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Becoming Modern or Problematicizing Modernity?

Criticizing Colonialism and Contemporary Society in Hadith 'Isa ibn Hisham and Meursault, Contre-Enquête

Abstract: In this paper, I examine the way that two Arab authors, Muhammad al-Muwaylihi and Kamel Daoud, approach the challenges posed by modernity. I argue that though they wrote at different times, their approaches to the challenges of modernity are similar insofar as both authors seek to simultaneously criticize foreign influences and level criticisms against some traditional elements of their own societies. In *Hadith 'Isa ibn Hisham* (What 'Isa ibn Hisham Told Us), al-Muwaylihi criticizes the ethnocentrism of Western colonialism, manifest in the way Europeans tended to devalue elements of traditional Islamic culture which al-Muwaylihi viewed as beneficial. In *Meursault, contre-enquête* (The Meursault Investigation), Daoud criticizes the violence of French colonialism while simultaneously criticizing what he perceives as the excesses of the influence of Islamism in postcolonial Algerian society. Because both authors undo the dichotomous paradigms which were prevalent at the time of writing, they create the possibility for an alternative interpretation of reality that does not fit neatly into the modern or the postmodern theoretical lenses. I argue that examining these approaches to modernity through the theoretical lens of Bruno Latour's amodernism allows new insights into the differences between European and Arab approaches to modernity. While European approaches to modernity have often emphasized the complete division of nature and society, science and culture, some Arab approaches have rejected this dichotomous characterization.

Although writing at very different times, Arab authors Muhammad al-Muwaylihi (1858–1930) and Kamel Daoud (b. 1970) both approach the challenges posed by modernity in similar ways. Both authors seek to simultaneously criticize foreign influences and level criticisms against some traditional elements of their own societies. I argue that by rejecting both European notions of modernity and some of the practices of traditional Arab society, these authors are essentially presenting a different understanding of modernity, one which rejects what some theorists have characterized as the modern dichotomy between East and West, nature and society, object and subject (Latour 1990, 1993; Mitchell 2000).

In what follows, I briefly introduce both *Hadith 'Isa ibn Hisham* and *Meursault, Contre-Enquête*, as well as their authors. I then describe the theoretical approach to modernity through which I wish to examine these two texts. I describe and analyze the ways

in which each text is critical of its own society and is anti-colonial, exploring how the authors reject the dichotomy traditionally associated with modernity in order to create a reality of their own. I conclude with a comparative analysis of the texts and a discussion of implications for future approaches to Arab literature.

Al-Muwaylihi's *Hadith 'Isa ibn Hisham*

*Hadith 'Isa ibn Hisham*¹ is a collection of serials, that Muhammad al-Muwaylihi (1858–1930) wrote and published in *Misbah al-Sharq* (Light of the East), his weekly gazette (Golia 2018). These stories star two recurring characters, 'Isa ibn Hisham, a young writer living in Cairo, and the Pasha, a long dead member of Egypt's traditional elite who once resurrected meets 'Isa and joins him in an exploration of British-occupied Khedivate Cairo. In each installment, these two characters encounter new situations, all of which seem to highlight the events and attitudes, both good and bad, of then-contemporary Egypt. Scholars identify the picaresque-like style in which *Hadith 'Isa ibn Hisham* wrote as drawing on the Arabic maqama genre, popular in classical Arab literature (Mondal 1997; Seyfi and Heshmati 2015).

Al-Muwaylihi's mixing of classical Arabic literary style with contemporary issues is typical of the kind of reconciliation of old and new, East and West, that many writers were attempting during the period known as al-Nahda (the reawakening or the renaissance). This period was characterized by a group of elite Arab intellectuals who wrote prose and poetry, fiction and philosophy, seeking to expand the cultural and intellectual sights of the Arab world based on encounters with European modernity (El-Ariss 2018). It is within this quest for cultural and intellectual development that al-Muwaylihi produced *Hadith 'Isa ibn Hisham*, as evidenced by the text's efforts to improve traditional society and reject Western imperialism.

Daoud's *Meursault, Contre-Enquête*

Kamel Daoud's 2013 novel *Meursault, Contre-Enquête* offers a retelling of the story of the murdered Arab in Albert Camus' *l'Étranger* (1942). In *l'Étranger* the principal character Meursault

1 Citations and quotations from *Hadith 'Isa ibn Hisham* included in this paper are taken from the 2018 edition of Roger Allen's English translation.

kills an anonymous Arab on the beach of Algiers. Through the ordeal of his trial Meursault comes to accept the absurdity of life and his duty to create his own meaning, thus becoming the hero of this existentialist novel. *Meursault, Contre-Enquête* is told from the perspective of Haroun, the younger brother of Meursault's victim, who (Haroun tells the reader) was called Moussa. Daoud's novel recounts Haroun's and his mother's search for meaning following his brother's death, allowing for a retelling of Camus' story, this time with Arab voices reasserted.

Through Haroun, Daoud offers an obvious critique of French colonialism and its violent consequences. However, Daoud also uses Haroun to voice criticism of the present state of affairs in Algeria, with criticism of the Islamist takeover of Algerian life featured prominently. His criticism of the influence of Islam in Algeria led a Salafi imam to release a "Facebook fatwa" calling for Daoud's execution for heresy (Cocquet 2014). This imam cited Daoud's public doubting of the Qur'an and Islam as justification for the fatwa. Interestingly, the imam also accused Daoud of "singing the praises of the West" (Cocquet 2014), despite Daoud's obvious criticism of the French in his novel. Additionally, while deriding the fatwa the Algerian minister of religious affairs also criticized Daoud for "being exploited by an international Zionist lobby hostile to Islam and Algeria" in an apparent reference to the widespread support Daoud received from French artists and intellectuals (Carvajal 2015). The resistance Daoud encountered from both the state and conservative religious figures highlights the saliency of Daoud's critique of his own society, in addition to colonialism.

Theoretical Approach

Hadith 'Isa ibn Hisham and *Meursault, Contre-Enquête* allow their authors to critique both Western colonialism and their own societies. I argue that this dual critique in response to the challenges of so-called modern life can best be understood by examining the texts through the lens of non-dichotomous theories of modernity. Various notable theorists, including Habermas, Marx, and Weber, have presented modernity as an ideology that is inherently linear and dichotomous. Conversely, Mitchell (2000) argues that Modernism is obsessed with a dichotomy between East and West

which has never really existed, and Stoler (1995) illustrates how even so-called postmodern thinkers such as Foucault assumed this dichotomy by ignoring the role of colonialism in influencing the formulations of power and subjectivities. Spivak (1988) similarly condemns post-modernism's "sanctioned ignorance" regarding the East-West dichotomy inherent in its approach.

Latour (1990; 1993) similarly argues that the ideology of modernity is defined by the dichotomous separation of nature and society, object and subject, scientific and transcendent. He further argues that this dichotomy has never existed and that therefore, modernity has never truly existed either. Latour argues that postmodernism is not the right word for his approach, since postmodernism is invested in maintaining the same dichotomies as modernity (1993, 58). Latour introduced the term Amodernism to describe his non-dichotomous approach to history.

When *Hadith 'Isa ibn Hisham* and *Meursault, Contre-Enquête* are viewed through the dichotomous lenses of Modernism or Postmodernism, their dual-critique of East and West seems controversial. The existence of theoretical dichotomization has led some scholars to focus on only the anti-colonial critique or only the anti-traditional interpretations of al-Muwaylihi's and Daoud's texts (c.f. Mondal 1997; Strand 2016). However, when approached from the vantage of Amodernism, these apparent contradictions fade, and the literary critic is better able to understand the arguments the authors are trying to make.

Criticism of Egyptian Society in *Hadith 'Isa ibn Hisham*

Al-Muwaylihi's *Hadith 'Isa ibn Hisham* is often characterized as a critique of life in Cairo under British rule (Allen 1970). The first part of the text is full of reprobation of traditional life in occupied Khedivate Egypt, as demonstrated through the Pasha's reactions to the changes he observes in Egyptian society and through 'Isa's explanations as he and the Pasha pass through Cairo together. Mondal (1997) argues that the Pasha constitutes a symbolic character, "a typical representation of the views of a traditional era" (Mondal 1997, 205). 'Isa describes the Pasha as "utterly baffled and bewildered," "unfamiliar with the present state of affairs," and "unaware that time had passed" and "things had changed" (34). Here, the Pasha serves as a metaphor for the old elite of Egypt who

cling to the past rather than embrace change and development. Al-Muwaylihi is clearly critical of traditional Egyptian life and favors at least some of the transitions taking place in society. While the Pasha is constantly shocked and incensed by the changes he discovers, 'Isa often lauds the same developments. The Pasha's abhorrence for the new coupled with his blatant incompetence, when compared with 'Isa's able navigation of Egyptian society, shows that one of al-Muwaylihi's primary goals in the text is to criticize traditional Egypt.

This goal of criticism is abundantly clear in 'Isa's criticism of the negative effects of tradition that he views as inhibiting progress in Egypt. He laments that Egyptians are "in the grip of conservative tradition," which he says makes "ambitious ideas falter" (49). Additionally, 'Isa's critique of the traditional religious establishment is scathing. He claims that the ulama's "greatest aspiration and goal is to obscure the clear truth and complicate our liberal faith" and suggests that "the laws of time demand...the Shariah be adjusted" (48). However, 'Isa's critique is not a blanket condemnation of Islam or of religion in general. Indeed, he qualifies his criticism by saying that the Shariah "lasts forever" but that "it is a treasure ignored by its own folk" (48). In this light, it is clear that al-Muwaylihi is not trying to criticize his religion. Rather, he is criticizing the way that the traditional Ulama have stagnated Islam to the point of obscuring much of its potential for positive influence in society. In this way, al-Muwaylihi's criticism reflects the ideas, commonly referred to as Islamic Modernism, which were a common feature of Nahda-era Arabic literature.

Islamic Modernism, as characterized by thinkers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhamad Abduh, emphasized the Qur'an and the Sunnah's ability to reform Islam, reconciling Islamic systems with modern developments, especially science and technology (Oxford Dictionary of Islam 2021). Al-Muwaylihi's advocating (through 'Isa) for a reformed, rational approach to Islam in order to meet the challenges of contemporary life typifies the arguments of Islamic Modernism. This should come as little surprise, as al-Muwaylihi and his father were both associates of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, two of the most prominent thinkers in the Islamic Modernist movement. Indeed, while living in Paris al-Muwaylihi assisted these two men with the publication of their journal *al-Urwah al-Wuthqa* (The Firmest

Bond), through which they disseminated their revolutionary ideas (Allen 2018, xvi). Throughout *Hadith 'Isa ibn Hisham*, al-Muwaylihi continues to argue for Islamic Modernism, as he critiques some traditions of his own society while praising the potential of Islam to meet contemporary challenges.

Al-Muwaylihi also demonstrates his Islamic modernist tendencies through his criticism of the excesses of Westernization in Egyptian society. Soon after meeting the Pasha, 'Isa witnesses an altercation between his new friend and a donkeyman, who both feel slighted due to the disrespect they have shown each other (26–29). While the Pasha is disrespectful because of traditional biases of status, modernity has apparently done nothing to instill a value of respect in the donkeyman, either. Thus, no one in contemporary Egypt respects their fellows. Here, al-Muwaylihi may be pointing out that along with traditional society, contemporary Egyptian society has entered “the folds of decay” (27) through lack of mutual respect despite supposed progress.

Later, 'Isa and the Pasha encounter more of what al-Muwaylihi portrays as the degradation of Egyptian society through their interactions with the police and the legal system. At the police station, the Pasha is accused of assaulting a policeman, when in reality he simply tripped and bumped into one (30). They witness additional signs of corruption in the way that the policemen are primarily concerned with catering to the desires of their superior, the precinct adjutant, rather than with justice (31–33). Moreover, 'Isa and the Pasha witness the corruption of the lawyer, the agent, and the judge, all of whom are more interested in their own financial gain than with justice or with helping others (39–47). These encounters with corruption demonstrate that al-Muwaylihi is troubled by the way that replacing the traditional Islamic judicial system with a Western model has removed the moral compass from Egyptian legal proceedings, leaving profit as the primary motivator. While al-Muwaylihi does not explicitly say that corruption is inherent to the European legal system, he does imply that abandoning traditional system has exposed society to moral ambiguity and decay. He is obviously uncomfortable with at least some of the consequences of Westernizing the justice system in Egypt.

This discomfort is emphasized even more when 'Isa explicitly laments the replacing of the Shariah with a European secular law code. He complains that “we [the Egyptians] are the ones who

subjected ourselves to their authority. We chose their legal code to replace the Shariah” (50). This statement contrasts the negative consequences of secular law ‘Isa and the Pasha had witnessed previously with the “noble Shariah” which “lasts forever” (48). This stance too represents one typical of Islamic modernists. According to al-Muwaylihi, simply becoming like the Europeans would lead to the corruption of society. Rather, Egyptian society needed to embrace its own heritage, including, and perhaps especially, Islam and the Shariah, which if correctly interpreted would allow Egypt to develop and gain strength without sacrificing its moral values.

Clearly, Muwaylihi is critical of the traditional elements of his own society, especially the way the religious establishment has obscured the purity of Islam and thus inhibited progress. He is also critical of the way Westernized modernization has failed to create a better society than the traditional one, as evidenced through a lack of mutual respect in interpersonal dealings, through corruption, and through the failings of the legal system to retain the spiritual relevancy and moral grounding of the Shariah. I argue that in this way al-Muwaylihi advocates maintaining Islam and embracing some modern progress while criticizing both traditionalist and Westernized modernist excesses, similar to the Islamic Modernism promoted by his contemporaries al-Afghani and Abduh. In arguing for a system that neither fully rejected tradition nor fully embraced Western conceptions of secular modernity, al-Muwaylihi and other Islamic Modernists of the Nahda period rejected the dichotomy of modernity, in which they ought to have fully embraced Egyptian tradition or Western secular systems of being. Instead, they seek a middle ground that is remarkably similar to non-dichotomous amodernism. This amodernism is further emphasized by the way al-Muwaylihi criticized Western colonialism.

Anti-Colonialism in *Hadith ‘Isa ibn Hisham*

Al-Muwaylihi’s anti-colonial message is most apparent in the latter half of *Hadith ‘Isa ibn Hisham*, when ‘Isa and the Pasha are travelling to the Exposition Universelle which took place in Paris in 1900. Here, they observe French society and at first idealize it as “the mother of perfect civilization, the haven of cultured urbanity, the site of refinement and grace, homeland of honor and glory” (393). In contrast to his and the Pasha’s encounter with

Cairo's corrupt judicial system, 'Isa lauds Paris as "the haven of peace and justice, the cradle of liberty and fairness" (393). He also praises European civilization for its generosity towards others. Thus, in the beginning stages of their trip European civilization receives nothing but praise, in a seeming endorsement of the total acceptance of the European paradigm essential to a dichotomous approach to modernity.

However, a friend with whom 'Isa and the Pasha are traveling, who may be al-Muwaylihi himself, quickly disabuses them of these romantic notions of Europe. He invites them to base their opinions "on actual observation and not on preliminary information that has become fixed in our minds" (395). The friend believes that most Egyptian visitors to Europe, be they students, tourists, diplomats, or Europe-obsessed reformers, approach Europe with heavy biases that cloud their understanding and lead them to always praise and never criticize (398–400). But he argues that his proposed ethnographic, observational approach will allow them to understand the good and the bad of European civilization "with complete accuracy" (397).

Implementing this observational approach, 'Isa, the Pasha, and the friend listen to a conversation between three Frenchmen at a restaurant. This conversation reveals to the visitors the hypocrisy of European civilization and the dangers of colonialism. Two of the Frenchmen argue in favor of colonialism, stating that Europeans ought to use their scientific knowledge and technological superiority "to civilize the peoples of the rest of the world" (402) and save them from "their primitive existence" (403). The Frenchmen propose that the best way to pursue this civilizing mission is to "take no prisoners" and to "do things that will make the Chinese [colonized Eastern peoples] shudder in fright" (403). They also refer to the colonized people as "weak, puny, yellow faced" (403). These insults and frightening proposals for violence are clearly meant to problematize romantic notions of colonialism, along with the dichotomous support for European modernity and abhorrence for Eastern ways of being which accompany those notions.

The response of the third Frenchman further elucidates al-Muwaylihi's non-dichotomous critique of colonialism. He states that French civilization is actually "a complete failure" because rather than securing peace and prosperity, it "kill[s] human beings, lay[s] waste to regions, and despoil[s] them of their wealth" (404).

Here, al-Muwaylihi is highlighting the greed and violence that are inherent to colonialism. He also points to the threats that colonialism poses to the positive parts of life in the colonized society, as the third Frenchman speaks of colonizing powers requiring all other societies to “destroy your statues, burn your books, change your clothing, eat different food, abolish your rituals, divorce your wives, remove the veils from your daughters’ faces, and abandon your crafts” (404–405). Through this metaphorical list of required actions, al-Muwaylihi demonstrates that colonialism leads to destroying the colonized societies’ heritage, learning, cultural dress, culinary traditions, religious practices, and family life, as well as threatening the sexual integrity of women and the economic livelihood of a country. The Frenchman goes on to say that it is correct to call European colonialism another crusade, which would have influenced al-Muwaylihi’s Muslim audience to further condemn colonialism.

The significance of these statements to the present discussion of amodernism is twofold. First, al-Muwaylihi establishes that European colonialism in practice is problematically violent, but he does so without criticizing the ideals of European modernity earlier praised by ‘Isa and the Pasha. Second, al-Muwaylihi implies that some traditional ways of life in colonized societies are worth preserving, such as certain culinary traditions and religious practices. Thus, al-Muwaylihi again establishes a non-dichotomous conception of modernity which accepts some parts of both Western and Eastern paradigms while remaining open to the criticism of other parts of those same systems of being. This nuanced approach is voiced by the third Frenchman when he says that Europe must “adopt a more balanced policy and put an end to this [colonial] greed and violence” (407). Rather than broadly condemning the entire Western paradigm, al-Muwaylihi seeks to avoid dichotomies in his search to explain the societal ideal. In this way, his text fits well into the theoretical approach of Latour’s amodernism.

Anti-Colonialism in *Meursault, Contre-Enquête*

Meursault, Contre-Enquête is an obviously anti-colonial text, most notably in the way it approaches the killing of Haroun’s brother Moussa. Haroun frequently criticizes the French presence in Algeria by conflating the murderer Meursault with all French

colonists. Upon being shown a photo of Meursault, he says that he and his mother saw the Frenchman as “the incarnation of all the colonists” (44). Later, Haroun demands to know what Meursault was doing on the beach where he killed Moussa, “not just that day, but for a long time! For more than a century to be frank” (73). Here, Haroun is really asking what the French have been doing in Algeria for so long, occupying the land and killing Algerians, just as Meursault killed Moussa.

The French occupation of Algeria began with the occupation of Algiers in 1830. The French invasion followed demands from actors in Algiers that the French government repay a debt owed to a prominent citizen of the city. In the 1790s an Algerian merchant had loaned a substantial amount of grain to the revolutionary government. Rather than repay the debt, the French sacked Algiers and carried off 43 million francs in gold. The French eventually expanded their military occupation and annexed the whole of Algeria, which was an official part of France until 1962. The beginning of the colonial period was marked by famine and disease and later years were marked by settler colonialism that left the native population marginalized, fostering the discontent that fueled the Algerian Revolution (McDougall 2017, 50–51, 80, 179–80). In the novel, Haroun often bemoans the hardships of Algerian life before independence. He discusses how as a child he often went hungry (39) and even stole food, just as the French stole the Algerian harvests (44). He speaks about his embarrassment when, attending school for the first time, he had no shoes and was conspicuously dressed in a tarboosh and Arab clothing (129). Haroun also talks about the suspicious glares he and his mother received from the colonists whenever they entered the French quarters of Algiers (54) and the conflicts and insults that frequently defined French-Arab interactions well before the revolution had begun (55). Haroun also speaks of the eager anticipation of independence and the appropriation of property (71). From these examples, it is clear that Haroun was deeply, negatively affected by the impoverished, marginalized nature of life during the colonial period, and even when he criticizes the present state of his country, Haroun is explicit that he is in no way “nostalgic for French Algeria” (41).

However, these obvious criticisms of French colonialism are peripheral to the trauma of Haroun’s lifelong confrontation with the death of his brother. Daoud’s novel is a new take on the murder

of l'arabe in Camus' l'Étranger. The nameless Arab turns out to be Haroun's brother Moussa, and the core of Haroun's anti-colonial critique, as noted by various scholars, is focused on his attempts to come to terms with the apparent absurdity and meaninglessness of Moussa's death (c.f. Brozgal 2016; Radhakrishnan 2017; Whistler 2018). Haroun approaches this struggle through his description of l'Étranger, through his exploration of Moussa's anonymity, and through his description of the feelings of guilt and responsibility that he carries following the murder.

The character Haroun has an interesting relationship with l'Étranger. While he recognizes it as a chef d'oeuvre, a work of genius (63), he also calls it "absurd! A poorly concealed lie" (63). Haroun's summary of Camus' book indicates the depth of his cynicism towards it.

