men in revolutions both as participants and as leaders in power. After laying out the causal mechanisms for such behavior, the experimental design and results testing this question are discussed. Because the experiment is only internal validity, an examination for the external evidence through case studies of women participants and leaders in the Egyptian Revolution of 2010-2011, as well as in the Muslim Sisterhood, will occur. The exploration of gendered differences in revolutions will end with the implications and importance of these findings.

How will women respond to contentious politics?

Before beginning to examine how men and women react in revolutionary situations, it is important to establish definitions of masculine and feminine behavior. In most societies, men act within masculine behavioral constraints, meaning that they are more likely to behave in an aggressive, high-risk way whereas women are more likely to behave in a low-risk way. There is contradictory literature on whether this is biological or socialized². However, what matters is that there is a gap on behavioral expressions between genders. These behavioral differences may also manifest themselves in the political realm and revolutionary situations.

Some scholars argue that there are differences between genders in regard to their political behavior that reflect the differences in personal behavior. However, this may be due to the circumstances in which each gender is socialized in, not inherent characteristics of the gender itself. Additionally, the environment which stimulates and facilitates learning encourages women to be more interested and informed about politics, and even participate more, than their brothers who had an advantage in these areas from socialization since childhood³. Further, political behavior may be controlled by gendered roles and responsibilities. One study examined what made Mexican women in particular participate in protests. Researchers found that higher protest participation was correlated with women who had greater social and household empowerment. If women had greater mobility within the society and did not need their husband's permission to leave, they were more active⁴. This suggests that constraints on female political participation are extended to gendered division of labor, not simply a gendered division of characteristics.

If revolutions are typically thought of as manifestations of anger-fueled political opinion, it is important to see how anger is demonstrated and perceived by each gender to understand societal expectations of this emotional expression. One experiment tested how male versus female anger was received in in-group deliberations in the form of juries. Even when women

expressed the exact same opinion and emotion as the male mock jurors, they caused the individuals, both male and female, to feel more confident in their own opinions after women expressed emotion but the expression of emotion from men did not affect their opinions at all. This suggests that a gender gap in-group situation exists concerning emotional expression. Women lose influence over both men and women when they include emotion into their reasoning, which has large reaching consequences for women trying to influence societally important decisions than men⁵. For this reason, women will be less likely to participate in or encourage revolutionary activities that would be emotional to maintain their efficacy and persuasiveness as a political actor.

A common assumption about women and their expression of anger is that they suppress their anger more than men, in part to maintain respect for their political standing, as explained previously. In one study, it was determined that “feminine sex-role types did not suppress anger more than masculine sex-role types,” and both suppressed anger the same amount. An interesting point of information is that androgynous or more gender-neutral participants were less likely to respond with anger and less likely to suppress their feelings as well⁶. This research suggests that men and women may both have similar constraints of on how they respond emotionally due to their gender -- men feel like they cannot respond to negative situations emotionally because it would undermine their masculinity whereas women feel they cannot react emotionally because it would feed into gender stereotypes on how they are ruled by their emotions. These results imply that women and men may react in the least emotionally charged way possible. The implications of this for the theory are that men and women would both choose the least emotional response to their anger, meaning that both genders would not resolve to high-risk emotional activity like violence. However, this contradicts the other literature⁷. Therefore, the theory that men will feel

freer to respond emotionally through potentially aggressive means while in a revolutionary situation than women will is still viable.

In addition to understanding perceptions and expressions of female anger, it is also important to understand how women choose to resolve this anger through conflict management. Previous literature has noted that there is no significant difference between male and female attitudes toward conflict⁸. This raises the question if there are no significant differences between how men and women view conflict, is there a difference between the way they would resolve it? Dahlia Scheindlin's work among Israeli women and their perspectives on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seeks to answer this question. By analyzing different datasets about Israeli views on the Intifadas, she finds that there is little consistent difference between the genders in their views on conflict. She does find that women are less inclined to support provocative policies but during wartime they become more likely to side with policies to end the violence, which includes long-term non-military interventions. Scheindlin concludes that gender stereotypes about women being pacifistic in conflict are harmful long term in seeking resolutions to conflict.

However, another study found that after controlling for biological sex, there was a gendered difference concerning conflict management styles contrary to Scheindlin's research. Masculine individuals ranked highest on the dominating conflict style whereas feminine individuals ranked highest on the avoiding style. Again, androgynous individuals ranked highest for an integrated style between the dominating and avoidant conflict management styles⁹. This implies that individuals that express traditionally masculine or feminine attributes feel that they have to live up to the expectations of this behavior, whether by confrontation and aggression or by avoidant behavior. In revolutionary situations where participants engage in political expression, it is likely men will be more likely to engage in aggressive tactics whereas women

will be more likely to engage in passive tactics that will not make them be as directly involved in violence.