A Frenchman kills an Arab laying on a deserted beach. It's two o'clock, it's the summer of 1942. Five shots followed by a trial. The killer is condemned to death for having badly buried his mother and for having talked about her with too much indifference. Technically, the murder is due to the sun or to pure idleness. Upon the demand of a pimp named Raymond who's angry with a whore, your hero writes a threatening letter, the story falls apart, and then seems to be resolved by a murder. The Arab is killed because the killer believes he wants to avenge the prostitute, or maybe because he insolently dared to take a nap (63).

Haroun's summary of l'Étranger emphasizes the way that Camus' novel diminishes the importance of the murder, as Meursault receives the death penalty for his lack of proper feeling toward his mother rather than for the murder of Moussa. There is clear sarcasm in the way Haroun's summary dismisses the murder of Moussa in the same way that Camus does. Haroun emphasizes that Camus' version doesn't care whatsoever for the Arab and is only focused on demonstrating the absurdity of Meursault being killed for his strangeness (65). Additionally, Haroun points out that in Camus' version of the murder "Moussa is an Arab that could be replaced by thousands of others of his kind" (58). Thus, Haroun's summary points to the way l'Étranger erases Moussa, and through him all Arabs, from the story.

The gravity of this erasure is further emphasized by Haroun's constant emphasis on Moussa's anonymity in l'Étranger. Haroun says that Camus included "everything but the essential: Moussa's

name!" (140). Haroun describes Camus' *l'Arabe* as having "neither name, nor face, nor speech" (63), "neither seen nor known, only killed" (56), and laments that his brother could have been famous, and thereby have had a meaningful death, "if only [Camus] had deigned to give him a name" (62). For Haroun, this erasure leads to a loss of meaning in his brother's life and death. He states that if named, Moussa's murder "would have posed a moral problem for [Meursault]" (62), and thus there would have been a reason for the murder. As it is, Haroun feels that his brother's murder was an absurd event through which he not only died, but "ceased to exist" (12).

The significance of the colonial erasure of Moussa and the resulting problem of meaninglessness is compounded by the guilt expressed by Haroun. Haroun says that he feels "responsible for a life that is not [his]," that he is a guardian of Moussa's body (44–5). He speaks elsewhere of carrying Moussa's corpse (52) of his desire to get rid of it (56). Thus, Haroun has taken on the meaninglessness of Moussa's death into his own life.

This meaninglessness is also amplified by the popularity of *l'Étranger*. Haroun describes Camus' novel as "a famous book that left this country and us without glory" (53). He laments that millions of readers admire Meursault for bravely confronting the absurd, rather than hate him for murdering Moussa (141). When Haroun tells the story of his first discovery that a book about his brother's murder was famous, he describes himself as a "poor native who never read and who had read nothing but suffered everything" (138). This clearly points to the epistemic violence (Spivak 1988) suffered by him and other native Algerians who had their stories (not) told by French colonials, who were free to ignore the experiences and identities of their subaltern subjects because those subjects were not involved in the creation or consumption of knowledge.

However, Meursault, *Contre Enquête* offers an anti-colonial course correction to the epistemic violence perpetrated by Camus. The solution to all of Haroun's problems is to tell his brother's story "to the entire world" (65). By telling his story, by naming Moussa, Haroun reasserts his brother into the story. He also turns the anonymity around by often referring to his brother's killer, not as Meursault, but as *un français* (c.f. 13) or as *ton héros* (c.f. 57), thus generalizing the murderer in the same impersonal way that *l'Étranger* generalizes the victim. This is clearly a radical act

of resistance to native erasure by the colonial regime. Through this resistance, Moussa's death regains meaning as a means of criticizing the very erasure of which he was a victim.

Haroun adds that calling Moussa l'Arabe is problematic for more reasons than the erasure of Moussa and the resulting loss of meaning. Haroun states that Arab is not a term he would naturally use to describe his identity. He states that "in our world, we were Muslim," that the term Arab is "like blackness, which exists only in eyes of white people" (70). For Haroun, it seems that the replacing of Moussa's identity with the blanket term l'Arabe is, in addition to personal erasure, a racialized projection of the white gaze. By combining Haroun's personal grievances with accusations of racism, Daoud clearly problematizes the French colonial project.

Criticism of Modern Algeria in *Meursault, Contre-Enquête*

Daoud's criticism is not directed solely at the French. Rather, he also passes harsh judgement on Algeria's Islamic culture and laments the loss of what he views as some positive impacts of the French mission civilisatrice. In criticizing both East and West, Daoud distances himself from the dichotomous paradigm of modernity problematized by Latour.

Daoud's novel is full of criticism of contemporary Algeria. This criticism is found in descriptions of Haroun's life, which defies social norms, in Haroun's railing against various facets of modern Algerian life, and, more than anything, through his insinuation that Algerian independence did nothing to alleviate the meaninglessness attached to Moussa's murder by French colonialism.

Throughout the novel, Haroun is depicted violating a variety of Algerian social norms, including visiting bars, eschewing Islam, and distancing himself from post-colonial narratives such as Arabization. All of these actions are considered transgressive for a large number of people in the Algerian context (Vince 2016). Haroun's drinking is the most obvious violation of custom in the novel. The majority of Haroun's storytelling takes place in a bar, where he seems to spend most of his time. He is constantly singing the praises of wine and lamenting the diminishing number of bars and vineyards in Algeria. This clearly violates the typical Islamic view that alcohol and other intoxicants are forbidden (based on Qur'an 5:90-91). Haroun, along with his mother, also violates

Islamic norms when they perform a burial for the missing Moussa, despite the fact that “the neighborhood imam was likely bothered” (43). Haroun also refuses to take part in important Islamic practices. He states that he does not pray, does not perform ablutions, does not fast, and that he will never perform the Hajj (149). In an Islamic rehashing of Meursault’s interview with the priest in *l'Étranger*, Haroun tells an imam that he will not assume the typical Islamic title of sheikh and that he will not come to the mosque (150–152). Refusal to undertake these public demonstrations of faith is a clear sign of diversion from current norms in Algeria, where religiosity has been on the rise (McDougall 2017, 290).

In addition to religious narratives, Haroun defies social norms related to decolonization. He does not fight in the War of Independence (92) and he distances himself from postcolonial narratives about the rape of Algerian land by the colonists, saying that he once espoused this view but no longer does (72). Furthermore, Haroun defies the postcolonial ambition of Arabization. The post-independence government of Algeria promoted Arabization, which included the idea that Arabic should supersede French as the language of both the street and the elite, in order to reject the French colonial paradigm which had marginalized Arab Algerians (McDougall 2017, 266–70). Instead of adhering to this narrative of Arabic as resistance, Haroun uses French, the language of the oppressor, as a way to reassert his Algerian voice in the description of his brother’s death (Jackson 2019). Haroun says that he “learned this language [French] and how to write in order to speak in the palace of the dead” (12). He adds that his fascination with French upon starting school was rooted in the way French allowed him to understand the story of his brother’s murder (129–30). Daoud’s use of French in this way was understood as a critique of contemporary Algeria by the imam who issued a call for his execution. One of the reasons cited for the fatwa was that Daoud had “attacked the Arabic language” (Cocquet 2014). Clearly, criticism of modern Algeria is inherent in Haroun’s rejection of common postcolonial Algerian narratives as well as its linguistic practices.

Daoud’s novel also criticizes modern Algeria through Haroun’s railing against various facets of contemporary life, including the status of women, alcohol, religion, and city life. At several points, Haroun laments Algeria’s loss of liberated women. This is obvious in the character of Meriem, the only woman whom Haroun has

ever loved, who thus symbolizes the ideal woman. In describing her, he praises not so much her beauty as her intelligence and her status as a *femme libre* (138). Haroun lauds Meriem as “free, conquering, rebellious, and living” (145). He commends “her resistance to familial conservatism” (138) despite the doubt and fear caused by her “dominating and polygamous” father (145). Through the idealization of the *femme libre* as demonstrated in Meriem, Haroun implicitly criticizes a society in which women are often marginalized through patriarchal domination.² Haroun criticizes what he sees as a backward slide in the rights available to women. After describing walking to the train station arm in arm with Meriem, he notes that such practices are no longer permissible (144). Elsewhere he notes that women were once proud of their bodies, but now see them as sinful and criticizes Algerian men for wanting a certain kind of woman as a wife, and a different kind of woman for sex (62). In lamenting the loss of Meriem, Haroun laments Algeria’s loss of the *femme libre*, “a type of woman who, today, has disappeared from this country” (145).

Haroun also criticizes modern Algeria’s opposition to alcohol.³ He decries the elimination of bars (35), the closing of bars on Fridays (80), the difficulties posed by institutional resistance to the production of wine (61), and the destruction of vineyards (126). Pushing back against the Islamist obstruction of alcohol, Haroun jokes that “in a few years, the only bar still open will be in Paradise” (15). Here, he is referencing the Islamic belief that while wine is forbidden in life, it is one of the rewards offered to the faithful in the hereafter (Qur’an 37:40–49). By joking about this belief which he finds irrational, Haroun criticizes not just the prohibition of alcohol, but the sometimes-contradictory nature of religion.

Haroun constantly criticizes religion in general, and especially the resurgence of Islam which he has witnesses in his lifetime (97). In his quest to challenge the post-independence increase in Islamic practice in Algeria, he criticizes both the practices and perceived consequences of religion. He remarks that the mosque near his home in Oran is “so imposing that I feel like it keeps people from seeing God” (75). He states his annoyance with the call to prayer (79) and with his neighbor who is constantly reciting the Qur’an.

2 The Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security (2019) index ranks Algeria in the bottom 15 % in the world for women’s status.

3 Since the early 1970s and the rise in Islamism in Algeria, per capita alcohol consumption has declined to almost nothing (World Health Organization 2018)

He also condemns the veiling of young girls (79).

Haroun also criticizes organized religion more explicitly elsewhere, saying that “he hates religions and submission” (76), perhaps indicating that he detests all religions, but especially Islam, as a common translation of Islam is submission. He says that he thinks religion makes people lazy (78) and that it distracts people from more important things (79). He compares himself to a person with a car broken down on the side of the road as others pass him and his problems during their search for holiness (80). Haroun seems to be concerned that in the quest to strictly follow their religion, the people ignore the real problems of the people around them and fail to help their fellows. In defining himself as the needy person who is being ignored, he is perhaps indicating his bitterness that despite Algeria's apparent turn toward religion, no one has bothered to help him or comfort him as he struggles with the trauma of his past.

Elsewhere, Haroun indicates his frustration with religion because of its inability to comfort him regardless of the actions of religious adherents. Upon discovering that the story of Moussa's murder had been recorded in *l'Étranger*, his mother exclaims “everything was written!” (138). This is an obvious reference to the common Islamic injunction *kul shii' maktub* (everything is written), which is associated with ideas of predestination and humanity's powerlessness to change the fate which God decrees. While his mother apparently finds some solace in religious sentiments, Haroun sardonically replies to her “Written yes, but in the form of a book, not by any god” (138). Compared to his mother, Haroun appears disenchanted with religion's ability to provide him with comfort in the face of life's challenges. His rejection, not only of predestination, but also of religion's value in general, demonstrates Haroun's break with contemporary Algerian norms and his vocal disdain for Islam shows his willingness to critique the failings he perceives in his society.

Throughout the novel, Haroun takes time to rail against the downsides of urban life in Algeria, with a special dislike reserved for Algiers, the Algerian capital, the city of his youth, and the site of his brother's murder. He describes Algiers as “a filthy creature, corrupted, stealer of men, traitorous, and dark” (32) and as a city full of disgusting smells and “millions of Meursaults” (149). Haroun's frustration with the unsavory nature of the city

manifests itself through comparisons with his trauma, as seen in his projection of his brother's murderer onto the city and its inhabitants. Elsewhere, he describes the capital as "an elderly, old-fashioned actress of revolutionary art" (62), perhaps arguing that the Algerian government is simply acting, pretending to legitimacy through the legacy of revolution but that this approach has become outdated and useless. He is clearly angry with the city, and elsewhere acknowledges that "the people are angry with cities" (32), acknowledging a more general Algerian dissatisfaction with urbanization. Haroun complains about the loss of nature and the trees' replacement by unsightly, unfinished buildings (41), about the disappearance of public gardens (78), and about post-independence Algeria's tendency to consume everything (108-9). He also complains about the general degradation of architectural aesthetics that accompanied the revolution. Listing the evolution of building styles, he begins by describing the "Spanish pediments, the Ottoman walls," symbols of past beauty and strength, and ends with a description of the contemporary oil refineries and the accompanying shantytowns, symbols of industrial decay and poverty (127). Clearly, one of the major criticisms directed at modern Algeria is the failings of urbanization.

Meursault, contre-enquête further contains criticisms of modern Algeria through Haroun's struggle to find meaning in his brother's murder, and in life and death in general. He comes to believe that post-independence Algeria, rather than alleviating the meaninglessness and absurdity enacted by the colonizers, in fact contributes to and augments Haroun's struggles with purposelessness. He questions the purity of Algerian nationalism, pointing out that everyone proclaims Algeria to be existentially important, but that post-independence Algeria failed to ever attribute this supposedly all-important nationality to his brother, content to leave Moussa as the anonymous, generalized "Arabe" (148). Thus, contemporary Algeria has failed to give purpose to Moussa's life or death, even in the way they claim is most meaningful, that of Algerian national identity.

Another way that post-independence Algeria failed to restore meaning to the death of Moussa was by denying Haroun's mother the right to a martyr's pension (58). After independence, the revolutionary government gave pensions to the families of shahids, or martyrs, who died at the hands of the French (Scheele 2006, 877). Granting the status of shahid and the associated pension

was not only a way for providing for the destitute, it was also a way of acknowledging the significance of the sacrifice of the deceased. However, because she could not give proof of Moussa's murder, Haroun's mother was denied this meaning by the post-independence government.

Although failing to receive the shahid pension, Haroun's mother sought to manage the trauma of Moussa's death through various confrontations with the French. Haroun's mother is the driving force behind his murder of the Frenchman Joseph, who had crept into their shed to hide during the confusion that followed the end of the War of Independence. His mother celebrates the killing as just revenge for the murder of Moussa (105), and Haroun acknowledges that he killed Joseph "because a counterweight to the absurdity of our situation was necessary" (132).

In committing this murder, Haroun was seeking to alleviate the absurdity of Moussa's killing by murdering in a way opposite to the murder committed by Meursault. Haroun names his victim, though Meursault did not. Haroun feels relieved after the killing (88), though Meursault felt nothing. Early on it seems that Haroun is well on his way to rectifying the true crime of *l'Étranger*, the meaninglessness of the murder, as Haroun eagerly anticipates being punished for the murder itself, rather than for the strangeness that led to Meursault's death sentence. While the result of Meursault's murder of Moussa was the celebration of absurdity, Haroun wants his murder of Joseph to result in the restoration of the meaningfulness of life and death. Haroun's two shots into Joseph's body were supposed to be two knocks "on the doorway of deliverance" (95) from the absurd.

In the end, however, Haroun is denied the balance he seeks in the face of the meaninglessness of his brother's death, for his murder of Joseph goes unpunished. When Haroun is brought to the police station for questioning, he finds to his dismay that he is not there to be punished for Joseph's murder, and that in fact he is on trial for a different crime entirely. Just as Meursault was tried for his strangeness, Haroun finds that "even if [he] showed up with the corpse of the Frenchman on [his] back" his crime would have still been "that which the intuition senses: [his] strangeness" (107). As it turns out, Haroun's true crime in the eyes of the revolutionary government was not his killing of a Frenchman, but his killing him at the wrong time (117). That is to say that rather than killing Frenchmen by becoming a mujahid fighting in the War

of Independence (115), he waited until after the war was over and the ceasefire declared to kill. The killing, the life and death of the Frenchman, were not what mattered. Rather it was that Haroun had not fought as all the other young men in his town had done. After being questioned, he is released without punishment.

Haroun is extremely frustrated by his release, as he feels it sends a message that life and death are meaningless, and the very absurdity he was trying to escape by committing the murder has now been amplified. In response to being “liberated without explanation, whereas I wanted to be condemned,” he states that “my vengeance was just hit with the same invalidity [as Meursault’s murder of Moussa]” (121). Thus, he finds that “death, in the first days of independence, was just as free, absurd, and sudden as it had been on a sunny beach in 1942” (115). While Haroun hoped that independent Algeria would liberate him from the weight of the meaninglessness of death brought on by Moussa’s murder and the resulting inaction of the French Colonial Regime, post-independence Algeria turned out to be just as unwilling to return meaning to life and death. In a stinging critique of post-colonial Algeria, Haroun compares it to the colonial regime and finds that “Independence only pushed them to exchange roles” (20).

The consequences of the increased meaninglessness brought on by the revolutionary government’s failure to punish him for the murder of Joseph are dire, as Haroun expresses that this not only leaves him in bitterness, it also “compromised love and the possibility of loving” (101). He acknowledges that he is too trapped by death and trauma for his relationship with Meriem to be successful (126). He states that “life is no longer sacred in my eyes,” that “I had chilled the bodies of all humanity in killing just one” (101), paralleling the Qur’anic declaration “if anyone kills a person... it is as if he kills all mankind” (Qur’an 5:32). Thus, rather than find the meaning he has been seeking ever since the murder of Moussa, Haroun finds himself devoid of the possibility of love or respect for life, ending the novel just as Meursault—hoping that people will hate him (153).

Daoud criticizes modern Algeria through a variety of means, most notably through scorn for organized religion, a resurgent Islam, and the postcolonial government’s failure to allow him to find meaning in life or death. When this criticism of Algeria is coupled with obvious disdain for Western colonialism, it seems that Daoud

is searching for a middle ground, a space that is neither exclusively Eastern nor Western. As Vince (2016) points out “Haroun belongs to both worlds” and thus creates a balance between them. In this way Daoud is rejecting the dichotomy which is inherent to certain conceptions of modernity.

Conclusion

Both *Hadith ‘Isa ibn Hisham* and *Meursault, Contre-Enquête* reserve both criticism and praise for certain elements of Western and Eastern paradigms. Al-Muwaylihi appreciates the science, technology, and the noble ideas of the Europeans, but is uncomfortable with colonial domination. He appreciates the potential of Islam but derides the way Egyptian society has traditionally practiced it. Daoud appreciates the freedom available in the West but derides the violence of Western colonialism. He appreciates the Algerian struggle for independence but criticizes the domineering influence of Islamists in post-colonial Algeria. When *Hadith ‘Isa ibn Hisham* and *Meursault, Contre-Enquête* are viewed through the dichotomous lenses of modernism or postmodernism, their simultaneous critique and praise of both East and West seems contradictory. However, when approached from the vantage of a modernism, these apparent contradictions fade.

As previously noted, various scholars have problematized modernity as an ideology that insists on non-existent dichotomies. Notably, Latour (1990; 1993) argues that both the modern and postmodern lenses are defined by the fabricated separation of nature and society, object and subject, scientific and transcendent. He proposes an a modern theoretical approach eschewing such dichotomies as a more useful analytical tool.

In order to illustrate the usefulness of the a modern theoretical approach to analysis, I will briefly examine the ways that both al-Muwaylihi and Daoud approach the transcendent in their texts. Approaching these works through the dichotomous lenses of modernity or postmodernity, one might assume that congruent writing would either wholly embrace the supernatural transcendence of traditional Islamic society or the scientific secularism of Western modernity. However, both books reject the East-West dichotomy, praising and critiquing both in their turn. Furthermore, in *Hadith ‘Isa ibn Hisham* al-Muwaylihi simultaneously criticizes the ulama

and their application of the Shariah and upholds Islamic law's transcendent reality (48). Additionally, he praises the advances of science and technology but is also open to the reality of supernatural powers, made obvious by the resurrection of the dead Pasha (22). This demonstrates that al-Muwaylihi is neither rejecting nor fully accepting either paradigm that a Modern reading might impose.

Meanwhile in *Meursault, Contre-Enquête*, Haroun openly disparages Islam and religion in general (79) but also expresses a non-critical belief in the spiritual reality of ancestors (37, 52). He also indicates the reality of transcendent visions, through his story of the vision he once had while walking on the beach (66). He also goes back and forth on whether or not he believes in God but ends the novel inconclusively with an invitation to "go ask Him yourself" (152), evidencing an openness to a metaphysical reality and the potential for communication with the divine. Perhaps most intriguingly, Haroun speaks explicitly to his desire to mix the material and the metaphysical in order to appeal to people (108). This seems to indicate that, like Latour, Haroun recognizes that no dichotomy exists between the scientific and the transcendent.

Latour's amodernism resolves some of the difficulties inherent to other theoretical approaches which impose non-existent dichotomies and thus miss important nuances. By removing the problematic East-West, subject-object, and scientific-transcendent dichotomies, a synthesized reading of the dual-critique of colonialism and traditional society in both *Hadith 'Isa ibn Hisham* and *Meursault, Contre-Enquête* becomes possible. This approach, when applied to other works of Arabic literature from the Nahda to the present day, would undoubtedly reveal new insights into the apparent Arab discomfort with traditional conceptions of modernity. Through the lens of amodernism, scholars of Arabic literature could develop a more complete understanding of the ideas at play in the works they study.

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Conditional Islamophobia

The Uyghur Muslims of Xinjiang, China

The People's Republic of China is infamous for both its domestic economic policies and its demand for unconditional allegiance from its citizens. In order to retain legitimacy in both spheres, groups threatening this balance face two options: assimilation or removal. Throughout history, China has leveraged its economic strength and homogenous majority in the suppression of ethnic and political separatism, most notably in the regions of Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang. While the international community may have a degree of awareness for China's strict implementation of national homogeneity, the veil of internal security severely restricts the free passage of information. For these reasons, definitive evidence of China's ill-treatment of one Muslim minority group in particular, the Uyghur Muslims, has emerged only over the past decade. A combination of leaked government data, undercover journalism, and survivor testimonies are gradually being pieced together to reveal China's enactment of a cultural genocide, the intentional destruction of a cultural or ethnic group. At this point, it is estimated that China has imprisoned nearly 9 million Uyghur individuals in internment camps, nearly 40 percent of the Uyghur population of Xinjiang. Simultaneously, other Muslim minority groups in China evade state persecution; the purpose of this research is to determine why unparallel governmental treatment among this demographic persists.

Satellite images provided the first definitive evidence of nearly 380 detention facilities in China's Xinjiang region (Wamsley 2020). This region is primarily populated by the Uyghur Muslims, a group that has not only occupied the region since the 9th century, but whose use of the Turkic Uyghur language and Islamic practice clash with China's Mandarin-speaking, atheist majority. In response to international pressure, Beijing now argues that the

aforementioned camps serve as counter-terrorism measures to their domestic Muslim population. Chinese officials stand by their claim that “vocational education and training centers” are established to “prevent the breeding and spread of terrorism and religious extremism” and go so far as to argue that admission to these camps is both voluntary and temporary (BBC 2020). Rather, China employs intrusive restrictions on outward expressions of Islamic adherence including religious clothing, fasting during Ramadan, and the practice of cultural heritage (Freedom House 2021). The government interprets religious adherence as “religious extremism” and uses outward expression of religiosity as justification for the detention of Uyghurs. While Muslims are a minority group in the state, China’s population of nearly 20 million Muslims amounts to a larger Islamic population than every Middle Eastern Muslim nation except for Iran, Turkey, and Egypt (Gladney 2003). The total Muslim population in China hovers around 17.6 million, with Hui Muslims (8,602,978) and Uyghur Muslims (7,214,431) composing the majority (Gladney 2003). However, if internment camps are erected with the purpose of countering Islamic terrorism, as the Chinese government claims, evidence of Muslim internment camps would be found throughout the country, rather than solely in the province of Xinjiang. Why has the larger Muslim minority, the Hui Muslims, remained comparatively unscathed?

To explain the discrepancy of Muslim oppression in China, it is necessary to survey the additional factors contributing to the plight of ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang. First, the concentration of Uyghur Muslims in a resource rich area holds the potential for differential government treatment and increased security. Next, Uyghur history of separatist movement and brief independence from the state effectively set them apart as a non-conformist group with the potential to endanger the stability of the overall state. Lastly, the Uyghurs are easily otherized due to the maintenance of their Turkic Uyghur language, Islamic beliefs, cultural practices, and altogether resistance to assimilation into the Han majority. By employing a comparative survey of the two most populous Muslim minority groups in China, the Uyghurs and the Hui, I will argue that the Uyghur internment camps have less to do with Islamic observance and much more to do with Xinjiang’s abundant natural resources and the Uyghurs’ rejection of national assimilation.

Literature and Theory

The plight of the Uyghur Muslims emerged onto the international stage despite China's best efforts to conceal internal conditions. Although China's barring of journalists in Xinjiang makes the case difficult to detail in full, international news sources have provided baseline information for the state persecution of the minority group. At the same time, reporting by new sources such as the New York Times, the BBC, and Al-Jazeera largely focus on the religious status of the Uyghurs rather than a more in-depth view of the historical, economic, and cultural factors leading up to the internment of Uyghurs (Ramzy and Buckley 2019; BBC 2018; Regencia 2020). Even more, hardly any sources acknowledge the presence of other Muslim minorities throughout the state. It is easy to draw a straightforward link between China's treatment of the Muslim citizens in Xinjiang, but more difficult to explain the uneven treatment of Muslim minorities throughout the state.

In their 2004 survey of ethnicity and civil war, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler examine the factors leading up to civil conflict and identify variables linked to civil war and rebellion, including diaspora, natural resources, and a hostile governmental structure. For the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, all three factors are present. First, Collier and Hoeffler explain that when a population is dispersed over a large area, state control becomes significantly more difficult. (2004) The high concentration of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang province allows for more feasible governmental targeting in comparison to groups spread out across the state, such as the Hui Muslim minority. Furthermore, the Chinese government relies heavily on Xinjiang's abundant coal and oil reserves. With Xinjiang supplying a fifth of the country's oil reserves, 40 percent of its coal reserves, and the largest natural gas reserves in the nation, Beijing's loosening of its white-knuckled grip over the region would ensure steep economic consequences (Wong 2014). The resource curse in Xinjiang is compounded by new innovations in the region, namely the Belt and Road Initiative, a project that is sure to increase pressure on the province in terms of increased government presence and security expenditures.

Collier and Hoeffler's final key factor in civic conflict refers to the presence of a hostile government, systems that prioritize elite ambitions to the detriment of civic minorities. One need

only to look to China's Cultural Revolution of 1966 for evidence of the government's willingness to exchange cultural differentiation for national homogeneity. This movement eliminated the "Four Olds" (old ideas, values, old, and traditions) of Chinese religious and traditional history (Zuo 1991). The rise of Mao Ze-dong led to the prohibition of outward expressions of religiosity; rituals were discontinued as religious temples, regardless of tradition, were either closed or torn down in exchange for the deification of Mao (Zuo 1991). Though China's constitution technically allows for religious freedom, the various methods by which the government actively extinguishes religious minorities will become clear in the following sections. Beijing continues its fight for homogeneity with the installation of reeducation camps as the most blatant display of a perpetual Cultural Revolution.

In addition to Collier and Hoeffler's findings on the impact of diaspora, economic incentives, and hostile governments on civil conflict, structuralist theories of nationalism aid in the navigation of the complex case of Muslim minorities in China. Ernest Gellner states that homogenous nations only gain such status by way of "kill[ing], expell[ing], or [assimilating] all non-nationals" (1983). Gellner argues that nationalism is a purely modern conception sustained by elitist high cultures; he rejects the notion that nationalism holds deep roots in human behavior and instead points to elite reformists as the bodies responsible for creating an economic system of feudalism that requires a homogenous citizenry. When Gellner's argument is applied to this case, it becomes clear that Beijing enacts minority persecution as a tactic to ensure Han-majority legitimacy.

The internment of the Uyghurs in China exposes the government's willingness to go to drastic lengths to maintain their legitimacy throughout the state. In this context, that means breaking several national and international laws in order to maintain Beijing's national, political, and economic dominance (Al Jazeera 2019). Collier and Hoeffler clarify a pattern of state discrimination when factors such as abundant resources, group concentration in one central area, and hostile governing system are present. Furthermore, structuralist theory outlines that increases in nationalist ideology, many times due to economic innovation, motivate states to implement homogenizing systems in order to carry out political and nationalist goals. The aforementioned

nationalist theories both align with and explain the current circumstances of the Uyghur Muslims and aid as a baseline for the comparison of Uyghur and Hui Muslims in China.

Research Design

The treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang requires a survey of the economic, historical, and characteristic differences of the Uyghurs in comparison to the Hui Muslims. First, in order to determine whether economic factors play a salient role in this case, I will compare natural resources in Uyghur and Hui populated provinces. If resource-rich areas equate to heightened levels of governmental interference, I will conclude that economic factors play a significant role in China's treatment of groups in state-sensitive regions. If Uyghurs are shown to still experience higher levels of governmental intervention in relation to comparatively resource-rich regions, I will conclude that factors beyond resources and economics are involved in the treatment of the Uyghur Muslims. The same conclusion will be made if Uyghurs or Huis face governmental discrimination in areas without significant natural resources.

A component of differential treatment between the Huis and Uyghurs ties back to historical factors and threats of separatism. A survey of separatist movements and national assimilation, or the lack thereof, for each group will determine the significance of historical trends in the current treatment of both minorities in China. If there is evidence found for one group benefiting from their willingness to conform to Chinese nationalism over time, I will conclude that an acceptance of sinicization, the strategic subsumption by the dominant Han culture, plays a role in survival within the state. However, if I find that either group continually faces state persecution despite assimilation efforts, I will conclude that factors beyond historical attempts toward assimilation influence minority treatment. Finally, if I find that rejection of sinicization shapes a negative perception and treatment of either group, specifically in terms of state framing and treatment, I will conclude that historical resistance to Chinese national ideals plays a significant role in the perceptions of Uyghur and Hui Muslims in the state.

Finally, I will survey the ascriptive characteristics of both

groups as a gauge for governmental treatment. Ascriptive characteristics refer to factors beyond an individual's control at birth, which include ethnicity, language, religion, class, and location of residence. If I find that those with ascriptive characteristics distinct from the Han majority face increased governmental oppression in comparison to assimilated groups, I will conclude that these characteristics play a role in the unequal treatment of minority groups. Specifically, I will look for derogatory statements about the use of non-majority languages, cultural practices, and physical appearance in comparison to supportive statements of groups who have conformed to Chinese language and culture. Conversely, if ascriptive characteristics distinct from the Han majority do not show a pattern of inviting state persecution, I will conclude that factors beyond ascriptive characteristics play a role in state treatment of minorities.

In terms of limitations, perhaps the most substantial involves China's notorious pattern of secrecy in regard to internal human rights conditions. Freedom House reports that China is among the world's most restrictive media environments as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has nearly complete control over news reporting and journalist presence and is not opposed to inflicting harsh penalties for spoken or written criticism of party members (2021). These factors have discouraged both internal and international journalists and informers alike from breaching China's austere internal security. As mentioned above, the realities of the Uyghur internment camps were only realized by a gradual compilation of data leaks, secret footage, and post-internee testimonies. However, applying foundational theories of nationalism and ethno-cultural cleavages bridges the gap to present a more clear view of the tactics of the Chinese government and the troubles of Uyghur minority persecution.

Results

A comparative survey of ascriptive, historical, and economic factors between the Uyghur and Hui Muslim minority groups clarifies the unequal treatment of ethnic groups in China. Xinjiang's Uyghur population faces extreme governmental pressure due to its economic significance, extended history of resistance to sinicization, and ascriptive otherization. The Hui Muslims, however, do not inhabit

an economically strategic zone and have made formal efforts to embrace Han assimilation. Although Uyghur and Hui Muslims share a religious framework, China's systematic prohibition of Islamic practice appears to be conditional.

Natural Resources

Once an oasis and center of trade along the Silk Road, Xinjiang has maintained economic significance for centuries due its natural resources and strategic location as a crossroad to Central Asia (Davis 2019). The US Energy Information Administration classifies the Xinjiang Autonomous Region among China's largest and most prolific gas producing regions as it produces more than half of China's coal reserves (Aden, Fridley, and Zheng 2008). In China's most recent publicly available report in 2018, Beijing reported, "the energy consumption structure was composed of coal, accounting for 59.0%; oil, accounting for 18.9%; natural gas, accounting for 7.8%; and other energy including hydropower, nuclear power, wind power, etc., which accounted for 14.3%" (Ministry of Natural Resources 2019).

Beijing's grip over the area tightens with the fear that civil unrest could disrupt oil revenues that have decreased in recent years. For instance, within the last twenty years, two of Exxon's key wells in the Tarim basin of Xinjiang came up dry, yielding just 3.15 metric tons of China's overall output of 156 metric tons of oil (Gladney 2003). Despite the downturn in oil yields, China's most recent public documentation of natural resources shows that the exploitation of oil is not slowing by any means. The government insists that it will continue to "push forward the pilot reform of oil and gas exploration and exploitation in Xinjiang" (Ministry of Natural Resources 2019).

In addition to China's significant dependence on the resources of Xinjiang, the conception of the Belt and Road Initiative adds increased pressure on the province. If Beijing's initiative is carried out, Xinjiang would essentially become a gateway to China's economic ventures with up to 138 countries (Davis 2019, Anwar 2019). The Center for Strategic and International studies estimates that China's investment for the BRI ranges anywhere from \$1 trillion to \$8 trillion; this estimate conveys the sheer weight of

such a project in addition to the reliance that China would have on Xinjiang's stability (Hillman 2018). The graphic below displays the preexisting railroads and pipelines as well as projections for new infrastructure that would increase the sensitivity of Xinjiang province in terms of increased security, infrastructure, and government presence. (Ma 2019).

The Chinese Communist Party claims that the BRI comes in response to wealth inequality between landlocked regions and the Eastern seaboard, as the port city of Shanghai is five times more wealthy per capita than inland provinces, such as Gansu (Anwar 2019). Beijing asserts that this inequality between the Eastern and Western provinces, especially in Xinjiang and Tibet, has been a driving force behind rising militancy in the autonomous regions (Anwar 2019). While the Chinese government claims that economic innovations like the BRI increase income equality, it is more likely that the government's concerns revolve around promoting economic efficiency by extinguishing potential militancy and separatism.

In contrast, the Hui population is scattered over several provinces, including the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Gansu, Henan, Qinghai, Yunnan, and Hebei provinces, and Xinjiang (UNHCR 2021). According to China's most recent report on natural resources, the most relevant innovations in each of these regions can be summarized as follows: pilot investigation for minerals in the Ningxia region, green exploration projects in Gansu and Henan, discovery of phosphorus rock deposits in Yunnan, and the discovery of geothermal reservoirs in Hebei (Ministry of Natural Resources 2019). In terms of China's sources of greatest energy consumption – coal (59%), oil (18.9%), natural gas (7.8%), and hydropower, nuclear power, and wind power combined (14.3%) – none of the Hui-populated regions compare to the high percentage of natural resources found in Xinjiang province (Ministry of Natural Resources 2019). Because China's economic investments in Hui populated provinces do not involve resources included in the greatest energy consumption, the government has less incentive to increase security and crack down on minority groups. In contrast, Xinjiang's resource curse as well as its strategic location in the Belt and Road Initiative ensure governmental interference in the region as long as an abundance of coal, oil subsist.

History of the Separatist Threat

In the case of Xinjiang, conflict between the Uyghur population and the Chinese government can be traced back to the 600s, an era in which China's assistance to the Uyghurs in combating aggressive neighbors required Uyghur loyalty to the Sui Dynasty and an informal incorporation of Xinjiang into the imperial state (Davis 2019). From this point, the Chinese government maintained control over the region until the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, an event that afforded the Uyghurs full independence from Chinese influence (Davis 2019). Yet in 1949, the victory of the People's Liberation Army in the Chinese Civil War put an end to Uyghur independence and the dream of an independent East Turkestan (Davis 2019). As Raphael Israeli puts it, "the Chinese state has always been, and still remains, unitarian and shunning the idea of a multi-state federation" (Israeli 1977).

The following decades of civil conflict pushed Uyghurs further into submission through the events of the Cultural Revolution as well as China's sponsorship of Han migration into the province. Specifically, the government provided financial incentives for Han-Uyghur intermarriage such as advantages on university acceptance for children from such marriages (Freedom House 2021). Han migrants were also awarded higher paying jobs in the urban centers of Xinjiang, effectively pushing Uyghurs out of the municipality and into the rural periphery (Davis 2019). Consequently, the Han percentage of the Xinjiang population increased from 6.1% in 1953 to 32.9% in 1964, illustrating the rapid change that took place in the space of only eleven years (Davis 2019). Resistance to Han migration rose to the surface in the form of a return to traditional roots, including religion. Following the death of Mao, the transition into the People's Republic of Xiaoping Deng allowed for informal flexibility in which the Uyghurs were able to rebuild mosques, reimplement the Arabic alphabet, and reintegrate religious educational institutions (Davis 2019).

This period, however, did not last long. Deng Xiaoping's implementation of economic and political reforms in the late 1980s to 1990s led to mass protests throughout the state and in Xinjiang. Assemblies in the province, such as the Baren protest in 1990, were marked by religious themes, such as the chanting of Islamic slogans (Davis 2019). The CCP interpreted political

movements with religious undertones as threats to their control over Xinjiang, emphasizing the growing association of Islam and terrorism. In response to Islam-related international terror attacks throughout the following decades, Beijing imposed 50,000 troops in the region to counter the potential threat of religious uprisings (David 2019). In addition to increased military presence in the region, Beijing launched a campaign known as the Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism or Strike Hard Campaign (David 2019). In Xinjiang, this effort was characterized by the destruction of Uyghur historical literature, incarceration of Uyghur authors, and banning of traditional Uyghur art, music, and language (Davis 2019). Inadvertently, this governmental pressure led Uyghurs to immigrate to neighboring Afghanistan, where there was a greater opportunity to join in militant Islam and bring such ideologies back to Xinjiang (Davis 2019). To this day, Uyghurs have continually resisted state pressure and have made no indication that they are willing to accept China's attempts to stamp out their cultural heritage. As a result, the establishment of Uyghur reeducation camps is Beijing's final endeavor in the suppression of Xinjiang's threat of non-assimilation.

A survey of the Hui Muslims offers the most relevant insight into China's differential treatment of ethnic, specifically Muslim, minorities. Because the Hui share an Islamic background and are also the most populous Muslim minority in China, it would seem that anti-extremist reeducation policies would also be aimed at members of this ethnic group. However, similar to other non-Uyghur minorities in China, the Hui have not faced significant state oppression. The UNHCR argues that the Hui Muslims are "by far the most acculturated to the majority of Han Chinese" due to their low group concentration and a governmental compromise that accommodates Hui tradition in the state (2021, Islam and Islamic Groups 1992). In contrast to Uyghur centralization in Xinjiang, no crash program has been able to formally acculturate all Hui Muslims to Chinese standards of nationalism; rather, their dispersion throughout the state has facilitated a drift from their heritage towards host culture assimilation (Israeli 1977).

This level of assimilation, however, has not always been reflective of the experience of the Hui Muslims in China. As a reaction to the Hui revolt against the Qing dynasty in 1856, government officials carried out a three-day massacre in Yunnan

province, also referred to as the Panthay rebellion, that led to the deaths of between four and seven thousand Hui Muslims (Atwill 2003). In response to the tragic end of the Panthay rebellion, Islamic philosophers reflected on potential courses of action that would allow for peaceful relationships between the Hui Muslims and the dominating Chinese nation (Nakanishi 2018). Wang Jingzhai, a prominent Muslim scholar during the period of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, developed an Islamic legal framework allowing for Muslim-Chinese coexistence amidst political upheaval (Nakanishi 2018). Ma Anyi, a Hui Muslim scholar of this period, adopted terms pioneered by Islamic jurist, Abu Hanifa of Iraq, to determine whether or not aggressive action was required in the wake of the Panthay rebellion (Nakanishi 2018). The term “dār al-harb” refers to territories without a “treaty of nonaggression or peace with Muslims, while the term “dār al-Islām” refers to “region(s) of Muslim sovereignty where Islamic law prevails” (Oxford Islamic Dictionary 2021). By designating China as dār al-Islām, Anyi “legally exempted Hui Muslims from the fight against non-Muslim Chinese people and enabled the Hui to mingle in non-Islamic Chinese society while retaining their ‘Muslim-ness’” (Nakanishi 2018). Under this framework, the Hui Muslims were to ensure their security by abiding by Chinese laws and governance. Anyi clarified:

When entering their territory, a Muslim is obligated not to betray them... We, the people of Islam in China, are not allowed to escape from obedience to the sultan of China or put pressure on him, even though he is an unjust infidel, since we are *musta’ min* [Chinese Muslims] under his reign, administration, and guarantee of security. If a person among us puts pressure on the sultan of China, this person is considered to be a betrayer. Betrayal is forbidden (haram) (Nakanishi 2018).

By following this direction, Hui Muslims became responsible for defending their nation of origin and upholding the controversial hadith of the Prophet that states “love for the homeland is an element of faith” (Faisal 2019). Additionally, the Qur’an declares in surah 4 ayah 60: “O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey His Messenger and those who are in authority among you” (Al-Islam 2021). Because the Hui identify China as their homeland as well as the “fatherland of Chinese Muslims” disobeying the sultan of China would be a violation of the *sharī’a* (Nakanishi 2018). As

discussed above, the Uyghurs have not made such formal efforts toward acculturation. Rather, Uyghur history shows the continual unwillingness of the group to succumb to Chinese impositions of nationalism, the result of which has led the government to implement last resort measures to extinguish a group that views the Chinese state as *dār al-harb* (Nakanishi 2018).

Ascriptive Characteristics

During the initial adoption of the Uyghurs into the Sui Dynasty in the 600s, the Chinese emperor, speaking of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, claimed, “barbarians, too, are human beings. If they are governed with moral power, they can become like members of the family” (Davis 2019). Despite the welcoming sentiment, Uyghurs over time have maintained an unwillingness to exchange cultural heritage for Chinese nationalism. Furthermore, their rejection of national assimilation in addition to their distinct language and cultural practices effectively create a framework of “good” and “bad” Muslims in China (Brophy 2019). At this point, it is necessary to determine whether differing linguistic patterns and cultural practices are as relevant as historical and economic factors or whether they are simply used to further justify state exclusion.