The past literature on female political behavior and participation, anger, and conflict management suggests if women are acting as participants in a revolution, they are more likely to act as “women” should-- meaning they more likely to use non-violence as a revolutionary tactic. When women are not acting merely as participants but in a higher-ranking position, they assume male characteristics to not be challenged by other revolutionaries. They feel freer to use violence as a revolutionary strategy since they are expected to assume new characteristics that allow them to use different tactics than usual.

There is a difference between men and women’s revolutionary behavior because they each have different manifestations of political behavior, conflict resolution, and anger expression. Women are hesitant to show anger for fear of being perceived as too emotional in a way society has prescribed as inappropriate for a woman. Acting as such may cause women to lose legitimacy within their gender and therefore their clout as a political actor or leader. Additionally, women are more conflict avoidant than men. Thus, they are more apt to use low-risk and pacifistic revolutionary strategy to 1) avoid violence which could be viewed as a manifestation of anger or emotion, and 2) avoid confrontation and conflict. Men will decide to use higher-risk and more aggressive revolutionary tactics because they do not suffer the same consequences of demonstrating anger or aggression in their behavior. Men are also more likely to use a confrontational conflict management strategy that typically ends in aggression between the conflicting parties, and maybe even violence. Thus:

H1: There is a gendered difference between the way that men and women approach revolutionary tactics as participants. Men are more likely to use violent

and higher-risk revolutionary activity whereas women are more likely to use low-risk and pacifistic revolutionary activity.

Due to these differences in participation between genders, there would also be a difference in the way that each gender's revolutionary leadership strategizes. Men will still be more likely to use aggressive tactics than women in these leadership positions. However, women will be more likely to use violence in this position because these positions typically demand "masculine" behavior. Female leaders will thus conform to this leadership expectation to enact violence when necessary for the furthering of the revolutionary cause. Women will conform to this gendered expectation and feel less of a social constraint to act in a pacifistic way. Instead, women will embrace more aggressive tactics while in these positions. Thus:

H2: There is less of a divide between the way that men and women approach revolutionary tactics as leaders than there is as participants. Men are still more likely to use high-risk and violent revolutionary activity and women are not as likely as men to use this same strategy but are more likely to use it as leaders directing it rather than participating in it.

Experiment: Revolutionary Hypotheticals

In order to establish whether or not there is a gendered difference in revolutionary strategy, it was best to conduct an experiment. The experiment's sample was drawn from students at Brigham Young University (BYU) as this is a fairly homogeneous student body where individuals in this sample are of the same education level and religion. With these aspects controlled for, gender becomes the main difference between individuals in this sample to evaluate their responses to revolutionary situations. A total of 80 students participated in this experiment, 35 were male and 45 were female. Although there were slightly more women that

participated, this sample size is close enough to each other to not skew the results significantly. Both sample sizes from each gender pass the standard minimum of 30 individuals to have a representative sample of the population. The experiment was distributed online via a Qualtrics survey.

Three revolutionary hypotheticals ask the individuals to imagine themselves as participants and leaders in a revolution. Each individual assesses his or her likelihood in 1) participating in the revolutionary strategy as a participant or 2) employing each revolutionary strategy in a leadership position. They rank their likelihood on a scale from one to five: one indicating most likely to use whereas five meant least likely to use. Participants were told to only use each number in the scale once. The five revolutionary strategies included a spectrum of both pacifistic and relatively low-risk revolutionary activities to riskier, violent revolutionary strategy. A scale of five was used so participants can choose from two low-risk, one middle risk, and two high-risk revolutionary activity options to ease the evaluation of each gender's choosing of a low-risk or high-risk revolutionary strategy.

The first two hypotheticals address the individuals as participants in the revolution. The first hypothetical given states:

“You are an individual living under a repressive regime. There is rapid unemployment and poor economic prospects. You have limited freedom of speech, press, and association. You also have elections, but they are limited. You decide to join your peers and rebel against the regime in response to these grievances. You now have to decide how to rebel.”

The second hypothetical states:

“The regime is still not responsive to your revolutionary choice after some time. You have to decide whether to stick to the same revolutionary strategy you have been using or to change. Do you stick to the same strategy or do you change?”