First, the use of the Uyghur language is one of the most conspicuous ascriptive characteristics setting the Uyghurs apart from Hui Muslim and Han populations. At this point, Uyghur is banned from classroom settings in exchange for Mandarin, a language necessary for work opportunities in governmental positions and occupation in state-owned enterprises (Crane 2014). Hui Muslims’ acceptance and use of Mandarin have gradually led to the perception that they are “stronger psychologically” in comparison to the Uyghur population (Van Wie Davis 2008). The notion of comparative superiority is due in large part to this shared vernacular, intermarriage with the Han majority, and the Huis’ aforementioned willingness to mold their religious beliefs to Chinese governance. In contrast, a 2019 publication by the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China claims, “[The Uyghur] population cannot read and write in the standard spoken and written Chinese language, and they have no basic knowledge of the law” (PRC 2019). From statements like these, it is clear that language is used as an equalizer as well as

an excluder; those who do not speak the majority language are painted in broad strokes and are perceived as incapable of true state membership.

Similarly, traditional cultural practices that do not promote the nationalist majority goals pose a threat to the Chinese government. Tahir Hamut Izgil, a Uyghur poet and filmmaker, shares how the suppression of symbols of Uyghur culture spiked beginning in 2012 as the government examined and blacklisted Uyghur literature, films, and music. He explains, “Uyghur music and dance troupes were obligated to perform entirely in Chinese...on topics like opposing separatism, loving the motherland, loving the party, [and] unity of the peoples” (Serhan 2021). Specifically, *meshrep*, a traditional gathering of male Uyghurs, has increasingly been outlawed as “illicit” and are often broken up by the police, despite its inclusion on UNESCO’s list of Intangible Cultural Heritage. (Palmer 2013). Furthermore, in its description of Uyghur religious practice, the PRC claimed:

They act in accordance with fabricated "religious law" and "domestic discipline" and defy the Constitution and State laws. They spread word about a "next life where one's fate is predestined" and deceive religious believers into rejecting the kind of vocational skills training by which they can improve their economic conditions and their capacity for self-development (State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2019).

The 36th Article of the Chinese constitution allows for religious freedom: “No State organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion” (Constitution of the People's Republic of China 2004). Nevertheless, governmental intervention in Xinjiang renders this clause meaningless.

Finally, physical characteristics of Uyghurs are now being translated into aggregated data for the purpose of racial profiling. It is impossible to make overarching or accurate claims on physical appearance among members of ethnic groups, yet China’s Orwellian facial recognition technology claims the capability of identifying individual ethnicity (Wakefield 2021). The use of artificial intelligence in the aim of identifying Uyghur and non-Uyghur attributes is the first of its kind, yet comes as no surprise

in one of the most heavily surveilled regions in the world (Mozur 2019). Based on the many arbitrary conditions for internment, facial recognition technology allows the government to employ yet another tactic to more easily place targets on the backs of Uyghur individuals.

Huis have achieved the title of “good” Muslims by way of their dispersion throughout the state in non-sensitive areas. While their use of Mandarin and intermarriage with the Han majority allow them to more easily maintain their Muslim identities, their survival is largely based on the lack of threat they pose to the Chinese state rather than their assimilation efforts. Furthermore, Uyghur persecution based on their ascriptive characteristics, such as outlawing the Uyghur language in schools, labeling Islamic practice as extremist activity, and even gathering data on physical features, are used as a means to an end. The Chinese government is less concerned about the ascriptive differences varying from the Han majority and more concerned about how a group with distinct, unifying traits could pose an economic threat in a lucrative geopolitical region.

Conclusion

In the past decade, more than eight million Uyghur Muslims have been through China’s reeducation programs in Xinjiang (BBC 2020). The Chinese government, when finally pressured to confront the existence of these camps, claimed their establishment to be contingent on countering Islamic terrorism in the region. However, one Muslim minority, the Uyghurs, experience forced labor, political indoctrination, and economic exploitation at the hands of a government that has deliberately changed the ethnic composition of the province for the insurance of their economic and nationalist aims (Freedom House 2021).

Muslims throughout the state, namely the larger Hui Muslim population, do not experience the same level of discrimination for a variety of reasons. First, the Uyghurs are concentrated in a province that provides significant oil and coal revenue for the state of China and that is also to become a major crossroad for China’s future Belt and Road Initiative, whereas the Hui ethnic group is dispersed over a number of non-economically significant provinces. Second, an extensive history of Uyghur revolt against sinicization has branded

the group as a separatist threat while the Hui Muslims made formal efforts to align their religious observance with the Chinese government. Lastly, the differing levels of linguistic and cultural assimilation, allow the Hui to more easily evade state persecution despite the religious framework shared with the Uyghurs. The Chinese government continues to argue that its illegal reeducation camps work to counter outward expression of Islamic adherence, yet Chinese officials' uneven implementation of their own guidelines shows that, national homogeneity and economic incentives are the true forces behind the oppression of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang.

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Mobilizing “Quietists”

Madkhali-Salafism in Libya

Abstract: Rabee al-Madkhali’s brand of Salafism represents an interesting case study of an apolitical group that has mobilized and adopted new roles within its political context. While Madkhali-Salafis share similar doctrines and attitudes – devotion to the wali al-’amr, apoliticism – even within Libya, there is some variation in approach and emphasis. Yet, even speaking generally, the Libyan Civil war created a social and economic context that overcame the free rider problem and incentivized al-Madkhali’s followers to fully join the conflict. Secondly, the fatwas and instrumentalist tendencies of al-Madkhali and others guided them to vote in elections, form into militias, and pick a side in the Libyan conflict. Lastly, personal level psychological factors, such as innate tendencies to compete over hierarchy or status, youth mobilizing at higher rates than the older generation, and falling victim to the “is-ought” fallacy, pushed them to perpetuate their political-religious agenda through violent means beyond accepted boundaries.

In 2011, citizens of Libya, backed by NATO-led forces, overthrew Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. In the process, and amidst the failures of proceeding attempts at unifying the country, militia-based warfare dominated the country. After more violence escalated in 2014 and the General National Congress collapsed, a divide erupted between the east and west. It was around this time when the two sides, having divided international legitimacy, solidified, and this conflict began evolving into a proxy war. The United Nations, Turkey, United States, Qatar, and Italy gave varying amounts of verbal and military support to Fayez al-Sarraj’s Government of National Accord (GNA) based in Tripoli. Turkey has even supplied military advisors and weapons to al-Sarraj’s forces. Haftar’s Libyan National Army in eastern Libya has enjoyed similar support from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and France. Saudi Arabia has provided generous funding, and French missiles were located near an LNA base in 2019, although the French government denied aiding Haftar militarily. Additionally, Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood have aligned with al-Sarraj, and Salafis tended to be loyal to Haftar (Weise, 2020).

Salafism, despite internal claims that it originates back hundreds of years, is a distinctly modern phenomenon. In the early 20th century, “modernist Salafis,” as they were labelled by western

scholars, sought to reform Islam and reconcile it with modernity; however, these reformers, including Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi and Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi, cannot be considered part of what is now known as the Salafi movement (Wagemakers, 2016). Around the same time, a separate brand of *salafiyya* developed, which is the post-1970s Salafism we know now (Lauzière, 2016). Its practitioners seek to emulate the *salaf al-salihin* or “pious ancestors” that around the time of Mohammad, namely the first three generations of Muslims. A “Salafi”—meaning “*salaf*-like”—strives to mirror the lives of the *salaf* in an all-encompassing way. This often goes to drastic lengths and is characterized by the staunch ultra-conservatism that has made this strain of Islamic thought somewhat infamous, even receiving push back from other conservative Sunnis. While Salafis are not necessarily part of the Wahhabi religious structure in Saudi Arabia, there has been a lot of interaction and shared thought between each movement’s leadership, particularly in the Islamic University of Medina and in Yemen. In contrast to the “modernist Salafis,” these are “purist Salafis.” Purist Salafis generally fit in three categories: jihadi, political, and quietist. Jihadi-Salafism, which includes groups like al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab, sets itself apart in the belief that military jihad should be fought against Muslims, non-Muslims, and apostate rulers of the Muslim world. Political Salafis, similar to the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups in method, engage in politics, elections, petitions, etc to spread their ideology. Lastly, Quietist Salafism, which is particularly relevant with Rabee al-Madkhali’s followers, avoid political engagement and activism, considering them *fitna*, or strife, that distracts from the true message of Islam. While Wagemakers (2016) separates quietists into those that remain totally detached from politics, those that are loyalists to their state, and those that tie their loyalties to the Saudi state, I prefer to see these distinctions as characteristics that can all be present to varying amounts in the ideology of a given quietist Salafi. I approach this differently because, as the case of the Madkhali-Salafis will show, the lines between these definitions bleed into each other and can coexist.

More recently, with origins in the 1990s, Rabee bin Hadi al-Madkhali, a Saudi religious scholar and prominent figure at the Islamic University of Medina, has mustered a following across the Arab world, and particularly in Libya. At the same time, his theology has garnered criticism for creating intolerance and

violence toward others, especially other Muslims. Critics call “the Madkhalis... extremists who are implementing an agenda to transform society” (Crisis Group Report, 2019). Beginning in the early 2010s, al-Madkhali’s followers became known, almost always pejoratively, as “Madkhalis.” While they would simply consider themselves to be “Salafis,” I will generally use “Madkhali-Salafis,” as it is a useful linguistic tool to describe the intersection of *salafiyya* and its adherents who subscribe particular to the voice of Rabee al-Madkhali. This group has been characterized as being “quietist” or “apolitical,” yet in recent years Madkhali-Salafis have expanded into a more institutionalized, militarily mobilized, and political role under Khalifa Haftar in Libya’s civil war (Wehrey and Boukhar, 2019). In a sense, it has adopted characteristics of both Political and Jihadi-Salafism.

Literature Review & Theory

So, what factors push groups and individuals to participate in a conflict when they otherwise may be ideologically opposed to it? More specifically, what kinds of factors would drive Madkhali-Salafis to engage politically and mobilize within Libya’s institutions. I suggest three: economic and social factors that relate directly to the advent of civil conflict, influential leaders that coerce the group to behave in ways often contradictory to their values, and psychological factors that naturally incline the individual, and subsequently the group, to political or violent mobilization.

Civil Conflict

From a constructivist and instrumentalist standpoint, I argue that civil conflict creates circumstances that motivate individuals and groups to mobilize in the interest of themselves and their associates, especially when group social sanctions align in a way that promotes group unity, when broken economies promote struggle and grassroots collaboration, and when physical factors of the region, such as Libya’s overdependence on oil, leads to the destabilization of existing societal structures.

Central to this question is the case of the “free rider,” who fails to contribute meaningfully to a public good but experiences all the resulting benefits as if they had (Rockart, 2016). In the context of a civil war, this takes the form of a citizen or group that refuses to

engage in the conflict yet enjoys economic, social, and other benefits. As one could easily imagine, the costs of joining a bloody civil war, or any violent conflict for that matter, are high, and the possibility of death, economic collapse, harm to self and others, and perpetuating the conflict create a powerful deterrent for someone contemplating engagement, at least from a strictly rationalist perspective. However, Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) challenge the basic descriptive assumption that it is comparatively less costly to be a civilian than a combatant in a civil war. Indeed, they assert that free-riding often becomes costly, and citizens may have a greater impetus to mobilize as rebels in the conflict rather than remain civilians. Kalyvas and Kocher pull from the writings of William McNeil, an American describing the post-WWII Greek Civil War (1946–1949), who reported:

Under the circumstances, many a peasant's son found himself irresistibly attracted to the guerrilla life; and an over abundant peasant population made recruitment easy.

Many of these soldiers in Greece “lived a good deal better than did the ordinary peasant and did not have to work in the same drudging toil.” They also benefited personally from perceiving themselves as heroes of “Greek national tradition.” So, in this case, the potential benefits from joining are myriad. Returning to the idea of the free rider, the public goods, or political goods in this case, may be “democracy, [control of] the rule of law, or collective defense.” They may also be social/psychological, personal, or economic. In short, the benefits of being a non-combatant may not always be as significant as previously thought, and there may even be strong incentives to mobilize (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007).

Diving deeper into participation drivers within conflict, Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) emphasize that the benefits of joining a conflict lie in traditional understandings of political and social grievances. These not only impact the psyche of the group but the individual as well. Such conditions will occur most among the poor and those marginalized from political and social hierarchies. In the Sierra Leone conflict, for example, militias formed at a local level among those who occupied the same disempowered socio-economic space (436–455).

Strong group social sanctions often have a notable impact on individual behaviors. A strong sense of community, in addition to

any idiosyncrasies in doctrine and belief, will help overcome the free rider problem and mobilize the individuals along group lines. Michael Taylor defines community in three ways: “(1) a membership with shared values and beliefs; (2) relations between members which are direct and many sided; and (3) practices within the community of generalized reciprocity” (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008, 442; Taylor, 1988). Beyond that, a sense of in-group cohesion and out-group exclusion creates an environment where individuals will act “groupishly”—they will be more likely to embrace collective action—whether or not a given behavior fits within traditional group norms (Haidt, 2013). Furthermore, as explained by Taylor (1995) and Hegel, the nature of identity is dialogical, meaning that self-identification is a product of comparison to the “other,” and this extends to group identity as well. The individual perceives the group as part of the “self”—akin to Anderson’s (1991) “imagined community”—and becomes willing to sacrifice and mobilize as an arm or a leg of this new body (Varshney, 2003). These strong networks with a close-knit social fabric override the free rider problem, highly incentivizing group mobilization (Moore, 1995; Olson, 1965).

Beyond the strength of social sanctions, localized economic pulls, and other social grievances, there is, of course, a highly opportunistic aspect of mobilizing in a conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) construct complementary arguments that describe the importance of conditions that facilitate insurgency. General instability, foreign financing, and the presence of rough terrain all incentivize insurgency. While these arguments are not specific to Madkhali-Salafis, they emphasize the general conditions that lead to civil conflict, and as such, apply across the board to all segments of society, including Salafis.

In a similar vein, Mason (2018) concludes, based on studies in the US measuring attitudes among Democrats and Republicans, that identity and partisanship are based less on policy than they are on group belonging. Mason’s approach directly relates to the role of social sanctions in spurring collective action, but it also acts as a bridge to the second factor in my argument: strong elite leadership as a powerful influence on mobilization.

Leadership

In 2018, Barber and Pope published a report providing convincing statistical evidence that in politics, humans tend to follow other

humans more than they do specific and consistent ideological frameworks. Their study showed that in the United States, strong Republican and self-proclaimed conservatives tend to be party loyalists instead of policy loyalists, and their voting preferences aligned with Trump and the GOP more strictly than they did with traditionally “conservative” positions. For example, two randomly assigned groups were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with the proposition to raise the minimum wage to \$10 per hour, but one group’s treatment read that Donald Trump or congressional Republicans supported the idea, whereas the other group’s treatment read that he/they *did not* support it (Barber & Pope, 2018). This study does not comment on *why* this is the case, and for the purposes of this paper, the “why” is not a necessity; however, I will nonetheless suggest that it is generally easier to follow a person than a system of ideas or values. To follow a person who you may agree with on other topics and who gives concise normative statements is morally easier than weighing pros and cons, debating internally, and fighting cognitive dissonance.

Hardin (1995) advocates a combination of Mason’s and Barber/Pope’s ideas in which he concludes that a major aspect of collective mobilization is identifying with a particular group, and only then can a leader, providing the proper incentive structure, effectively exert his/her influence on the community.

Other prominent thinkers discuss an instrumentalist take on leadership as it relates to group development and identity formation. As part of Laitin’s (1986) assessment of identity development in Nigeria, he argues that the hegemonic power of British indirect rule guided the adoption and politicization of city-based identity in the Yoruba region. Likewise, within the case of the Madkhali-Salafis, I expect that leaders will play a key role in guiding the identity formation of Sheikh Rabee’s followers.

Posner (2004) also mentions the role of instrumentalist leadership, although he wrongly downplays it. Importantly, and central to both Posner’s and Laitin’s arguments, religious and political leadership shapes the futures of groups, and while they emphasized this process in identity formation, the same applies to *changes* in group practice and belief. I should also note that pre-existing identities can act as tools for political elites to manipulate and mold (Chandra, 2012).

But why are we so inclined to follow leaders? Valikangas et al. (2011) presents a model, based on Kelman (1961), of “follower

motives" in a business context that I will apply to politics and religion, inasmuch as the situation in question involves a fixed hierarchical structure, followers, and a large top-heavy power difference. We can expect these effects to be even stronger in cultures where authority has institutional or religious significance.

First is "utility." People accept a leader when they believe the leader can provide them with a reward or help them avoid punishment. In a religious context, this may look like a faithful worshipper praying to a saint with hopes of tangible or spiritual blessings. This may also take the shape of a person following a religious leader because they believe the leader to have a special connection with the divine, and therefore the leader is able to guide them accordingly. In a political context, a person may make a judgment that a certain leader is likely to be successful and aligning with them will lead to the largest amount of future personal utility. Second, the identity or social identification of the leader, and how it relates to that of the follower, will create a sense of relationship between them, regardless of the lack of social interactions. There must be a shared sense of belonging, which may relate to religion, status, ideology, or other factors. Third, a person will follow a leader because of a value system. This is intuitive. We will follow someone who has a similar sense of right and wrong, as we hope to live with minimal dissonance.

Psychology

Beyond conditions related to civil war and instrumental leadership, a third factor comes into play: individual psychology. In tracing the development of violence amongst humans, evolutionary psychologist Aaron Goetz suggests that one of the key human mechanisms of perpetuating violence is disputes over status and hierarchy between unrelated males (Goetz, 2010; Wilson and Daly, 1985). Status and hierarchy may seem obvious elements of conflict, but it is important to acknowledge them when describing groups that cloud their motives with religious justifications.

Nussio (2017) critiques the limitation of opportunity and grievance based models of conflict—these include participating in conflict because of political frustrations, injustice, and economic or social benefits. Instead, he favors personality related explanations, citing qualitative and interview-based studies that shed light on why many Columbians joined the country's civil conflict in the 1990s. His reports indicate that many who willingly mobilized demonstrated

susceptibility to boredom and were prone to adventure seeking. The study also shows that the phenomenon of “sensation seeking” explains which demographic of people we are likely to see engaging in conflict. A “sensation seeker” is someone more prone to engage in high risk activities, including violence and conflict. As we might intuitively expect, *ceteris paribus*, young men between the late-teens and early twenties are most likely to engage in military operations (Nussio, 2017; Zuckerman, 2007; Roth et al., 2007). While we would expect young men to be more inclined to mobilize in conflict for these reasons, we should also consider that, across a wide range of cultural contexts, men receive the most social pressure to engage in violence.

Gorman Smith et al. (2004) reveals that, in a Chicago test group, youth exposed to community violence were more likely themselves to perpetrate future violence. The following were the criteria used to evaluate violence:

(a) a family member died violently, (b) a close relative or friend died violently, (c) a family member was seriously injured because of violence, (d) a family member was robbed or attacked, (e) a close friend or acquaintance was a victim of violence, (f) the respondent saw someone beaten, (g) the respondent saw someone shot or killed, (h) the respondent was a victim of violence, and (i) the respondent witnessed a violent crime.

These criteria consist of the same circumstances we expect an individual to be exposed to during a civil conflict, and as such, we will consider these criteria to sufficiently apply to a civil war and the violence in it. We would expect that as violence continues, the rate of participation will thus increase among young men. But what would compel violence even after the initial trigger is gone?

One study demonstrates that Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and alcoholism are the two most significant factors in US veterans that engaged in violence after returning from conflict; however, those with PTSD and *no* alcohol were only marginally more likely than average to engage in violence. This puts into doubt a trauma-based reason for continuing violence, and furthermore, this scenario disregards that in the Libyan context we are looking at, the initial trigger—the civil war—is still going on.

Another potential answer lies in the thoughts of David Hume, who condemned the “is-ought” fallacy. This fallacy occurs when a person derives a moral imperative from a statement of fact without

a deeper logical basis, i.e. “My local California grocery store always makes announcements in English then in Spanish, therefore, it was *bad* that today they did the announcements in Spanish *then* in English.” or “I have used militia violence to achieve peace in my local province in conflict contexts, therefore, violence must be a legitimate means of achieving my aims in moral and religious matters.” As a notable tangent to this fallacy, Hirschi and Gottfredson (1990) theorize that whether a person will return to a certain set of actions, criminal or not, is to be considered a matter of self-control. In their studies, those who had internalized principles of self-control, learned at an early age, were less likely to perpetrate crimes later. This position, while perhaps valid and measurable in a stable society, applies poorly to the complexity of a situation with active and ongoing conflict. I assert that Hume’s “is-ought” fallacy has more reliability and stronger explanatory power.

In short, a staunchly apolitical group is likely to remain as such unless it experiences the following circumstances: 1. Socio-economic effects relating to a civil conflict, during which broken economies and in-group mentalities encourage Madkhali-Salafis to band together and mobilize, 2. Guiding leadership at the hands of Rabee al-Madkhali, Khalifa Haftar, and the Saudi government, whose clout and directives steer the Madkhali-Salafis into politics, institutions, and violence, and 3. On an individual level, falling victim to competition-based psychological propensities to violence and justification, where the young tend to engage more than the elderly.

Methods

As I test the explanatory power of my theory against the recent evolution of the Madkhali-Salafis, my criteria will derive from general indicators based on the previously mentioned studies. Firstly, for the Madkhali-Salafi “free rider” to be motivated enough to engage and step out of the quietist bubble, the benefits of mobilization need to outweigh the costs. To assess this, I’ll look at the impact of the Libyan civil conflict on group mobilization and search for evidence of the civil war creating social, ideological, or economic benefits for the Salafis who choose to engage. This may even be related to the intensity of social sanctions against those who refuse to conform to group norms, which is particularly relevant in the case of Madkhali-Salafis because of the strength of their sense of in-group and out-

group. Building on this, if we find general economic instability, instances of foreign funding, and the presence of other factors mentioned by Fearon and Laitin, we can conclude that the conditions of the country have created a climate favorable to insurgency, and therefore groups along all ideological lines, including the Madkhali Salafis, will be more inclined to participate in violent conflict.

Taking a more instrumentalist approach—that social identity and group habits can be consciously decided, created, and manipulated—I will measure the influence that political, social, and religious leaders have on the trajectory of Madkhali-Salafis. Lopsided power dynamics constitute a key component of this argument. I expect that Rabee bin Hadi al-Madkhali will have a distinct influence over his followers, issuing fatwas and other types of legal and situational opinion to guide them toward political engagement; here, we should expect that when there is a conflict between a specific ideology and following a leader, that al-Madkhali's voice will prevail. However, I also expect that other forms of power dynamics may influence Madkhali-Salafis on both sides of the national conflict. These may include Khalifa Haftar and the LNA, pressure from the GNA, or perhaps even the Saudi government.

While personal data for Libyans and their reasons for joining the conflict may not be readily accessible, there are other signs we can observe that indicate that the psychological stickiness of conflict and violence is propelling Madkhali-Salafis beyond their traditional role in Libyan society. Measuring the impact of the somewhat abstract motive behind the “is-ought” fallacy presents significant challenges, so unless I can find statements from individual Salafis that model the hypothetical statements I included in the theory section, I will not formally consider any evidence obtained as proof for or against it. Instead, I will measure the impact of the “is-ought” fallacy by whether violence sees continued escalation without notable criticism from the in-group, namely, that violence becomes normalized and escalates in severity and breadth.

First and foremost, I anticipate that violence carried on by these groups, whether as militias or otherwise, will be outside their official capacities and institutional roles that relate to peacekeeping, warfare, and militia capacity. Additionally, if large numbers of youth join the Madkhali cohorts, and individuals justify the conflict for status or hierarchical reasons, we can conclude, based on aforementioned theories supported by Nussio (2017), Zuckerman (2007), Roth et al.

(2007), Goetz (2010), and Wilson and Daly (1985), that psychological factors are indeed at play. Lastly, because exposure to violence is strongly associated with perpetuating violence itself, we can say that over the course of the conflict, we will hear of Madkhali-Salafis joining the conflict because of personal loss due to related violence, and thus, evidence that emotional ties can pull the individual from free-riding.

In this process, I will analyze U.S. and other governments' reports, fatwas from Rabee al-Madkhali and related scholars, reports from reputable and legitimate research institutions, books, news articles, and any available and relevant statistical data. If the Madkhali-Salafis' experience corresponds with the aforementioned expectations from each of these three categories, I will confidently conclude that the theory has legitimacy.

Results & Discussion

Civil Conflict

The teachings of Madkhali-Salafism intensify the incentive to be a "free rider" in Libya's civil war. As previously mentioned, Salafis are often divided into three categories – jihadi, political, and quietist – each characterized by how they interact with state institutions. While this distinction often falls short of the nuance needed to correctly characterize a group, it serves as a useful tool from the outside to assess general differences in attitude and methodology. As for so-called "quietist" Salafis, which include followers of al-Madkhali, "they essentially focus on spreading the faith (*da'wa*), privileging obedience to the ruler and neither employing violence against rulers nor participating in institutional politics" (Collombier, 2020). As such, when protests against Gaddafi's regime began in 2011, many initially remained neutral, choosing to engage with neither Gaddafi loyalists nor rebels. However, we should note that there was a mixed response among Madkhali's supporters in Libya, and many remained loyal to Gaddafi, which earned them the nickname "white chickens" from rival groups (Wehrey and Boukhars, 2019). Their inclination toward non-involvement was challenged by their foundational dedication to the *wali al-amr*, which refers to whoever is the legitimate leader of the country.

While not every Madkhali-Salafi engaged, the social benefits of mobilizing were often high. Indeed, divisions exist amongst al-

Madkhali's followers, yet a strong sense of in-group inclusion and out-group exclusion dominates their religious thought. This is most evident in their interpretation of *al-wala' wa-l-bara'*, or loyalty and disavowal. Compounded with a focus on *djarh wa-ta'dil*, making arguments against opponents to deny them religious legitimacy, Madkhali Salafis create a culture that excludes *takfiris* or *kharijites*, those who are considered religiously misguided. They use this kind of rhetoric with a special focus against other Muslims, which fuels enmity toward groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists (Damir-Geildorf et al., 2019). This creates a strong sense of community among Madkhali-Salafis and dissuades deviance from the group. This cohesive sense of community helps to override the motivation to be a "free rider" within the group and encourages the individual to act as a part of the community instead. Then, as the Madkhali-Salafi community experiences other pulls to engage—such as the struggle for power and influence within the Libyan context—both the individuals and the community get drawn into the politics and conflict.

Economic incentives also played a key role in mobilization. Since the downfall of Gaddafi's regime and the country's failure to unite in 2013, civil war has spread, and Libya has seen a rise in militia-based security. Many militias, and especially Madkhali militias, fulfilled the role of community protection and policing, but still others mobilized seizing "oil fields, airports, ministries, and ports to use as strategic leverage with the weak transitional government" (Naumann, 2013). Some received foreign financial support, and others vied for support from whatever functioning political institutions are available. These militias formed across the ideological spectrum, including Ansar al-Sharia, a Benghazi-based Salafi jihadist group, and Madkhali-Salafist groups (Wehrey and Boukhar, 2019; Naumann, 2013). In the wake of economic collapse following the 2011 revolution, in addition to overall instability, these opportunities to receive funding and resources attracted Libyans across the country to mobilize (Khan and Mezran, 2013).

Fearon and Laitin (2003) specifically refer to Libya as an area that is attractive to insurgency, largely a product of the country's rocky terrain, spread out population, and decentralized militia-based fighting. In a similar vein, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) indicate that Libya's dependence on one single export is a major factor in the advent of a civil war. In the case of Libya, its over-reliance on

oil and the inability of the country to maintain levels of production during the conflict contributed to continued economic struggle and instability throughout the 2010s. Importantly, these factors do not apply only to Madkhali-Salafis, but they are key elements that influenced the birth of Libya's civil conflict in general.

In short, Libya's economic collapse and related instability incentivized al-Madkhali's followers to mobilize and join militias as a means of controlling resources and revenue. Their strong out-group social sanctions strengthened the group mentality that helped override the "free rider" problem.

Leadership

Fatwas from Rabee al-Madkhali also pushed his followers to mobilize in the Libyan conflict. In 2012, Libyan Madkhali-Salafis pushed against a national election under the General National Congress for a variety of reasons. On one hand, their basic apolitical tendencies made participation in an election unattractive, and secondly, this election was dominated largely by Islamists and Muslim Brotherhood groups, principle opponents of Madkhali-Salafis. However, Ali Zeidan, then the Prime Minister, expressed fears to the Saudi establishment that Madkhali-Salafi rhetoric would derail the election and therefore peace and stability in the country. After a short time, al-Madkhali issued a fatwa urging them to participate "for the greater good" (Wehrey & Boukhar, 2019; Crisis Group Report, 2019). Here there are two tiers of leadership. First, al-Madkhali's followers listened to and responded positively to his call to participate in the election, and second, the Saudi establishment exerted its influence over al-Madkhali. Yet this wasn't the only time al-Madkhali guided the actions of his followers.

During Operation Dignity in 2014, when Khalifa Haftar attacked Benghazi, al-Madkhali advised the Salafis that they should only involve themselves in the conflict to defend their local communities, and he followed this up with a fatwa more broadly forbidding participation in the Dawn Dignity conflict (Wehrey and Boukhars, 2019). Later in 2016, he specifically urged his followers to fight against the Benghazi Defense Brigades, an Islamist, Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated group that had been opposing Haftar's attempt at seizing power, and later in 2018 he specifically urged his followers to side with the LNA and Haftar (Maktaba as-Suna, 2019). In 2017, al-Madkhali also issued a fatwa specifically targeting not just MB affiliated militias but the

Muslim Brotherhood itself, saying “It is incumbent on the Salafis in Libya to be victorious for the religion of Allah the Sublime and protect it (the religion) from the Muslim Brotherhood and others” (Al-Madkhali, 2016; my translation). Although some Madkhali-Salafis, such as the Special Defense Force, are more affiliated with the GNA, many Madkhali-Salafis have gravitated toward the LNA.

Further complicating the situation, a rift in Madkhali-Salafism has manifested itself in the influence of a relative of Rabee, Muhammad Hadi al-Madkhali, who has garnered support in various pockets throughout Libya, specifically in eastern militias and in a few neighborhoods in Tripoli. Muhammad has been quicker to support violence, whereas Rabee has hesitated. In 2012, Muhammad publicly congratulated Libyan Madkhali-Salafis who destroyed a Sufi shrine, and in 2015, he gave an explicit call for Libyan Madkhali’s to join Haftar’s side in Operation Dignity, which was about a year before Rabee himself did the same (Wehrey and Boukhars, 2019).

Khalifa Haftar also manipulated al-Madkhali’s followers. He referred to Operation Dignity as “anti-Islamist” to Libyans and Arab allies, and “secular” to westerners. This rhetoric pandered to the tastes and preferences of the Madkhali-Salafis in a blatantly manipulative move to strengthen Haftar’s base (Crisis Group Report, 2019).

In sum, Madkhali-Salafis experienced guidance from Rabee al-Madkhali, the Saudi regime, Muhammad Hadi al-Madkhali, and Khalifa Haftar, among others. This top-down push spurred these Salafis to engage in activities they otherwise would not likely condone: participating in elections, forming militias, and becoming prominent actors in local and national security.

Psychology

Amidst the civil war factors and leadership factors, there are also psychological reasons that help explain not only why the Madkhalis first engaged in violence but why they perpetuated violence far beyond their original levels of participation. In the initial conflict against Gaddafi, a generational divide predicted, to an extent, who would mobilize. This is illustrated by one father-son split in Benghazi when a son told his father he could not sit on the sidelines, saying “I told my father, ‘Look, we have to do something. We can’t just let the Muslim Brotherhood take over.’” There is an intersectional motive here that relates to age in sensation seeking

and in sectarianism. (Wehrey & Boukhar, 2019). Al-Madkhalis older followers were less willing to mobilize than were the younger ones, which also illustrates the struggle for political and social dominance, or hierarchy, that characterizes this conflict. This innate need to fight violently against rivals for status in the Libyan political sphere drove many of Madkhali's followers to politicize and mobilize.

I found no evidence of Madkhali's followers joining the conflict for personal reasons such as the related deaths of loved ones or relatives being harmed. While I can't say with certainty that this was a major factor in the conflict, I maintain that as a theoretical framework, this is a strong argument that applies in other contexts. For example, in the drawn-out conflict in Northern Ireland, even today, 30 years after the worst of the violence has passed, many Protestants report an emotional memory connected to family members killed by the Irish Republican Army, and vice versa, many Catholics report how fresh the conflict feels because of members of their families killed or harmed by Protestant violence (BBC, 2013). In the case of Libya, I am certain that examples of this will emerge in the next five to ten years. Additionally, there may simply be a lack of reporting on such issues. This is certainly a potential area for future study in Libya. Will polarization between Madkhali-Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood persist in violent ways even after formal peace has been achieved?

I propose that there is evidence to support the idea that social conflict will persist past the end of the civil war. This lies in Madkhali violence outside of acceptable situations, which for our purposes here includes legitimate conflict with other militias, imprisoning violent perpetrators, etc. The examples I will cite here are clearly outside the context of warfare.

In 2017, the Special Deterrence Force, a Madkhali-Salafi affiliated militia, shut down a Comic Con convention held in Tripoli. Despite being loyal to the Western-backed Government of National Accord, which had officially approved the convention, they arrested over twenty people under allegations of breaching the country's "morals and modesty." A number of those arrested "were told that Libya is a Muslim country not a free/liberal country." The SDF claimed that this event is "derived from abroad and exploit[s] weakness of religious faith and fascination with foreign cultures." One event organizer said that those who were detained were later beaten by the SDF (BBC, 2017).

According to a 2018 U.S. report on international religious freedom in Libya, LNA-aligned Madkhali-Salafi groups are to blame for torture, “physical attacks, sexual assaults, detentions, kidnappings, and killings” against “religious minorities, including Christian migrants, converts to Christianity, and foreign residents.” The report also indicates that the SDF has started to enforce their version of Islamic law. For instance, the SDF detained a Coptic Christian man in the “Mitiga Airport Prison facility in Tripoli for two weeks” where “he was flogged twice a day...” Other reports detail a Moroccan woman, Ghizlane Soukane, who was arrested “on charges of practicing sorcery and magic” and who has since disappeared. The SDF arrested another Coptic man because they thought it was illegal for him to practice medicine as a non-Muslim. Furthermore, in areas where there were no laws relating to women’s dress and free movement, the SDF and the Nawasi Brigade imposed strict restrictions on conduct they deemed un-Islamic (US Embassy in Tripoli, 2018). These punishments extend beyond formal law and demonstrate an increase in force and arbitrary detention. Indeed, many Madkhali groups have been key players in keeping local peace and countering terrorism in Libya, but they have also become the primary instigators of domestic and institutional—even if unofficial—violence.

As previously mentioned, Hume’s “is-ought” fallacy may explain the normalization of Madkhali evolution, but I was unable to find the necessary statements to concretely back this up. So as I use Hume’s theory here, it remains only a theoretical backbone to conceptualize the progression of Madkhali development. Notably, as the Madkhali-Salafis garnered more clout and control over security institutions, the acceptability of violence against other militias became normalized, and furthermore, they gained more control over religious institutions. One Derna resident said in 2018:

In Benghazi they control all the mosques now, and Rabee al-Madkhali’s literature is everywhere to the exclusion of work by other scholars, particularly those they disagree with. In their sermons they denounce the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists but also Sufis, secularists, liberals and the whole idea of democracy and pluralism”(Crisis Group Report, 2019).

In the confluence of religious power and security/military power, it is no surprise that the lines between the two have blurred; however,

this observation from the Derna resident is not evidence of the normalization of violence but rather evidence of the widespread nature of their influence in Libya.

What does comprise evidence of normalizing violence is Madkhali-Salafi escalation, especially the 2016 assassination of a political rival carried out by Rabee al-Madkhali's supporters. A subunit of the Special Deterrence Force, a hardline Salafi group called the Crime Fighting Apparatus, "reportedly kidnapped and killed Nader al-Umrani, the head of the Ghariani-led Dar al-Ifta's Islamic Research and Studies Council," which oversees religious rulings around Tripoli (Wehrey and Boukhars, 2019). Ghariani is a staunch critic of Rabee al-Madkhali, and the rivalry between the followers of Ghariani and al-Madkhali has its roots in the months and years immediately following the 2011 revolution when the two groups competed for ideological control over Tripoli's religious institutions (p. 131).

In summary, Madkhali security forces started applying the brutality of conflict to their policing, and their religious dogma created another dimension for their violence to occupy. Because of the violence that "is" in the context of warfare, they figured that they "ought" to use the same methods in other spheres, including religious and political ones. Underneath all this, and perhaps most significantly, status and hierarchy – namely, competition with Islamists – stands out as the true psychological motivators behind the Salafis motives. In the case of Libya, this takes the form of religious, security, and ideological struggles that were strong enough to motivate Madkhali Salafis to shed their apolitical skins and join the fray of institutions and governments.

Conclusion

Up to now, I have excluded religious thought as a significant factor in mobilizing al-Madkhali's followers, besides the fact that it contributes to the strength of the in-group social bond. I have done this because, despite the exclusive and harsh attitudes among this Salafist group, they would not be displaying their current extrajudicial violence in Libya without the effects of the civil war, manipulative leadership, and psychological factors. While not every point I considered ended up being relevant, the majority of the factors I explored indicated that my theory has legitimacy. First, the

civil war, Libya's dependence on oil, and the poor economy created an environment where mobilizing became socially and economically beneficial. Second, Rabee al-Madkhali guided his followers to participate in elections, coalesce into militias, and largely remain loyal to Haftar's forces. Lastly, al-Madkhali's followers mobilized in ways that psychologists would expect, seeing high amounts of youth engagement and mobilizing in order to politically supersede Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood.

It is only under this framework that these Salafis have gained enough influence to impose their strict interpretation of Islam across Libya. Certainly, this poses a threat to future stability in Libya. Even after the civil war ends, the country will live with an increased animosity between these Madkhali-Salafis and their Islamist opponents.

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Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Modernity in Turkish Society

Evaluating Far-Right Viewpoints Among Turkish Youth

Just last year in July, under the command of President Erdogan, Turkey reverted the Hagia Sophia to a mosque. This came as a shock for many in the Western world since up until this point, Turkey had appeared to them as a prime example of a budding secular liberal state in the Middle East. The decision to revert the Byzantine cathedral into a mosque was diametrically opposed to the ideals of Mustafa Kemal, who had turned it into a museum nearly ninety years ago in the name of statewide secularization.

For the most part, Turkish citizens and political figures applauded the mosque's conversion. Many Muslims living in the Middle East region outside of Turkey seemed to hold the same opinion. Meanwhile, Turkish nationalists glorified the choice, having long considered the Hagia Sophia's museum status a representation of Western imperialism in the form of imposed cultural secular values. A New York Times opinion article at the time echoed the shock of many Westerners by saying, "It is a sad reflection on the state of Turkey's democracy that a monument of such global importance and value should become an authoritarian leader's political tool" (New York Times Editorial Board, 2020).

Besides a return to Islamic conservative values, many politicians and state leaders have taken hard stances against the inflow of ethnic minorities into Turkey. A political culture has developed within the country that no longer feels attached to core civil liberties associated with liberal democracy but is more politically traditional and less tolerant of ethnic diversity (Kirişci & Sloat, 2019), creating political polarization along religious-nationalist and secular-globalist lines.

Moreover, it is not only a top-down state-sponsored approach

that is reflecting newfound illiberal ideals. An increasing number of the citizenry are also beginning to embrace extreme strands of ethno-nationalism and religious fundamentalism (Karaveli, 2019). Resentment towards ethnic minorities in Turkey has increased substantially over the past decade among Turks (Kirişci & Sloat, 2019), with concepts of racial hierarchies and the “purity of the Turkish race” becoming more commonplace in the Turkish political sphere (Xypolia, 2016). This includes many Turkish youth who have also started adopting this quasi-Islamic and nationalistic viewpoint (Rydgren, 2018). As opposed to the secular and liberal viewpoints of many youth in Western and European countries (Bullard, 2015) , almost half of Turkish youth still identify as traditional conservative (Konda 2018).

Why did Turkey shift politically towards nationalist authoritarianism with traditionally religious overtones rather than pursuing the secular liberal model which Western European Countries have followed? In particular, why is this newfound “Islam nationalism” as I call it, attractive to many Turkish youth? In this paper, I seek to outline why some Turkish youth prefer Islam nationalism over secular liberalism. If we can answer why this political shift is occurring among Turkish youth, we can understand in part why the Turkish political zeitgeist has shifted in this direction. Additionally, understanding this trend could allow more accurate predictions for how mainstream nationalist movements in Turkey may look in twenty to thirty years.

For this paper, I theorize that the shift towards Islam nationalism among Turkish youth has two major contributing factors. The first is that ethnic cleavages, which have developed among Syrians residing in Turkey and ethnic Turks, have sharpened the distinctions between Turkish and Syrian identities. The result is animosity from young Turkish nationalists who feel that sharing political power and dividing economic resources with their Syrian neighbors is a threat to their own economic prospects, as well as to the prospects of their fellow ethnic Turks. The second factor is a dissatisfaction with modernity as a method of providing personal meaning. Many youth in Turkey feel isolated and lack purpose. Some who have suffered from this have begun looking to ethnic kinship and religion for meaning. Turkish youth who fall in the Islam nationalist category may see ethnic heritage and a traditionally religious way of living as a way to show themselves

and their fellow peers where they belong in society.