The response choices for these two hypotheticals dealing with revolutionary participants gave five options for revolutionary activity (ordered from lowest-risk and pacifistic to highest-risk and violent):

- Vote against leaders in the regime,
- Make a rebellious post on social media,
- Go on strike,
- Join a (potentially violent) protest or rally, or
- Enact violence against a regime leader.

The scale of low-risk to high-risk revolutionary activity was based on the anonymity, and thus safety, given to the individual in each situation as well as the participatory effort required of each activity. Voting may not be completely anonymous, but, for most regime-type societies, it will not change the status quo of the election system significantly, so there is more anonymity afforded in that type of counter-activity than in writing a social media post. Writing a post typically entails that the individual loses their anonymity if it is posted from their account and requires more effort than checking a box. In a nation where free speech is restricted, the possible monitoring or questioning resulting from this social media post seems to be higher risk than voting. Going on strike constituted a mid-risk activity because there is even less anonymity than the social media post and there are greater repercussions from the employer of the individual as well as a possible state response to such inaction. The higher risk revolutionary activities include

joining a potentially violent protest or rally. The highest risk revolutionary activity is enacting violence against a regime leader.

The third hypothetical addressed the individual's revolutionary strategy as the leader rather than the participant of the revolution. This hypothetical states:


“You are the leader of a revolutionary party. You need to decide how to organize the revolutionary participants and show the regime that you want change effectively. Which events do you choose to organize?”

There are five response choices in this hypothetical that mirrored the response options for the participation hypotheticals. They are worded slightly differently to account for the fact that the respondent is now in a leadership, not participant, position. Ordered from low-risk and pacifistic activity to higher-risk and violent activity, they are:

- Make a voting campaign against the regime,
- Create a social media group for revolutionaries,
- Encourage a nationwide strike,
- Organize a (potentially violent) protest and rally, or
- Organize a violent attack against a regime leader.

The individuals in the sample assign a numerical value based on their likelihood of participation or leadership of each revolutionary activity. *T*-tests were then conducted on their likelihood of using each revolutionary option in each revolutionary hypothetical by gender. This statistical test revealed the average rating of likelihood for men and women per each revolutionary activity in each situation. Analyzing the means of each gender determines the likelihood of each gender's use of each of the revolutionary strategies. This is helpful in evaluating how each gender on average ranks each activity.

When respondents assign a number to a revolutionary option, the responses of all the respondents are averaged. Since lower numbers indicate a higher likelihood of participation or use in a leadership position, and higher numbers indicate a lower likelihood, lower means will indicate a higher likelihood while higher means will indicate a lower likelihood of use.



Thus, the lower the mean for the gender, the more likely that gender is, as a whole, willing to use that revolutionary activity. Inversely, the higher the mean, the less likely the gender is willing to use the specified revolutionary activity.

Table 1: Participation in Revolution I

	Men	Women	T-Score	P-Value
Vote	3.0294	2.5652	1.7004	0.0933*
Post	3.3823	3.5000	0.4549	0.6506
Strike	2.9412	3.1522	0.7631	0.4479
Protest	1.9706	1.9565	.0418	0.9667
Violence	3.8823	4.5869	2.2318	0.0302**

p-Value < 0.10*, p-value < 0.05**

To reiterate, the *Participation in Revolution I* hypothetical asked individuals to rank the likelihood of revolutionary action based on their potential participation in each activity. Men, on

average, were most likely to indicate that they would participate by: protesting, going on strike, voting against the regime, posting on social media, and enacting violence against a regime leader. Women in contrast indicate they would most likely participate by: protesting, voting against the regime, going on strike, posting on social media, and enacting violence against a regime leader. This shows that both genders are least willing to use violence against the regime leaders, but female willingness to do so was lower than men's. Women as a whole ranked violence against regime leaders at 4.5869 whereas men as a whole only ranked it a 3.8823. This figure is also statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. This suggests that although each gender is less willing to use violence, men are quicker and more willing to use it on average than women. This supports the hypothesis that men are more likely to use violent and higher-risk revolutionary activity whereas women are more likely to use low-risk and pacifistic revolutionary activity as there is a difference in means between the genders in their choice of activity. It is also important to note that men and women were both most likely to engage in a potentially violent protest. This result may have occurred because of the potential for violence, not the definite use of it like enacting violence against the regime implies. This suggests that women are as likely as men to engage in potentially risky behavior, but if the risk is imminent then women are more averse to it than men are. These results do not mean that women are unwilling to participate in violent behavior; it means that men are more willing than women to participate in such behavior. The results demonstrate the difference of means between men and women in more peaceful versus more risky revolutionary action.