Some of the terms I will be using such as “liberalism” or “modernity” have various definitions. So, to avoid confusion, I will first seek to define key concepts which may hold differing connotations. I will then briefly explain the history of religious nationalism in Turkey as well as some of the major mainstream theories regarding it, followed by a more precise elaboration of the theory I am presenting. I will seek to support my claims through an interview process targeting ethnic Turks who identify as both ethno-nationalists and Muslims. About half of the questions which I will present to the interviewees will focus on revealing if ethnic tension between the Syrians and Turks living in Turkey is a major contributing factor to their worldview. The other half of the questions will seek to confirm if their traditionalist worldview is a reaction to social and economic liberalism.

Key Concepts

When referring to liberalism throughout this paper, I will involve its various aspects. Primarily, it is a political system that seeks to promote individual liberty, freedom, and democracy (Minogue et al., 2020). Liberalism also entails a heavy focus on a separation of church and state, in order to isolate religion as much as possible from political decisions. I also am including economic liberalism in my definition, which involves private ownership of the means of production and competitive markets that state monopolies do not control. This means globalized institutions such as multinational corporations are included, as well as multi-state agreements created to maintain or expand the democratic peace (Rosato, 2005). While understanding that there are differences between classical liberalism and neoliberalism, I will focus on this broader definition that includes both ideologies.

Throughout this paper, I will also be referencing the term “modernity”. What I mean by this is the encapsulation of current political phenomena brought about by Western liberalism. This includes the presence of Western hegemonic powers, the increased advocacy for civil rights, and the impact of globalization. One of the impacts of globalization is globalism, which is an ideology that promotes the free exchange and movement of goods, information, and people (American Heritage, 2021).

My definition for Islamo-nationalism is an ideology that

seeks to combine traditional Islamic values with contemporary ethno-nationalism. By rejecting modern day liberal values, Islamo-nationalism is a unique reaction against modernity. Additionally, by focusing primarily on the distinction of Turks from other ethnic groups, it is exclusionary in nature and seeks to promote the welfare of Turks before any other group. To create social cohesion as well as a strong lasting identity, Islamo-nationalism incorporates values which are viewed as traditional by Muslims. Whether or not Islamo-nationalism incorporates these values, the ideology will regardless claim to protect and adhere to them to help maintain its influence. I also define Islamo-nationalism as a collectivist ideology, which seeks to promote the welfare of the nation as a whole rather than focusing on personal liberation and individual rights like liberalism does. This means that Islamo-nationalism will tend to be authoritarian, with a belief in a “strong-man” style of government to ensure the implementation of nationalist and Islamic values.

I will also briefly mention differences between cultural Muslims and practicing Muslims. I will define cultural Muslims as anyone who identifies as Muslim and embraces the celebrations, art, culture, architecture and other traditions made possible through Islam, but does not necessarily believe or worship in an Islamic manner. In contrast, practicing Muslims adhere to Islamic religious practices and believe in the legitimacy of Islam as the correct religion.

Why Religious Nationalism?

Before the end of WWI, Turkish nationalism defined itself as an Ottoman nationalism which derived its loyalty from dynasty, Islam, and the state. Yet in the 1920s, the country’s nationalism began to resemble a Western-inspired nationalist model, which emphasized loyalty to both the state and ethnic homogeneity (Kushner, 1997). In the recent past, Islam has also been implemented in nationalist rhetoric and ideology, resulting in Turkish nationalism synthesizing loyalty to Islamic religiosity to a perceived racial and ethnic separation (Yavuz, 2003).

Several theories exist which attempt to explain the phenomenon of this synthesis. One of the most popular approaches is that Turkish Islamo-nationalism originated primarily as a reaction to the sudden creation of Turkey’s modern state following the Ottoman

Empire's collapse. This approach assumes the premise that an ethno-centric variation of Turkish nationalism was not influential prior to the state's creation, and that Islamo-nationalism was only made possible after the effectiveness of recently modernized European governments was proven. (Taşpınar, 2012). The theory concludes that recent resurgences in political Islam are delayed reactions to Kemalist top-down approaches against religious garb and culture in Turkey. While this theory correctly states that Mustafa Kemal was crucial in forming Turkish ethno-nationalism, it provides no explanation as to how ethno-nationalism became popular without major dissent from the ethnic Turkish populace. This theory discounts any primordial ties of ethnic kinship or cohesion which Kemal would have been able to capitalize on to maintain and secure his own power.

A second theory suggests that the Turkish military's role during the 1980s in implementing Islam using a top-down approach was the main contributing factor to the rise of Islamo-nationalism. The theory suggests that the military saw Islam as a powerful political tool to create order and stabilize their own interests. By fusing Islamic symbols with the nationalist government, they intended to create a more homogenous and cohesive nation. This was done in the hopes of cementing state power, while simultaneously moving people away from left-wing ideologies which it saw as a threat (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008). This theory encounters similar problems to the first one mentioned. While the Turkish military's top-down approach likely played a significant role in shaping Turkish nationalism to include an Islamic religious identity, it assumes that said identity became part of "Turkishness" as a direct result of this approach. Yet Islamic identity has been prevalent in the region much longer than the military's decision.

The last major theory is that the formation of Islamo-nationalism can be attributed to the problem of power sharing caused by political and economic inequalities between ethnic Turks and Syrians (Cederman & Wucherpfennig, 2017). This theory suggests that economic problems have created rifts in Turkish social structures and have been a leading cause for the deference to identity politics in the region (Abbas, 2021). The argument states that weakness in the Turkish economy has played a significant role in creating a negative perception towards perceived outsiders (Erdoğan, 2014). In Turkey's struggling economy, Turks feel a

lack of economic support as their government distributes scarce resources to Syrians living in Turkey. This increases disgruntlement among ethnic Turks towards the Syrians. The result is additional sectarian tension, while an “us versus them” mentality continues to develop. This theory correctly shows how ethnic cleavages among Turks and Syrians have evolved due to competition for power and resources. However, it does not explain why the key component of Islamic religiosity has interwoven itself with Turkish ethno-nationalism.

While the theories mentioned above are correct in as far as they help explain either the Islamic or ethnic components of Islamo-nationalism, they have not yet been synthesized together to create a comprehensive whole. I will do this by highlighting the importance of identity across time while simultaneously presenting a perspective that emphasizes the role ethnic cleavages play in the phenomenon, especially among Turkish youth.

Theory

To show how ethnic cleavages among Syrians and Turks residing in Turkey and dissatisfaction with modernity are causes for Islamo-nationalism, I hypothesize the following:

First, I hypothesize that economic strains in Turkish society have caused resentment and galvanized ethnic division between Turks and Syrians, which have in turn contributed to the rise of Islamo-nationalism. Although Turkey has experienced influxes of ethnic minorities throughout its history, it is the inflow of Syrian refugees which has contributed to the current feelings of resentment and contemporary strand of Turkish ethno-nationalism (Taşpınar, 2012). The beginning of the current wide-spread ethnic tensions between Turks and Syrians started in 2011. Since that time, 3.6 million Syrians have migrated to Turkey (Todd, 2019), creating economic strain as native Turkish businesses are forced to compete with newer Syrian businesses. Additionally, many Syrians as well as Turks are reliant on some form of help from the state to support their families, causing strain in state welfare programs. As a result, it seems to become less disputable that local ethnic Turks’ resentment towards Syrian refugees seems to continue to rise, especially in border cities where Syrians tend to congregate. This resentment primarily stems from economic competition between

the two ethnic groups as they must share limited resources. Yet there has also been a feeling among many that they are losing their home and way of life to foreigners (Aktürk, 2017).

In these regions, housing and medicine are scarce, and rent prices are high (Düvell, 2014). As a result, when local Turks see Syrians opening small businesses or being overrepresented in hospital care, Turks who have already been living in these areas often feel frustrated. Many resent their government for abandoning them in favor of perceived foreigners (Kaya, 2013). Many tradesmen have difficulty finding work due to large numbers of Syrians willing to work for lower wages. As is the case with any country with high levels of immigration, low-skilled native workers are the demographic most likely to feel threatened and resentful since their jobs tend to be most at risk (Richwine, 2016).

In this regard, resentment from economic strain will result in Turks placing an emphasized distinction between themselves and Syrians. As a result of naturally occurring lines of consanguinity between ethnic Turks, Turkish identity is coming into conflict with Syrian identity due to their different perceived histories, cultures, and races. Since Turks in areas with large numbers of Syrian migrants do not view Syrians as their kinsmen, when the government allocates scarce resources to Syrian immigrants instead of Turks, animosities deepen. Turkish youth who live in these areas grow up seeing the resentment caused by the workers who feel disenfranchised in their communities. By seeing their troubling situations, it would become easier for a young Turk to blame the Syrians and accuse them of taking advantage of welfare programs. Additionally, young Turks may view the diversity in these cities as an attempt to undermine their own Turkish identity and culture. In this regard, we can see how contrasting differences between Turkish and Syrian identities may compel some Turks to adopt an ethno-nationalist stance.

Yet this only accounts for Turkey's rising ethno-nationalism and not the more recent incorporation of political Islam. To explain this, I argue that a metaphysical, a-rational component is also present, which is centered in resentment towards modernity. Turkish reversion to Islamo-nationalism as a collective a-rational decision reaffirms the important role that "stickiness" of ethnic and religious identities plays in creating ideology (Varshney, 2003). Resentment of modernity most likely would feed off the

consanguinity found within common Turkish kinship (Connor, 1978) to create a common shared experience, which is Islam in this case.

Islam also is shaping identity among Turkish youth from a psychological perspective as well. There exists a substantial number of youth around the world who believe liberalism has failed to provide personal meaning and well-being (Creutzig, 2020). One reason for this is the correlation with individualism and the increasing number of people suffering from depression and feeling isolated (Schnell et al., 2018). By attributing the increased number of youth who feel disenfranchised or purposeless to the individualism that liberalism promotes, nationalist youth may justify rejecting liberalism as a whole in favor of religious institutions which have successfully proven themselves intergenerationally to provide personal meaning and purpose (Saarelainen, 2018).

Modernity has also brought the world Western liberal universal values which seek to promote human rights and individual liberty. Economic liberalization has brought investment from multinational corporations to developing countries, thereby boosting their economies, and creating consumer friendly spaces for great economic prosperity. However, many individuals in Turkey may feel that the global expansion of these institutions have eroded local identities and created rootless societies. The response is the same one that acts against the current global institutions' failed provision of personal meaning. This shows that the surge of Islamo-nationalism in Turkey is a reaction to Western hegemony whose roots extend far beyond economic ailments and material concerns (Tuğal, 2002).

By reclaiming indicators and laws that defined their local and shared identity in the past, Islamo-nationalist Turkish youth can feel unique pride for their own ethnic group instead of in universal humanist values. By virtue of an individual's cultural style and an emphasis on the shared identity of being a "Turk" instead of a more local identity predicated on province or city (Gellner, 2006), Turkish nationalism has begun embracing aspects such as religious practices and traditions that are common throughout the nation in a reaction against perceived foreign threat from the liberal West.

Research Design

Since my research concerns the younger generation of Turkish nationalists, interviewees in my sample were 15-35 years old, in addition to identifying as both Muslim and ethno-nationalist. In terms of gender demographics, I interviewed seven males and seven females, coming to a total of fourteen interviewees. The reason for the even split between males and females was because I am studying nationalist views among youth, not just among one gender in particular. As a disclaimer, my analysis will not speak for every Turk living in Turkey, nor for every Turkish nationalist. I recognize that multiple Turkish nationalisms exist, including Kemalist, ethnic, and conservative (Uzer, 2020), as well as various liberal and communist nationalisms. I also recognize that there are many Turks who would like liberal values implemented in the Turkish political system. My research does not seek to encapsulate the full depth of ideological variations in Turkey, but instead will focus on how some Turkish youths synthesize ethnic nationalism with political Islam to create a unique identity.

Additionally, since I am only focusing on Islamo-nationalists' individual world views and value structures, I will not use Erdogan's rise, nor perceptions of Erdogan's policies amongst the broader Turkish populace to prove how Turkish nationalism is moving in one particular way. My research focus is not to give a comprehensive view of rising nationalist sentiments in Turkey, nor to provide any reasons for why many Turks are supporting more conservative political figures. It will also, for continuity's sake, focus only on nationalism and perceptions among ethnic Turks, and not from ethnic minorities within Turkey. Given these parameters, I will take a qualitative approach to testing my theory by directly interviewing self-identifying Islamo-nationalists of ethnic Turkish background.

To find willing participants who fit the criteria of being both a Turkish ethno-nationalist and a Muslim, I decided to use the internet. I used two online applications to find Turks who fit my requirements and with whom I could speak. They were HelloTalk and Instagram. HelloTalk is a mobile application that pairs two people who want to learn one another's language. The other application, Instagram, was extremely beneficial in finding more radical nationalists. Instagram allows people to find other accounts like theirs, and on the application exist many tight knit communities of radical groups. I found the far-right Turkish

community quickly, since many far-right Turkish accounts follow each other on the application. Most accounts did not use their real names or pictures, and instead used avatars of important Turkish political leaders or generals for their accounts. While some may consider the anonymity of these online communities to delegitimize scholarly work, I do not. Hiding behind an anonymous face allows radical online Turkish nationalists to freely speak their opinions without the social pressure a face-to-face interview might create when discussing dissident opinions.

I chose both HelloTalk and Instagram because I wanted a broad range of variation for levels of religiosity and nationalist views among my sample. I assumed that Turkish nationalist Instagram accounts, due to their anonymous nature, would attract nationalists with more extreme views, while HelloTalk would provide more nationalists with moderate views.

Once individuals expressed interest in being interviewed, I confirmed that the participants fit the requirements of being an ethnic Turk, identified as a Muslim, and was within the 15-35 age range. I additionally asked for their gender and the province in which they resided. If they were not comfortable telling me their home province, I asked if their city had a lot of Syrian residents who migrated there. Then, I asked them to put themselves on a scale from 1-10 on how religious they were, with lower numbers representing being more culturally Muslim and higher numbers being more practicing Muslim. I also asked them to put themselves on a scale from 1-10 as to how ethno-nationalistic they were, based on how racially conscious and collectivist they identified. I informed them that besides the 32 fixed questions I would ask, I might ask additional follow up questions for clarification purposes.

Although gathering data using online applications limits the legitimacy of a representative sample size, my intent is not to represent the broader views on nationalistic trends in Turkey. I am looking for Turkish Islamo-nationalist youth who see both their ethnicity and religion as essential parts of their nationalism, and I am seeking to understand their rationale for this belief.

Hypotheses

In order to test my hypotheses, I will compare my predictions to the answers I receive from the Turkish Islamo-nationalists I

interview.

Hypothesis 1: To discover if Syrian migration plays a significant role in the formation of Islamo-nationalism, I hypothesize that Turks living in cities with higher levels of Syrians will have more concern with Syrian demographic growth in Turkey. I predict that due to limited state and private resources in these areas, Turks will feel like they are competing economically with Syrians and thereby harbor more concern.

In Hypothesis 1, I asked several questions regarding the interviewee's views on Syrians in Turkey and which ways they would solve the current problems they faced. Such questions included:

1. Do you think multiculturalism is good in Turkish society?
2. Do you support Turkey's decision to allow Syrian migrants to immigrate to Turkey in large numbers back in 2011?
3. Is it possible for Syrians and Turks to have good relations if they both live in Turkey?
4. Do you think Syrians should go back to their original country? Why or why not? If not, should the Turkish government incentivize Syrians to leave Turkey once Syria is stable?
5. Do you have concerns about the birthdates of Syrians in Turkey as opposed to Turkish birth rates?

Hypothesis 2: I predict that those who identify as practicing Muslims will feel more camaraderie with Syrian Muslims due to shared religious identity. Practicing Turkish Muslims who believe that all Muslims are part of the Ummah (Zaher, 2021) regardless of race or ethnicity might lead them to prioritize Islamic identity over ethnic identity. This is opposed to cultural Muslims who might view Islam merely as a subcomponent of Turkish identity and could be more likely to regard ethnic Syrians as outsiders, despite religious similarity. Therefore, my second hypothesis is that Islamo-nationalists who identify strongly as culturally Muslim will be more nationalistic than practicing Muslims.

In order to help test for Hypothesis 2, prior to the interview I will ask the participants to place themselves on a scale from 1-10 as to how ethno-nationalistic they would consider themselves, with 1 believing in the complete free exchange of people from Syria to Turkey and 10 being a desire to deport as many ethnic minorities

from Turkey as possible. I also asked them to put themselves on a scale from 1-10 as to how culturally Muslim or practicing Muslim they would consider themselves, with 1 being agnostic/atheist but recognizing the importance Islam has had in crafting Turkish identity, and 10 being a devout Muslim who believes in the truthfulness of Islam in addition to the cultural aspects. I did this to see if my prediction that higher levels of religiosity among Islamo-nationalists correlated with lower concern for ethnic homogeneity.

Hypothesis 3: I hypothesize that Turkish ethno-nationalists who believe modernity has eroded their national identity will identify as more nationalistic on the scale. I predict this will occur since the more disenfranchised a Turkish youth will feel, the more likely they will want a return to a more traditional and homogenous society. By asking questions regarding how they view the current state of Western culture and liberal values as well as where they see themselves in their own society, I should be able to determine this.

In order to find out if those who believed modernity had eroded their national identity would also have high levels of nationalism, I asked the interviewees the following questions for Hypothesis 3:

1. What are your thoughts on democracy?
2. Do you believe globalism and its institutions have stripped you, acquaintances, or people in your nation of personal meaning?
3. What are your thoughts on Western liberalism, and how would you define it?
4. Do you think the West is immoral right now?
5. Do you believe Western commerce and multinational corporations are eroding your identity?

Results

I found that regarding Hypothesis 1, the young Islamo-nationalists I interviewed held negative views towards Syrians and often harbored racial resentment. Additional references from them about Syrians unfairly using Turkey's state benefits shows that competition for state resources is a major concern for Islamo-nationalists living in regions with high percentages of

Syrian migrants. 10/14 of the participants lived in provinces with significant Syrian minority populations including Istanbul, İzmir, and Şanlıurfa. 9/10 of the participants living in provinces with large Syrian minority populations held negative views towards the Syrians present in their country.

Additionally, 8/10 of those participants brought up concerns with Syrian “overbreeding” or “overpopulation” during the interview, even using those precise terms . Of those who expressed this concern, 5/10 mentioned it before I asked Question 8, which was my only question regarding Syrian birth rates. This indicates that there is a correlation between the presence of Syrian refugees in a province and Turkish Islamo-nationalist resentment due to




Figure 1: Turkish Islamo-Nationalist Views Towards Syrian Migrants




Figure 2: Concern for Syrian Migrant “Overbreeding” or “Overpopulation” Among Turkish Islamo-Nationalists

concern of long-term regional demographic change.

Several quotes from the interviewees regarding their negative views towards Syrians in Turkey and their current birth rate include:

Although the Syrians benefit from all of Turkey's facilities, they still hate Turks from Turkey. (anonymous 28-year-old female, Istanbul province)

Syrian people don't pay taxes, they go to Turkish hospitals without paying anything, they don't go into military service while Turkish people do. Syrians just muck around and hurt the economy. Would you like them? If so, let Syrians come to your country. Syrians do not love Turkey; they just don't have any place to go. That is why they stay here. If Syrians want to live in Turkey indefinitely, they need to learn how to live like a Turk. We don't want them to turn Turkey into Syria. Syria is back where they came from, so if they love their culture and their country, they can go back anytime. Nobody is trying to keep them here. (Faruk 35-year-old male, Istanbul province)

The reason we don't like Syrians is because they behave as if they were in their own country. They talk rough and harass our women in every way. Their culture does not suit us. We cannot get more immigrants and the state knows it. (Esma 18-year-old female, Istanbul province)

Syrians in our country have been given too many rights. They live better than us, and they breed too much - they are dangerous. It is not possible for us to get along. We are culturally different, they have a different language, different race, and if it were up to them, they would just always have sex and have children. Look at the state now. Our language is Turkish. They stabbed us in the back throughout history. We Turks have had animosity with Arabs for 1300 years. (Kaan Ozuturk (Instagram alias) 18-year-old male, İzmir province)

Syrians are Arabs, and Arabs will never get along with Turks. Turks can help Syrian women, children and their elderly. But there are so many Syrian men that don't have problems with health. But rather than fighting for their country, they come here and make a ton of babies and those children become beggars. A Syrian having ten kids is a parasite for the entire society. Since there are a lot of ethnic divides here, I am more racially aware of my Turkishness because of this. (Toghrul 16-year-old male, Iğdır province)

I do not see a Syrian as my brother. But I do not see him as an enemy either. But if he is hostile to me or to Turkishness, I will end his lineage. (Yaşım 16-year-old male, Şanlıurfa province)

Regarding Hypothesis 2, after mapping out the levels of nationalism from the interviewees on a scale from 1-10 and their levels of religiosity on a scale from 1-10, I found that a correlation between the two did not seem to exist since responses varied greatly. This means that the results Hypothesis 2 are invalid, as




Figure 3: Combined Levels of Nationalism (1-10)





Figure 4: Combined Levels of Religiosity (1-10)

it is inconclusive if low levels of Islamic religiosity correlate with high levels of nationalism.