It is important to discuss that the only statistically significant results of this hypothetical are the strategy of violence against the regime. This presents an issue to the level of confidence we can instill in the rest of these results. While the statistical insignificance of these results

between the two gender's means are important to consider, these results give us insight into how men and women may decide to participate in revolutionary situations. In any case, the results of the other four revolutionary options may not be significant, but they are suggestive. Additionally, the only result that is essential to testing the first hypothesis is the difference of likelihood between genders on their willingness to be violent. Since this result is significant, the hypothesis is tested against this result with confidence.

Table 2: Participation in Revolution II

	Men	Women	T-Score	P-Value
Vote	2.3667	2.1304	0.7989	0.4274
Post	2.9667	2.8478	0.3689	0.7134
Strike	3.3333	3.1521	0.6355	0.5275
Protest	2.7333	2.3696	1.0804	0.2844
Violence	3.8667	4.4565	1.7687	0.0834*

p-Value < 0.10*, p-value < 0.05**

The *Participation in Revolution II* hypothetical presented the individual with the situation that the regime is still unresponsive to their cause. Participants either use the same strategy or use a new one to see if this would change male or female willingness to participate in riskier revolutionary behavior. Men indicate that they were most willing to: vote against the regime, engage in protest, post on social media, go on strike, and finally, enact violence against a regime leader. Women indicate the same order of likelihood as men. It is valuable to discuss why both genders previously indicated their greatest likelihood of participation was engaging in protest while in this hypothetical both genders indicated it switched to voting. This means that men and women shifted from employing possibly violent means of revolutionary behavior to a nonviolent

form. This may be because if the regime was unresponsive to previous demonstrations or tactics, the best way to change the unresponsiveness of the regime would be to change the regime itself.

In order to evaluate the first hypothesis, each gender's willingness to use violence as revolutionary participants must be compared. Both genders were more likely to use violence against the regime last even when the regime was unresponsive. Although the rankings stayed the same, the means changed for each gender's likelihood to use violence. Men and women were more likely to indicate their willingness to participate in violence in this situation than they were in the first hypothetical. In this hypothetical, women ranked using violence against the regime as 4.4565 compared to 4.5869 in the first hypothetical. Similarly, men ranked using violence as 3.8667 compared to 3.8823. Although these differences are small, they do suggest that both genders are more willing to use violence when regimes are unresponsive. Additionally, these results are significant at the 90% confidence level.

Again, the statistical significance of the second hypothetical did not meet standards of great confidence for this statistical test. However, it yields results to think over about gendered differences of behavior. The results from the second hypothetical challenge are consistent with the first hypothesis as well. Women and men are both willing to participate in more extreme revolutionary actions when their first chosen revolutionary strategy is not effective. However, men still indicate an increased willingness to participate in violence the second time around compared to women, as demonstrated by the difference of means between the two genders.

Table 3: Leadership in Revolution

	Men	Women	T-Score	P-Value
Vote	2.4444	2.2955	0.5692	0.5712
Post	3.2962	3.5618	0.9605	0.3417

Strike	2.6296	2.4773	0.44892	0.6553
Protest	2.3704	2.0455	0.9874	0.3283
Violence	4.1481	4.7045	1.7945	0.0813*

p-Value < 0.10*, p-value < 0.05**

The *Leadership in Revolution* hypothetical tests which revolutionary activity the individual would choose to organize in a leadership position. Men were most likely to indicate willingness to: organize a potentially violent protest, make a voting campaign against the regime, organize a nationwide strike, create an anti-regime social media group, and finally engage in direct violence against a regime leader. Women indicate the same order of likelihood as men.

These results do not support the second hypothesis. Although men and women have a difference in their willingness to lead a violent revolutionary strategy, where men express more of a willingness to lead a riskier behavior, they both rank the violent revolutionary strategies of attack against a regime leader as last. The hypothesis states that the women would be more likely to be violent in a leadership position because they would feel like they needed to emulate masculine roles in their leadership positions to be successful revolutionaries. Women may employ violence since they would not be expected to exhibit pacifistic behavior. Interestingly, women were less likely to use violence when they were in leadership positions than when they were participants in the revolution. In this *Leadership* hypothetical, the average ranking of women using violence against the regime was 4.7045 whereas as participants women ranked their likelihood of using violence as 4.5869. This lower mean in the *Participation* hypothetical indicates they had a higher likelihood of using violence as participants than the higher mean indicating a lower likelihood of violence as leaders.

Additionally, this same pattern happened for men. Men report that they were less likely to use violence as leaders than they were as participants in the revolution. This means that men feel

they are less inclined to operate in to a tradition of violence that may be associated with their gender when they are in leadership positions. This may be the case for a few reasons -- individuals in this experiment may not have thought that violence was the most effective revolutionary strategy, or they thought the potential risk and cost was too high. They may also have thought that they wanted to try other avenues of rebellion first before resorting to violence. Regardless, this result varied from this expectation and should be given further analysis.

Like the *Participation* hypotheticals, the results from this situation did not have statistically significant scores besides the “Violence Against the Regime” result. As such it is not with great confidence that we can accept these conclusions. It is thus important to look out at external evidence for examples of differences in approach to revolutionary strategy between women. This experiment demonstrates that there is a difference between genders in their willingness to participate and lead revolutions according to either pacifistic or more violent strategy.

Experimental Limitations

As with any experiment, there were limitations. The insignificance of many of the experiment results makes it hard to accept with confidence that there truly is a difference in the way men and women approach revolutions either as participants or leaders. To minimize this limitation, the two hypotheses were tested around the “Violence Against the Regime” answers, which produced significant results. However, it would have been better to have all the results be significant to not only test the violent responses of the revolutionaries, but the likelihood that men and women would choose the pacifistic strategies as well.

Further there may be contestable elements of the research design. The scale that stipulates voting and social media as a peaceful, civilly disobedient behavior whereas participating in a

strike is mid-risk behavior could be argued differently. This decision in measurement of what constitutes low-risk or high-risk behavior may vary among the individual in the experiment or even among those trying to replicate the experiment. However, an argument can be made that the measurement scale of pacifistic to violent behavior is justified in this experiment.

The individuals were not tested on how they would react in a same-gender or mixed-gender situation. The hypothetical's inclusion of a description about being in a same-gender or mixed-gender revolutionary group may have triggered the individual to start thinking about gender and how they would operate in these situations without giving an honest answer. Testing the mixed-gender situation is more effective in a case study. To see if there truly is a gap in revolutionary tactics between genders, we must look at real world cases of women in revolutions.

Case Study: Egypt

Although this experiment is useful for determining the internal validity of how gender works in revolutionary settings, it is important to discuss external examples where women have participated in and lead revolutions. The theory of this study is challenged by this case study of Egyptian women during the 2011 Arab Uprising and the Egyptian Muslim Sisterhood during this time. The theory says that women are hesitant to show anger because acting as such may cause women to lose legitimacy within their gender and therefore their clout as a political actor or leader. However, this case suggests that women are not necessarily hesitant to show anger in itself -- they are hesitant to betray societal expectations of gendered political behavior, whatever that may be.

One recent prominent case where women participated and had leadership roles in a revolution is the Egyptian uprising in 2010 and 2011 where unprecedented amounts of men and women took to the streets in protest. It is useful to look at Egyptian women's participation in the

revolution as well as the specific participation of one female group -- the Muslim Sisterhood. Egypt has a considerable amount of women that participated in its revolutionary history. The evidence from this case study is more generalizable than anecdotal compared to other areas of the Middle East, which will be better for a broader analysis of female revolutionary behavior. Additionally, there is considerable literature and primary sources about how women have behaved in Egyptian revolts to provide stronger evidence to test the hypotheses.

It is valuable to explore the differences in perception of Egyptian women in the 1919 Revolution compared to the 2011 Revolution. Women played a central role in the public sphere in the 1920s and were highly visible in public. Similarly, this occurred again in 2011. Following the 1919 Revolution, women's movements expanded into independent, visible, active organizations. Female participation in the 2011 Revolution has shown various ways women have become visible and participated in performative acts such as protests or social media posts. Egyptian women seemed to see themselves as agents in the public space using this visual public sphere to participate. In fact, the visibility of women in the 2011 Revolution can be traced to the initial visibility of women in the 1919 Revolution¹⁰. However, the outcome of the 1919 Revolution had implications for the roles of women in a nation. Nasser and the Free Officers saw women as a way to bring to pass their vision of nation building. Thus, contestations over the role of women appeared in subsequent revolutions "between the state and opposition forces, and framed around furthering political objectives in an attempt to monopolise the meaning of Egyptian motherhood"¹¹. Thus, concepts of gender have been intertwined into revolutionary thought following the 1919 Revolution and were a part of the 1952 Revolution.