I found that in respect to Hypothesis 3, my sample selection showed great variety regarding views on modernity and liberalism among Islamo-nationalist youth in Turkey. In my findings, there was only one participant who did not like democracy and only three participants who said they wanted to implement Islamic law or values into their legal code. However, when pressed regarding specific social issues such as gay marriage, only two were ok with it being legalized. There was also great concern among many of the participants that Western corporations would come to Turkey and bring secularism and liberalism to their native culture. When asked to express their views on Western countries, 9/14 considered the West very immoral. Yet regarding how they felt about Western influence, there was great variation.

For those with higher levels of nationalism, or 5-10 on the scale, there were six who approved of Western globalism and



*Figure 5: Perceptions of the Morality of Western Countries
Among Turkish Islamo-Nationalists*




Figure 6: Views of Western Globalism Among Islamo-Nationalists

five that disapproved of it. This rendered the third hypotheses inconclusive.

Several quotes worth mentioning which regard modernity and liberalism included:

The current cultural status in the West is bad. The spirit of nationalism is disappearing. (Farkas, a 26-year-old male, Van province)

I have negative thoughts about liberalism in general. I would define it as weakness and no sense of pride at all.

The newest generations nowadays don't care about tradition anymore, making them want to live in a fully Westernized culture, which is also a big problem.

My thought on democracy is that it shatters the unity between our people. I think everyone in the country should be governed under one authority, encouraging them to serve the nation equally no matter what gender, social class, or fame. Though, I absolutely despise a tyrannical regime that torments its people. (Sinan 23-year-old male, Istanbul province)

While Western liberalism may seem good as a word, it also has its bad sides. It's sad that overly competitive countries are born and come into situations that will kill people with this ambition. I think the capitalist system is good only for the rich. But globalization is a good thing, I think. We need each other as countries. (Esma 18-year-old female, Istanbul province)

Greedy corporations have come in and destroyed Turkish culture. If it were up to me, I would make sure that businesses only were able to operate if they benefited the people and enriched the culture instead of selling it off like they do in the West. (Salur 21-year-old male, Istanbul

province)

Discussion and Conclusion

Results did show collective resentful feelings towards Syrian refugees from participants living in provinces with high numbers of Syrian migrants, as predicted by Hypothesis 1. Moreover, it seems that their close interactions with Syrian migrants have played a significant role in the formation of their Islamo-nationalist worldview. The reason for this is Islamo-nationalist Turkish youth who I interviewed perceive the growing number of Syrians in their home provinces as a direct threat to either their own identity and economic prospects, or the identity and economic prospects of their perceived kinsmen. This suggests that in their view, the more the Syrian population in Turkey grows, be that through natural birth rates or migrant in-flow, the more likely there will be economic and cultural displacement for native ethnic Turks.

Despite my other two hypotheses resulting in inconclusive predictions, I discovered vital information regarding their future potential. Even though a compelling correlation was not found between high levels of nationalism and being culturally Muslim as predicted with Hypothesis 2, there was a significant number of cultural Muslims who had high levels of nationalism. This indicates that the inconclusiveness could be a sample size problem and that the subject ought to be explored further.

From Hypothesis 3, I determined that the majority of the Islamo-nationalists I interviewed did view the West as immoral due to Western policies such as the legalization of gay marriage. Yet those who identified with having a higher level of nationalism were split almost equally regarding views on modernity and liberalism. Although this rendered Hypothesis 3 inconclusive, this may show an ideological dichotomy in young Islamo-nationalists' viewpoints, which is torn between both aspects of modernity and traditionalism which they consider valuable. This view is similar to the one given by at the time Prime Minister Erdogan, who during an interview said, "I am not a secularist, I am a Muslim. But I am the prime minister of a secular state" (al-Arabiya, 2011). Like Erdogan, the participants claimed that they too wanted a separation from church and state. Yet when asked about specific social policies such as gay marriage, the majority still wanted to ensure that it stayed illegal.

If Turkish youth who live in cities with a higher density of Syrian migrants are more likely to hold antipathy towards the Syrians, then current Turkish migration trends could play a significant role in the further formation of Islamo-nationalism. The Turkish state's inability to address its native citizenry's economic concerns would only catalyze the current animosity. This also could mean that the current strain of Islamo-nationalism found among the youths which I interviewed could potentially represent a budding movement which in time could see further traction. If Turkey wants to prevent further ethnic antipathy between the two groups, it must find ways to address its native citizenry's economic concerns.

Additionally, if a correlation can eventually be shown that youth who identify as cultural Muslims, as opposed to practicing Muslims, are more prone to higher levels of nationalism and animosity towards Syrian immigrants, then it would show that Islam is being used alongside a Turkish ethno-centric worldview to produce a newly synthesized nationalism. Since this new nationalism's other component is a focus on Islamic conservative values, we could also expect severe opposition to prospective social liberalization efforts in Turkey if Islamo-nationalism continues to be a significant political movement. The Islamo-nationalists who I interviewed said they wanted a separation of church and state in order to prevent Islamic law being mandated by the government. However, they still wanted religiously traditional values implemented within the legal system, which could affect the outcome of potential attempts to implement civil rights in Turkey.

Appendix

1. National Geographic used World Religion Database, Andrew Umentum, eds. World Religion Database (Umentum: Change in Percent of Non-Religious People Within Population, 2005-2015).

2. When I found potential candidates, I sent them the following in the form of a direct message:

Sayın Türk arkadaşlarım,

Maalesef sadece biraz Türkçe biliyorum. Ben üniversitede öğrenciyim ve Türk milliyetçiliğine dair bir araştırma yapıyorum. Türk milliyetçileri ile konuşmak istiyorum. Eğer milliyetçi ve istekli olursanız sizinle görüşmek isterim. Görüşme İngilizce veya Türkçe olacak. 32 sorulu bir anket var. Eğer anket yapmak isterseniz kendinizi Türk, müslüman ve milliyetçi olarak tanımlamanız gerekiyor.

The English translation goes as follows:

My dear Turkish friends,

Unfortunately, I only speak a little bit of Turkish. I am a student in my university and am doing research on Turkish nationalism. I want to talk to Turkish nationalists, so if you are nationalist and willing, I would like to meet you. The interview can be in English or Turkish. I have a list of 32 questions. I also have 3 requirements to answer. my requirements for the interview are, you must be ethnically Turkish, you have to identify as a Muslim, and you have to consider yourself a nationalist”

3. The fixed questions that I asked all of the participants were as follows:

1. Are you proud to be Turkish? Why/why not?
2. What does it mean to be Turkish?
3. Is being Muslim a key part of being Turkish?
4. To you, what does it mean to be a nationalist?
5. Is nationalism racist?
6. Do you support Erdogan? What do you think of him and why?
7. Regarding Atatürk, what do you think of him and why?
8. Regarding Ekrem İmamoğlu, what do you think of him and why?
9. Do you think Selahattin Demirtaş was rightfully imprisoned?
10. What do you think of him and why?
11. Do you think multiculturalism is good in Turkish society?
12. Do you support Turkey’s decision to allow Syrian migrants to immigrate to Turkey in large numbers back in 2011?
13. Is it possible for Syrians and Turks to have good relations if they both live in Turkey?
14. Why do you think some Turks don’t like Syrians in their country?
15. Can Syrians in Turkey be proud of being Syrian, or should they consider themselves Turks if they are living in Turkey?

16. Do you support Turkey preventing Syrians from entering the country?
17. Do you think Syrians should go back to their original country? Why or why not? If not, should the Turkish government incentivize Syrians to leave Turkey once Syria is stable?
18. Do you have concerns about the birthdates of Syrians in Turkey as opposed to Turkish birth rates?
19. What do you like about the West? (Meaning Europe, USA, Australia, Canada)
20. What do you dislike about the West?
21. Do you feel like your culture is threatened by the current Western influences?
22. Do you think Turkey's political interests are threatened by the Western hegemony?
23. What are your thoughts on democracy?
24. Do you think Islamic values should be reflected in Turkish law?
25. Do you believe globalism and its institutions have stripped you, acquaintances, or people in your nation of personal meaning?
26. What are your thoughts on Western liberalism, and how would you define it?
27. What would your thoughts be if gay marriage was legalized in your country?
28. Do you think the West is immoral right now?
29. What are your thoughts on the separation of church and state?
30. Do you support Erdogan's decision to turn the Hagia Sophia back into a mosque?
31. Do you believe Western commerce and multinational corporations are eroding your identity?
32. Have you always believed in nationalist values, or did you adopt them later in your life? What has compelled you to adopt your current nationalist value system?

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Women's Rights Development in the Middle East

The Case for Equity

The international development industry has been traditionally limited to economics, with progress measured by GDP or industrialization stages. But this only tells part of the story. Development also includes human rights, particularly the right of women to fully participate in society and exercise their freedoms. When half of the population is underserved and marginalized, the country cannot reach its full economic, social, or intellectual potential. Women's rights are essential to development. Nuanced approaches to development that advocate equity between the sexes, rather than rudimentary equality, are more successful in advancing women's rights and therefore a nation's development.

The difference between equality and equity is paramount in feminist theory. Equality can be defined as ensuring everyone receives the same opportunities and treatment regardless of the differences between them. It assumes that a single solution is the best for all. But in a patriarchal society, 'all' has historically referred to men, so that "best for all" has often meant "best for men." Uniformity across gender is not successful when the uniform is designed for a male body. Women's unique needs and challenges in a male-biased environment are neglected by assigning the same treatment to both men and women. On the other hand, equity is characterized by proportionality rather than sameness, or giving more to those who need more. Although this means resources are not distributed equally, they are distributed fairly. Women have more disadvantages and face more barriers than men in Middle Eastern society, so they need more support to achieve the same outcomes. This approach holds that only when given more can women truly be equal.

Equity is the necessary next step in development policy. For decades movements for women's empowerment, and by extension international development policies, have focused on gender

neutrality, believing that ignoring the differences between men and women will translate to no difference in outcomes between men and women. But with the advent of the third wave of feminism in the 1990s the validity of this approach has come into question. Economist Diane Elson coined the term “male bias” to refer to the way preferential or discriminatory gender treatment is built into the fabric of the world. Simply applying men’s standards, perspectives, and resources to women cannot fix this deep structural inequality. Gender-aware solutions that value women’s input and experiences are more effective in achieving equality in the long term by compensating for this gap. This paper will discuss challenges to gender equality in the Middle East region and then analyze the approaches to equality and equity of women’s rights development projects in Yemen and Saudi Arabia as geographical case studies in order to argue that policymakers must adopt equity-based strategies on gendered issues in order to achieve full development.

Challenges to Gender Equality

Middle-Eastern tribal customs limited women’s rights by subjugating and objectifying them. One argument for the historical subjugation of women is that they have always had low political bargaining power (Abbott). In a tribal system such as the one that existed in Arabia for hundreds of years, warfare was common. Men’s physiological upper body strength was better suited for combat than women’s lower body strength, and these physiological differences led to a power imbalance. Those who had the strength to enforce decisions were the ones to make those decisions, so women became subordinate. These tribes also heavily emphasized the concept of honor (Charrad). Honor is a source of power because it functions as a measure of social standing and therefore method of enforcing order when community ties are necessary for survival. Honorable behavior is codified in gender-specific ways. For women, honor looks like strict obedience to husbands, perfecting domestic labor, and most importantly sexual purity. All three of these characteristics function as restrictions on women’s physical freedom and create inequality. Honor killings, where a woman who had sexual relations outside of marriage was killed by her male family members, became an accepted part of tribal law. Evidence of this phenomenon is found in Ottoman-era documents

detailing the tradition as a necessary family affair and the existence of a section recommending different methods of execution for adulteresses in Hammurabi's code (Ruggi). This kind of violence rests on the assumption that a woman is an object belonging to her male relatives, capable of sustaining property damage in the form of outside sexual interactions. It is both created by and contributes to the dehumanization of women. Its consequence is the loss of sexual freedom and the right to expression.

Religious traditions provided restrictions on women's rights through the patriarchal authority and social capital of organized religion. Although some interpretations and practices of Islam reinforce traditional gender roles in Middle Eastern society and contribute to women's issues, Islamic theology is not fundamentally misogynist. The Qur'an contains doctrine emphasizing the equality between men and women in their eternal rewards for good deeds, divine potential, and even control of individual income and property (Saleh). Faith on its own leads naturally to the respect of women's rights. But where faith interacts with esoteric policy, as is necessary in organized religion, women find oppression instead. Patriarchal systems handpicked religious justifications from Islam to exert control over women. For example, the command to dress modestly in the Qur'an intersected with patriarchal objectification of women to create a strict dress code under the pretense of divine commandment. In countries such as Iran women are denied the right to free expression, forced by religiously based law and zealous law enforcement to cover their hair and wear loose, dark clothing. Severe regulation of women's bodies creates inequality when compared to their free male counterparts because it can be physically immobilizing and a taxing mental burden to constantly exist in the right way.

Over time, these traditions sustained gender inequality and the modern patriarchal society to keep women inferior to men. In the family unit, men are still decision-makers and expected to govern with a tight fist. This is manifested literally in Saudi Arabia with a guardianship law that up until 2019 prevented women from travelling without permission from a male relative (Wagtendok). Other countries demonstrated the cultural prevalence of restricted movement for women when seven Middle Eastern countries listed "equal rights to legal capacity and freedom of movement" as a reservation in their adoption of the Convention on the Elimination

of All Forms of Discrimination against Women or CEDAW. Several other articles of the convention found offense with culturally embedded gender inequality, so that only two countries ratified the document with no reservations and the rest held an average of four reservations (Lomazzi). Honor killings of women still occur, prompting international outrage but little legal reform with each media cycle (Husseini). Even more common are medically invasive virginity tests before marriage to ensure sexual purity, which have become their own lucrative industry in Egypt and Morocco (Charrad). This practice continues to classify women as sexual goods and deny them of free expression. Most countries in the Middle East today have a legal code based off Islamic sharia law that puts women at a severe disadvantage. They do not share equal rights with men in the eyes of the law. In Saudi Arabia, men can divorce their wives without any consent on the part of the wife, leaving little recourse for her to object (Saleh). On the other hand, women cannot divorce their husbands without his consent in the matter. All of these represent a lack of rights to privacy, free movement, agency, and even life. The continuation of these practices is a challenge to the development of women's rights in the modern Middle East.

Access to Education

Education is an instrumental part of women's rights development. Education is listed as basic human right in both the UN's Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (UNICEF). But education is not just valuable for its own sake. Academic education is linked to higher rates of self-confidence, lower rates of teenage pregnancy, and upward social mobility (Borden). There are also economic benefits to education beyond the increased income from higher-skilled work. Studies in Sierra Leone have found that children who live among women with high educational attainment are likely to have a higher probability of attending school than those who live among uneducated women (Kamanda). This means that girls' education can create a cycle that leads to more education, eventually lifting whole families out of poverty in future generations. Knowledge is a powerful tool for increasing multiple rights, so increasing girls' access to education is paramount for the full development of women's rights.

Yemen is one of the least developed countries of the Middle East region, ranking just 151 out of 177 countries on the Human Development Index (Abdallah). Even before the civil war that broke out in 2013 and has created the world's greatest humanitarian crisis, Yemen was an incredibly impoverished nation. The country has faced consistent currency depreciation since the economic collapse of the 1970s, forcing it to become reliant on foreign aid to simply clothe and feed its people (Abdallah). Even then, about 80% of Yemenis are vulnerable to hunger and malnutrition runs rampant among both the old and young (Borden). Political instability exacerbates these every-day struggles as Yemen underwent a tumultuous civil war in 1994 between the unionist North and separatist South before reaching a tenuous confederation government. Without major interventions, Yemen was on a downward spiral towards complete and utter poverty.

In order to lift its population out of poverty and further develop the nation, the Yemeni government aimed to improve education. They focused on new school construction and teacher hiring throughout the 1990s. The programs found success in overcoming the geographic barriers most Yemeni children face in achieving their education. Previously, Yemen's widely spread-out demography meant most children had to walk over an hour through the desert terrain to reach the nearest school. Increasing the number of schools and teachers in rural areas provided a solution to this problem, enabling more children to attend school, especially secondary school. But although the initiative increased overall enrollment, these traditional approaches to increasing education had very little impact on the gender disparity in education. As of 2005, there was still a 41.4% gap in enrollment between girls and boys after the age of 12 (Abdallah). The government's top-down, gender-blind approach to education reform was unsuccessful.

To better understand the failures of this initial approach, the UN launched a qualitative policy investigation of the barriers to girls' education in Yemen. Through interviews with local Yemenis in 2007 they discovered that a plurality of the families were not biased against education for girls. There was no demonization of girls' education, rather school attendance was viewed as acceptable for both sexes. But the families were biased against mixing boys' and girls' attendance in co-education. Because of this perspective, a lack of female teachers or separate female classes was among

the top reasons parents gave for girls' withdrawal from school (Abdallah). Cultural perceptions of girls as inherently more vulnerable to physical and sexual violence has created a history of gender segregation in Yemen. Parents want to protect their daughters and their honor more than they want to educate those daughters. Therefore, a solution that addresses this cultural value is necessary to implement real change in the region.

The difference between equitable and equal approaches to development led to the project's failure, and then its success. An equal approach to education, as Yemen had been implementing before, called for universally expanded education. The emphasis was on the quantity of education available, and boys and girls received the same education in the same classrooms from the same teachers. However, an equitable approach to education recognizes the unique cultural needs of girls and builds girls-only classes or schools to address those needs. Gender equality in education and enrollment could only be achieved through differential treatment. Recognizing that resources must be , the Yemeni government partnered with the World Bank in 2008 to launch a massive female teacher hiring and retainment initiative (World Bank). While the civil war that erupted in 2013 disrupted this project, preliminary data indicated that the program was highly successful in increasing both the enrollment and retainment of female students (World Bank).

A second explanation for gender disparity in education found by the UN is a lack of cultural emphasis on education for girls. In a 1997 survey, 28% of women who had dropped out of secondary school reported that they had already had enough school or they simply disliked school (Abdallah). These personal explanations reflect a larger disregard for girls' education in rural Yemeni society. While families may not be opposed to girls' education, they are not strongly in favor of it. There is no incentive for women to pursue and continue their academic education in a society where women are traditionally limited to the roles of homemakers despite the positive externalities of academic education.

Yemen addressed this second causal mechanism with another equitable approach, allocating resources proportionately to need. In order to create an incentive for families to send their daughters to school, the Yemeni government designed a conditional cash transfer program in 2004. In its first iteration, 275 schools provided

families with the equivalent of US\$35 cash per daughter with 80% attendance and a final passing grade (World Bank). It is difficult for families to see the benefits of education because they are long-term by nature and may not translate directly to increased income for women who do end up staying at home as wives and mothers. They have no clear reason to prioritize school. Cash transfers are a relatively easy way to manufacture motivation because they tie the outcome to a tangible reward. There is a clear, immediate benefit to the action of going to school. Although this money may not be equally dispersed among families in a community because it applies to girls and not boys, it is equitably dispersed. Girls need more motivation to attend school, so the answer is to reward them more for attending school. The program significantly increased girls' attendance (World Bank). Ultimately equal attendance and education will be reached through a fair distribution of resources.

Participation in the Workforce

The right and ability to work is a major aspect of women's rights development. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights includes the right to work and free choice of employment (Assad). Work is the ultimate expression of purpose and capability. It is a source of identity, recognizing individuality and also offering social connections based on that identity. Work represents freedom to move in the public sphere, contrary to traditional gender roles that limit women to the private sphere. It also leads to economic independence. Women who can support themselves by earning a livelihood are no longer dependent on men, but equal to them. Therefore, it is imperative to create an environment that not only facilitates but encourages women's participation in the workforce.

Saudi Arabia is one of the richest yet most economically underdeveloped countries in the world. It owns the second largest oil reserves in the world and derives over half of its revenue from the exportation of oil. However, oil prices are dropping, and oil is a finite resource that will eventually run out. This is not a sustainable economic model. Saudi Arabia recognizes this issue and is attempting to develop and diversify its economy. Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman has issued his grand modernization plan, Vision 2030, to reduce the country's dependence on crude oil and become a developed, modern nation. One of the target

goals of Vision 2030 is increasing women's employment rate from 22% to 30% (Omran). Including women in the workforce is a key part of this plan for economic development. Increasing the size of the labor force automatically increases the income generated. Additionally, increased income in turn increases consumption and further expands economic activity. Beyond simple quantity, women provide valuable contributions to the workforce. They have talent, intelligence, and unique perspectives that generate high quality work in every sector. Squandering this potential would be an enormous economic loss.

Saudi Arabia is notorious for its oppression of women in the public sphere and has taken measures to change this as part of Vision 2030. Gender roles are codified in Saudi Arabia's laws. Women must wear a full head and body covering in public, are not permitted to interact with men other than relatives, have historically been banned from driving, and require a male guardian's written permission for any sort of travel or work outside of the home (Kucinkas). These restrictions on women's movement and behavior present a major limitation to their participation in the workforce and prevent Saudi Arabia's full economic development. Until 2016, because of laws on extra-familial contact, women and men were prohibited from working alongside each other in the workplace. As part of the reforms implementing Vision 2030, job segregation between genders is no longer required by law (Kucinkas). Men and women can now work in the same office space and enjoy theoretically equal employment opportunity.