In the 2011 Revolution, gender was invoked to mobilize certain behaviors. Asmaa Mahfouz, a leading revolutionary figure in the 6th of April group, made a speech emasculating

men who would not join her in protest against Mubarak¹². She challenged ideas of what Egyptian behavior means for a woman. Not only did she create a new set of expectations of behavior for herself as a female leader, but she also solidified expectations of revolutionary behavior for men. Mahfouz then called for men to come down and protect other women in the protests. This suggests that Mahfouz's revolutionary behavior as a leader encourages women to participate in potentially violent situations and encourages men to also participate by challenging their masculinity. For her, there is little risk of the breaking social gender norms, because exploiting assumptions of gender increases the amount of revolutionary participation. Mahfouz's new image and space for women in Tahrir Square meant that they could act more "masculine" and be more aggressive in their revolutionary tactics and also encouraged men to stay true to their stereotyped revolutionary tactics.

Women in the Tahrir Square protests would willingly go to the front of the lines during attacks against the police so that the press would get photographs and video of the police attacking women. Women exploited their own gender stereotypes of frailness to rebel against the regime, and "delegitimise [Mubarak's state] as thugs"¹³ for hurting "frail" women. For these female participants, there was no risk in breaking gender norms; they played into them, and it benefitted the revolutionary cause. Women may be more willing to participate in violent behavior when it means they do not also have the added risk of breaking outside societal norms of gendered behavior. Further, women appropriating the virtue of their femaleness to fight back against the regime in the same way Nasser and Mubarak appropriated Egyptian womanhood to uphold their own political agendas demonstrates a different kind of female revolutionary behavior than previously seen. Women become political actors willing to engage in potentially violent behavior because their femininity will make the violence enacted against them have

amplified shock factor for the viewer. This suggests that women may be willing to participate in riskier violent behavior.

The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 also has interesting implications for mixed-gender revolutions. Interviews with male participants in the Revolution showed that female participation in the event shifted their perceptions of women. One man stated that in Tahrir Square, he saw that women were “just as capable and courageous as men”, and that he rethought what he learned about the roles and behavior of women¹⁴. It appears that in this mixed-gender situation, women participated in the same risky ways as men and that this improved gender relations between the two. Women participated more aggressively within this Revolution by not only participating in potentially violent protest, but when violence did break out, they willingly moved towards it. However, their means to accomplish this aggression were different. They participated knowing that the optics of aggression by the state against female citizens would hurt the state’s credibility. By playing into stereotypical norms of female fragility, female participants can effectively become aggressors toward the state without breaking social norms.

Female revolutionary leaders like Mahfouz were more willing to lead riskier violent events like protests and challenge the masculinity of male participants and male leaders of the Revolution. Within the broader Egyptian Revolution of 2011, it appears that the first hypothesis about women typically avoiding participation in violence seems to be untrue. Men and women both participated in risky revolutionary behavior although for different reasons. However, the second hypothesis about women feeling that they can organize more risky, violent events when they are in leadership positions seemed to be upheld by the case of Mahfouz and her role. The results of this case study of female participation and leadership provide possibly inconsistent evidence to what the experimental results found. In the experiment, there was a gendered

difference in revolutionary strategy, but this case study implies that there was no significant difference in the revolutionary strategy each gender used. Both participated in more risky, aggressive activities or prompted more aggressive action in others. However, there was a gendered difference in the means of which they employed the activity. Female leaders capitalize on social gender norms by inciting women participants capitalize on social gender norms as an act of (sometimes passive) aggression. This case study reveals the female willingness to comply with gender norms around political behavior in an effort to avoid social repercussions for acting outside the prescribed and appropriate way. Acting as such would mean threatening not only the social order but also the success of the revolution as gender plays a role in the level of revolutionary activity as well as inciting others to participate.

Additionally, the experiment showed that women were not likely to organize potentially violent events when they were in leadership positions, whereas this case shows that women were likely to do so. This discrepancy may be explained by the insignificance of the experiment's results. Another female-dominated revolutionary group should be examined to determine support for these hypotheses.

Case Study: Muslim Sisterhood

Now that the role of women and their actions within the Egyptian Revolution is established, it would be valuable to focus on the growth of women within revolutionary groups like the Muslim Sisterhood. This group has been both in mixed-gender and same-gender situations. The various gender dynamic situations allow for the testing of the hypotheses in conditions where gender is and is not a factor within in-group interactions. Thus, possibly gendered political behavior can be analyzed as a function of social norms and perceptions

stemming from the outside gender's gaze or from inherent social norms about gender from within one's own gender group.

The Muslim Brotherhood has faced pushback from President al-Sisi that resulted in the branding of their group a terrorist organization and the jailing of the prominent leaders and many followers of the movement. This has pushed the leaders of the movement to give more power to members they typically would not have -- namely the Muslim Sisterhood, the female branch of the movement¹⁵. The Muslim Sisterhood grew independently from the Brotherhood after they refused membership to these women because of their gender. When the Brotherhood needed them, they became the leaders of the movement for some time. The Sisterhood receives assignments from the Brotherhood while they are incarcerated. In the Muslim Sisterhood, female roles are situated to benefit their families and communities and not to be in political affairs. Women have been excluded from the highest leadership rankings within the Brotherhood. Scholars believe that their participation and leadership within the Brotherhood has been primarily "objects of male activism rather than active political agents in their own right"¹⁶. The Sisterhood is recognized by the Brotherhood but is not allowed a formal space within the movement. They do not have the same opportunity to lead their organization as they report back to the head of the Brotherhood. However, they do lead and participate in street demonstrations, anti-regime alliances, and coordinate financial resources. They still have their women-only movements to mobilize women and youth and organize women-only marches as well. The Sisters are also heavy bloggers. They rely heavily on "cyber dissent" in the blogosphere to turn attention to Islamist issues¹⁷.

The Sisterhood is limited to these participatory methods because the Brotherhood's perception of them and their role in the organization has been very conservative. Regardless of

the men's presence or not, the perception of appropriate female political behavior prescribes their revolutionary activities. This perception of women's roles restricts how the Sisterhood can participate in the revolutionary movement. The leadership limited their activism because they did not want to expose the Sisters to state repression¹⁸. The Brotherhood has, however, encouraged greater Sisterhood participation by supporting some Sisters to run for office on behalf of the Brotherhood's political party. In the capacities that women are able to work in, they participate in constrained ways.

It appears that in this mixed-gender movement, and even in a same-gender situation, those women's participation and leadership choices are constrained by the gender specifications imposed on them by the male leaders and participants of this Islamist movement. Women participate in lower risk revolutionary activity while men are given higher risk opportunities for participation and leadership. Even when the Sisters participate in revolutionary events with other members of the Sisterhood, the women participate in this same-gender movement the same way they would in a mixed-gender movement. This is because they are expected to demonstrate their political opinion in a prescribed way of non-risky behavior. The Sisterhood's behavior differs from the women in the greater Egyptian Revolution because in this revolutionary situation women and men were able to participate in the same revolutionary strategy and lead in the same way. This suggests that the ideological or societal expectations of how each gender is to behave influences their participation and leadership style. These expectations, like the ones imposed by Mahfouz about an expectation for both genders to participate in risky political behavior, seem to dictate behavior in revolutions. These case studies suggest that gendered behavior in revolutions is dictated by the gendered expectations of the society or the tone of the revolution toward male and female participation.

Determining revolutionary differences by gender

Through the exploration of a potential difference between genders in their expression of rebellious political behavior, either in participation or leadership positions, there are conflicting results. The experiment which tested the revolutionary tactic men and women would use either as participants or as leaders showed that there was a difference between genders in revolutionary strategy each gender would make. Men are more likely to use violent tactics compared to women as participants in revolutions. This is consistent with the first hypothesis. However, the experiment showed that women and men both ranked violent options last when they were put in authority positions within a revolutionary movement. There was a difference of means between the two, suggesting there was still a difference in willingness to employ violent strategy; however, each group was less willing to use this type of strategy. This did not correlate with the hypothesis that women would be just as likely as men to use violent tactics.

It is interesting that men were more willing to use violence as participants rather than leaders of a revolution. This did not seem to align with traditional assumptions about how men would act in power, given that they have masculine standards to live up to in conflict situations. This result suggests that maybe men are not prone to using aggressive leadership styles compared to other civilly disobedient options, and that the interaction between gender and leadership style does not determine if they use violence or not. Instead, it is the weighing of the more peaceful and more aggressive choices that matters in the context of the revolutionary situation.

Although many factors were controlled for in the t -test (age, religion, education) by choosing a homogeneous sample, the high p -values indicate that there may be another omitted variable that would better explain the choice on revolutionary strategy. Future research should

include more demographic questions in the analysis to see if there is another factor which has a greater effect on civilly disobedient revolutionary behavior versus aggressive revolutionary behavior. A variable that may be of interest in a future experiment would be a revolutionary variable that determines societal expectations for each gender within the revolution. This way the researcher can test if the societal expectations for each gender's behavior are predictive of the behavior rather than just the gender itself.

The statistical insignificance of the majority of the results means that although the results are interesting, we should not place our confidence in them as much as the case studies of the Egyptian Revolution and Muslim Sisterhood. The exception to this would be the results regarding the impact of being male or female on violent revolutionary tactics. Both the *Participation* and *Leadership* hypothetical results were significant for men and women choosing to enact violence against a regime, at least at a 90% confidence level. The hypotheses were tested against this significant result. The evidence supports the first hypothesis and the second hypothesis is unsupported by the evidence.

The case study of the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 and the Muslim Sisterhood's activity within that period showed something different. Women within the Revolution used the same predominant revolutionary tactic as men -- protest. Protest within this Revolution also often turned violent, demonstrating that women were just as likely and willing to participate in violent revolutionary strategy. Although men and women joined the protest for different reasons, either to use their gender to humiliate the regime as women did or to prevent their own humiliation and emasculation as men did, they both came together to use the same tactic. This challenges the results of the experiment. The leadership strategy of women in the Revolution also contradicted the results of the experiment. Prominent female leader Asmaa Mahfouz encouraged women to

participate in protests that turned violent. However, these conditions did not hold the same among the Muslim Sisterhood. Their participation was limited by the gendered constraints the Brotherhood imposed on their activity. The Sisters were limited to more passive forms of revolutionary participation. Additionally, they were given virtually no outlets for leadership during this time.

In either of these cases, it seems that the gendered expectations of men and women concerning their political expressions dictates the type of revolutionary strategy they choose to participate in. This suggests that there is no specific “gendered” way that women will act; women will not inherently choose more peaceful ways and men will not inherently choose more aggressive ways. Rather, if gendered differences exist or if they do not, this is dependent on how revolutionary leaders choose to socialize the participants to fulfill the needs of the movement. For example, the Egyptian Revolution needed to mobilize greater numbers of people so leaders like Mahfouz challenged traditional concepts of masculinity to mobilize men, and also reframed female participation in a (violent) protest as a socially acceptable behavior. These examples show that gender differences in participation and leadership can exist, and that they are fluid because they are influenced by the culture of the nation and agenda of the revolutionary movement.

The implications of this study suggest that the framing of gendered behavior in a revolution would affect how men and women act. If women would be less likely to invoke violence and more cooperative in finding a solution to the conflict, this would affect conflict resolution during revolutionary situations. If the framing of female behavior permits aggression in conflict, and women are more likely to invoke violence in a situation, this may increase the aggression of women in revolutionary situations. Women may exploit the gendered stereotypes

of perceived pacifism to get into positions to further the revolutionary cause that men have a harder time getting toward, like how female terrorists are able to cause more damage because people do not assume they can be violent. This information would be helpful for both the state trying to quell revolutionary fervor as well as national security advisors who are wondering which demographic groups may be more aggressive than others. This insight that women can and will act just as aggressively as men, if given permission by the revolutionary movement, changes the way that security officials need to view female revolutionary participants: everyone can invoke aggressive tactics and there are no assumptions to be made about gender in these situations.

These results also affect how we understand gender dynamics in revolutionary situations. Women are increasingly becoming more involved in revolutionary movements and are playing a larger role. If women are given an opportunity to demonstrate their courage and ability to be equal participants in a broader social movement, this may have great social implications and be a good opportunity to improve gender relations between the populations. Especially if the revolution is successful, the bond and new perspective that each gender has for each other will be helpful in establishing a better foundation for the status quo of the new nation.

The greatest ramifications of these research findings are that gendered differences in revolutionary behavior are the result of societal and in-group framing of behavioral expectations for each gender. The fluidity and variance between different choices in revolutionary strategy can be explained by the different expectations of each revolutionary movement. This research shows that one can decipher how a woman or man will act based on how the culture wants the individual to. If this is the case, security officials will be able to decide which gender may be more prone to aggression or civil disobedience in a revolutionary situation. Future research

should replicate the aforementioned experiment but should also include variables about the culture in which each gender operates, because this may have more influence on the choice of more passive or aggressive revolutionary tactic rather than the inherent nature of the specified gender itself.

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¹⁴ *Ibid.* 205.

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