However, this simple rule change to treat men and women equally does not address the reality of women's historical exclusion from the workplace and has therefore failed to accomplish its goal. The physical and cultural legacy of sex segregation can still be felt. Physically, most workspaces do not address women's needs. They lack female-specific bathrooms, lunchrooms, and prayer rooms—all spaces which are still legally required to be segregated by gender (Kucinkas). Companies must choose between either incurring extra costs to remodel their offices or simply continuing to hire men. Their budgets make the choice clear. In addition, women are still not culturally accepted in traditionally male workplaces. Biased hiring processes and sexism within the workplace both block women from entering the workforce and encourage them to leave. This has prevented women's employment rates from catching

up and becoming equal to men's employment rates (Hussein). An approach based on equality is so far unsuccessful in increasing women's participation in the workforce.

Saudi Arabia has made some equitable reforms that more adequately address the issue by compensating for women's unique challenges. Most cities in Saudi Arabia do not have public transportation programs, forcing women to pay for male chauffeurs to commute to work. In 2017 Prince Mohammed bin Salman announced that Saudi women would be able to drive for the first time, albeit during certain hours of the day (Al-Ubaydli). This decision was a major step in bringing more women into the workforce because it provided a means of independent transportation. Furthermore, the labour ministry currently offers women vouchers for ride-share services like Uber to help them commute when driving is not possible (Omran). These vouchers are an equitable development strategy because they are specifically available to women, the group that faces an identity-bound hardship. Women need extra assistance to commute to work and therefore contribute to the labor force that men simply don't need because of their historical privilege. By recognizing this reality and addressing women's needs as separate and unique from men's, the two groups can actually achieve the end goal of equality.

Further equitable reforms address distinctly female needs. The Saudi government also announced the creation of 233 new childcare centers in 2018 (Al-Ubaydli). Providing childcare is critical to allowing women in the workforce because it reduces the uniquely female barrier of motherhood. Multiple studies from around the world have found correlation between childcare availability and parent labor force participation (Ansel). Women face a burden that has been coined by Arlie Hochschild as the "second shift." This refers to the expectations that women will nourish, teach, play with, clean up after, and fulfill all the daily needs of their children. Men are not expected to perform these tasks, not because they are incapable of them but simply because this is how labor has been historically divided, providing them with a natural advantage in the workplace. Giving women equal opportunities to participate in the public sphere without reducing their workload in the private sphere is to give them an inherent disadvantage and therefore unequal opportunity. Childcare centers offer a solution to this problem by removing some of those "second shift" burdens for women.

By allocating government funding to this childcare initiative, the Saudi government is providing a nuanced, equitable resolution to the advancement of women's rights. This equity will encourage the development of women's rights through participation in the workforce.

Despite these initiatives, in order to be more equitable and truly advance women's participation in the labor force, Saudi Arabia must invest in more direct women-specific work force initiatives. The government should subsidize the cost of providing physical facilities for women in offices. This would reduce the burden companies face by hiring women and allow for more female employees. Another option to incentivize hiring more female workers is to provide tax breaks or other financial compensation for companies who reach a certain quota of gender diversity. The government has already implemented Saudization quotas that require business to hire a certain percentage of Saudi employees rather than foreign employees (Al-Ubaydli). It would not be unfeasible to apply this method to gender and create gender diversity quotas to encourage companies to hire more women. Quotas may seem unfair or unequal because they allocate jobs by identity rather than merit. Ideally, hiring based solely on merit would achieve the same results. But it does not, as exemplified by the experience of women in Saudi Arabia over the last four years. Equitable approaches that make up the difference between men and women's socially constructed advantages are necessary to ultimately achieve equality.

Conclusion

Women's rights are an instrumental part of a country's development and can be achieved more quickly and meaningfully through equitable development strategies rather than equal development strategies. The difference in creating these strategies is listening to the voices of women to discover what specific barriers they face. The researchers in Yemen relied on qualitative data from personal interviews to understand the situation. The policymakers in Saudi Arabia gathered demographic information and conducted surveys to understand the situation. In future enterprises, policymakers must follow this same pattern of earnest listening to understand the situation. The highest form of gender

equity in the development field is making women's voices a priority above men's voices in the decision-making process, thereby leading to equitable and successful solutions.

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Tales of Enlightenment

Literary Universals in Kalīla wa-Dimna

Ibn al-Muqaffa's rendition of *Kalīla wa Dimna* into Arabic prose is significant for its inauguration of the Golden Age of Arabic prose writing, finally obtaining a foothold in a literary culture dominated by verse. This immensely popular collection of animal fables is emblematic of the “Abbasid Revolution” wherein the Islamic notion of *ādāb* annexed new swaths of semantic territory, broadening its horizons from an ethnocentric category to one encompassing Persian, Greek and Indian influence. In a time when the “prophetic hadīth had not yet developed into a source of law, and guidance for the regulation of political order was sought in Persian precedents,” a work such as *Kalīla wa Dimna* was immensely important, belonging as it does to the ‘mirror for princes’ genre. The two major discursive traditions that developed in Islamic civilization (*ādāb* and hadīth-based), were distinguished primarily by their source of wisdom, being non-prophetic and prophetic respectively. Lest talking animals be considered prophets, this work belongs squarely in the *ādāb* camp. However, “intense interfacing” between the two was possible, as demonstrated by the practice of weaving of Qur’anic verses into *Kalīla wa Dimna*, an activity done “without however altering the inherently mundane teachings of the genre.”

Though today it is commonly regarded as part of the Islamic literary oeuvre, *Kalīla wa Dimna* has its origins in the penumbral past. Its roots lie in Sanskrit soil, specifically in the Pāñcatantra and Mahābhārata between the first century BC and 500 AD. From its ever evasive and incalculable origins, the editorial hands it passed through worked heavily on the text, adding, omitting, combining and glossing freely. Consequently, “one cannot truly say that what is at hand today is Ibn al-Muqaffa’s translation” let alone the Sanskrit original. But through it all, readily recognizable literary

archetypes have survived, indicating a sublime universal validity adhering to them. Brooding over the work itself, a collection of tales both ‘*dulce et utile*,’ is the question of just how it has managed to gain the affections of people from Ethiopia to China, Zoroastrian and Jew alike. One answer, Doris Lessing notes, is that the genre of animal fables as instructional material “is as ancient as mankind itself,” which Sir Richard Burton made sense of by postulating that “man’s use of the beast-fable commemorates our instinctive knowledge of how we emerged from the animal kingdom.” But beyond vague theories of collective biohistorical consciousness, a simple explanation presents itself. I argue that the tales’ lack of specified ideological allegiance allows for the allegorical liberty that forges bonds between text and culture. It is my aim to probe the obvious universal appeal these tales have had, demonstrating concretely how they occupy the optimal liminal space between cultural specificity and abstract universality that makes them an ideal vessel of archetypal investiture.

In this paper I will offer one allegorical reading of the opening section of this edition of *Kalīla wa Dimna*, wherein Dabshalim is representative of a man in *jāhiliyah* encountering Islam, as demonstrative of *Kalīla wa Dimna*’s omnifarious ability to host the religious and literary imaginations of a global readership. This method of allegorical reading is a gesture towards the Sufi tradition of *ta’wīl* (esoteric interpretation), and is warranted by the explicit invitation of Ibn al-Muqaffa’, who “hid a kernel within the outer shell of the text, and advises the intelligent reader to decode the real meaning, coyly veiled behind the words and the stories.” Of course, a text is neither a crystalline object nor subject to limitless interpretation, the text and the reader mutually constrain one another in order to generate the virtual dimension of reading.

The guiding paradigm for calling this reading “Islamic” takes as its premise the Quranic notion that the central human problem is ignorance (*jahl*) and the solution is enlightenment (*islām*). The general lineaments of an enlightenment tale are broad enough and easily recognizable, bordering on what are referred to as literary universals. ‘Universal’ is a weighty term, but as Patrick Hogan notes, it does not necessarily mean that it applies to all works. Rather, “linguists use the term ‘universal’ to refer to any property or relation that occurs across (genetically and areally unrelated) languages with greater frequency than would be predicted by

chance alone,” the intrinsic property of universals being that “as abstraction increases, frequency can only increase or remain the same.” Enlightenment tales are of this sort; abstract enough to occur at a frequency greater than chance, but not too abstract as to become meaningless. Todd Lawson pinpoints the two key elements of the enlightenment narrative: “recognition and education—recognition of the spiritual and intellectual impoverishment represented by the status quo, and recognition of the apostle who will guide them away from that state.” It is this abstract form that houses one of many Islamic readings of *Kalila wa Dimna*.

An Allegorical Reading

King Dabschelim in his hours of insomnia passes the time by studying the heavens, being “entranced by the silent music of the spheres,” working out astronomical calculations on his personal maps. While the ability to compute celestial altitudes, azimuths and other problems of spherical astronomy can hardly be considered to be a mark of ignorance, the Islamic implications of ignorance encompass more than immediate material reality, capabilities, and worldly knowledge. The King is reportedly averse to the linkage between astronomy and astrology, one being an exact science and the other being a mantic (in the case of the Qur’ān, pseudo-mantic) or divinatory endeavor. In his day, “astronomy and astrology were linked like twins,” but for him it was too ‘loose’ and susceptible to numerous interpretations. Ultimately though, his aversion is rooted in his apathy towards the future. He is King, He is Sovereign, He does as He pleases. If he is not satisfied by the astrologers predictions, he simply orders their heads to be severed from their bodies. In other words, the unseen (*al-ghayb*) has no place in his mind and no sway on his heart.

Yet even the King’s stern secular shell cracks when a sign (*‘āyah*) appears in the heavens. “On the night when he saw this shooting star, even King Dabschelim felt a twinge of apprehension. It was so dramatic that even he thought it must be a sign.” After switching to observing the moon the same brooding existential question mark overtook him, as he “simply drifted into wandering, in a vague way, what this vast universe signified” asking himself why he, King Dabschelim, saw it, and what it could signify. Here he is struck by the primary noetic stimulus of the created world—nature

itself. By this point, the Muslim audience thoroughly steeped in the Qur'ān would recall that the whole universe is muslim, as Fazlur Rahman reminds us, in that all of creation submits to God and it is only man that may or may not become muslim. It is God who “gave everything its creation and then guided [it] (Q 27:50),” measuring out the movements of the heavenly bodies into perfect harmony. Rahman writes: “Nature is in fact so well-knit and works with such regularity that it is the prime miracle of God, cited untiringly in the Qur'ān.” Given this, King Dabschelim's inchoate stirrings are well positioned for the revelations to come. The natural world itself has not changed, but his gaze has taken on a new dimension, one where the possibility of a universe pregnant with meaning—signifying something rather than nothing—has displaced a cold cosmic indifference. In this is the archetypal resolution of Q 42:26; “it is not the eyes that are blind, but it is the hearts in the chests that grow blind.”

It is not enough, however, for humankind to arrive at these ambiguous conclusions on their own. The king still needs a Messenger to guide him on the straight path, for “[God] is the Knower of the Unseen... He does not disclose it except to a messenger of His choosing (Q 72:26-7).” The king falls into a deep sleep and finds himself once again staring into the heavens only to be interrupted by a stranger dressed in a green robe, who “approached quickly without any of the usual deferential bowing and scraping. His face and his garment seemed to shimmer with their own inner glow and he moved with supreme confidence.” This Messenger is literally and literarily garbed in similitudes of Muḥammad. The green robe he wears is the traditional color of the Prophet, in which he will be clothed on the day of Judgment according to some *aḥādīth*. The dome of the Prophet in Medina is painted with this color (*al-Qubbah al-Khaḍrā'*), which additionally is the color of garments in paradise (Q 76:21), and the cushions upon which the faithful will recline in paradise (Q 55:76). This green-clad Messenger does not pay the usual obeisance to the king, for there is only one true King (*al-Malik*). His face shimmers and glows, barely able to contain the *nūr* Muḥammadī (light of Muhammad), signifying his pre-existent entity that preceded even Adam, as well as the legendary light in the *Sīra of Ibn Ishāq* that rested in Muḥammad's father's body until he was conceived in his mother's womb. Khalil Andani notes that the distinctive feature of this esoteric doctrine is “the cosmogonic role

of the Light of Muḥammad in creating and sustaining the Cosmos... and the human manifestation of the Light of Muḥammad through a series of Prophets...culminating in the historical Muḥammad.” In this case, the glowing Messenger has a pointed warning for the king:

Remember to remember the meteor you witnessed tonight...by their vastness the heavens give even a king an inkling of his stupidity. You were quite right to pause and wonder, Dabschelim, for there are some things you will never know. That shooting star is yourself, O King—a mere atom of a moment’s span. And will you too, O Bright and Powerful One, vanish in the darkness without the slightest trace?

The Qur’ān is quick to remind us that “the life of this world is but comfort of illusion (Q 3:185).” The caravan of life sees the sun rise and set in but a moment’s span. God will inquire of the residents of the fire in the Hereafter, ‘How many years were you on earth?’ and they will respond “We stayed a day or a part of a day, but ask those who keep count (Q 21:112-3).” Of paramount importance, therefore, is to come to a knowledge of the truth before life’s sunset. The mysterious man in green announces: “I come to tell you of a treasure rich beyond your dreams” after which he departs, leaving Dabschelim in daze, “feeling neither happy nor sad, but simultaneously hopeful and utterly powerless.” This typifies the visceral reaction a man of *jahl* might have upon hearing the Qur’ān for the first time or encountering the Prophet’s charisma—bestirred and awestruck, hopeful and powerless.

The king wakes and sets off immediately for the mountains in the northeast, intent on securing the treasure that will teach him to “be truly rich, and not the ignorant pauper-king that [he] in truth [is].” A solitary man is found sitting in the mouth of a cave, who bears glad tidings of a great treasure hidden up for this very time. At this point in the allegory, the setting itself serves as a deep cipher for a surah in the Qur’ān aptly named The Cave (*al-Kahf*)—“Did you know that the People of the Cave and the Inscription were of Our wondrous signs? (Q 18:9).” The man whirls around in little circles like a dervish, proclaiming “All praise! All praise to the Unseen Powers which govern men’s affairs!” and later tells the king that his gift is “in conformity with the supreme will of the Unseen Powers.” They proceed into the cave to locate the treasure, whilst the allegorist’s cave fills with the opening sounds of Surat *al-Kahf*:

Praise be to God, who revealed the Book to His servant, and allowed in it no distortion.

Valuable—to warn of severe punishment from Himself; and to deliver good news to the believers who do righteous deeds, that they will have an excellent reward.

In which they will abide forever (18:1-3)

The heaps of precious material things do not catch his eyes as the enigmatic lock box does. It contains a roll of satin covered in masterful calligraphy in an ancient language, which ignites a storm of opinions from his henchmen, some calling it a magic talisman, others a curse, others a will—“and they say, ‘This is nothing but manifest sorcery’ (Q 37:15).” The king silences the tumult of opinions and seeks only to know its contents, which turns out to be sagely wisdom—“Whoever is granted wisdom has indeed been granted abundant wealth (Q 2:269).” Enlightenment has come. The errors of the king’s previous ways are made manifest, and a voice from the dust reminds him of the straight path to take. The contents of this Book will “answer as from an oracle of Heaven every question that can enter the king’s heart,” and thus the allegory is consummated in the proud made low, holding an oracular Book in his hands.

Conclusion

Though any interpretation of a text is, by nature, allegorical, there remains a distinction between reading allegorically and allegoresis. Allegorical reading maintains some semblance of allegiance to an author’s possible intentions, whereas allegoresis is unfettered by such considerations. In consonance with the Qur’anic cosmology of signs to which the human *fiṭrah* (original disposition) is attuned, this reading presumes to be allegorical on a deep level. But as previously observed, this happens on a level of abstraction deep enough to allow alternatives. By way of conclusion, then, it is worth pointing out that the Islamic paradigm of ignorance to enlightenment is also shared by the worldview of the *bhagavad-gītā* among others, and the story could be read via Buddhist forms just as readily. Even within the Islamic paradigm a more Sufistic allegory is waiting to be had, with the green clad man in Dabschelim’s dream being al-Khaḍir, the enigmatic Green Sufi who appears in visions to initiate Sufis into the divine mysteries.

Kalila wa Dimna hosts all of these possibilities and more in its

pages, a testament not just to theories of universal archetypes but to the possibilities of a multivalent world of mutual recognition that we so desperately need. Returning to my earlier observation of its optimal positioning between cultural specificity and meaningless abstraction, it is clear that *Kalila wa Dimna*'s limbs are abstract enough, and robust enough, to roost birds of many colors, while concurrently evading the specificity of names and doctrinal expositions that would quickly become the arena for sectarian skirmishing.

'Universal,' though, is a loaded term. It is often faulted as "a hegemonic European critical tool," but Patrick Hogan has argued convincingly that it is in fact "antiuniversalism that occludes cultural particularity" and that "manifests and fosters patriarchal, colonial, and other oppressive ideologies." He further argues that there is a dire lack of enthusiasm for the study of universals, with focus tending towards differentiation and particularity. The fear is that by studying and propounding universals, or properties of universality, scholarship will inevitably whitewash world literature and mask its wonderful colorations. But as both Ibn al-Muqaffa and *Kalila wa-Dimna* epitomize—him being genetically Persian but writing in Arabic, and it being genetically Sanskrit but renowned in Arabic—it is the compresence of difference that bridges the gaps between cultures, peoples, and languages. Ground-level differences can peacefully (and quite splendidly) coexist at high enough levels of abstraction without discounting or trivializing the differences that constitute culture and identity. As for what abstractions fit this bill, their discovery and articulation has been the task of civilization from the beginning. Returning for the last time to the paradigm of enlightenment, it is this recognition that precedes the education that universals have to offer.

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الرئيس الأمريكي الجديد يواجه تحديات كثيرة في الشرق الأوسط

تم تنصيب الرئيس الأمريكي السادس والأربعين جو بايدن الأسبوع الماضي وبأشهر هو وديوانه سريعاً بمناقشة سياسات جديدة وتنفيذها في الشرق الأوسط. ومن أهم المسائل التي يواجهها بايدن الاتفاق النووي مع إيران والعلاقة بين إسرائيل وفلسطين والحرب الأهلية اليمنية.

الاتفاق النووي مع إيران

انسحب الرئيس السابق دونالد ترامب من الاتفاق النووي مع إيران وفرض عقوبات عليها في العام ٢٠١٨ نظراً لعدم امتثال إيران للاتفاق الذي يمنعها من تطوير الأسلحة النووية. ونتيجة لذلك فانخفضت العملة الإيرانية وزادت نسبة إنتاج اليورانيوم.

ويخطط الرئيس بايدن بأن يعالج هذه الأزمة عن طريق التواصل والدبلوماسية بدلاً من التهديد والاستفزاز، بينما يعلن آية الله علي خامنئي أن إيران لن تشترك بأي مفاوضات مع الولايات المتحدة.

إسرائيل وفلسطين

إن سياسة الرئيس السابق الغير تقليدية تركت أثراً أيضاً في الصراع الإسرائيلي الفلسطيني لأنه أظهر تحيزاً قوياً نحو إسرائيل وأعلن بأن القدس عاصمة إسرائيل بما يخالف القانون الدولي. ومع ذلك فإنه من المتوقع أن الرئيس بايدن سيقوم بإصلاح العلاقات الدبلوماسية مع الفلسطينيين والعمل على إنفاذ تدابير لبناء السلام في المنطقة. علاوة على ذلك، صرح الممثل لبعثة الولايات المتحدة لدى الأمم المتحدة أمس بأن سياسة إدارة بايدن ستضمن "دعم حلّ الدولتين المتفق عليه بشكل متبادل، وهو الحلّ الذي تعيش فيه إسرائيل في سلام وأمن إلى جانب دولة فلسطينية قابلة للحياة".

الحرب باليمن

وأخيراً وليس آخراً هي الحرب الأهلية اليمنية بين الحوثيين الذين تدعمهم إيران والحكومة اليمنية التي تدعمها المملكة العربية السعودية وهي من أسوأ الأزمات الإنسانية في العالم اليوم بسبب تدمير البنية التحتية باليمن والنقص في الدواء والغذاء للمدنيين. لذلك تهدف إدارة بايدن إلى إنهاء هذا الصراع الكارثي وإدانة المملكة العربية السعودية بجرائم الحرب التي تجاهلها ترامب نظراً لتحالفه مع المملكة.

وعلقت إدارة بايدن الأسبوع الماضي بعض العقوبات الجديدة على الحوثيين التي فرضها وزير الخارجية السابق مايك بومبيو لما لها من أثر سلبي على الحالة الانسانية وعدم تقبلها من قبل الأمم المتحدة والمنظمات الخيرية في اليمن. ومن المتوقع أيضاً أن بايدن سيحذر السعودية من التورط في العنف المفرط من أجل بناء السلام والاستقرار في المنطقة.

ولا شك بأن الشعب الأمريكي والدول العربية ينتظرون آثار سياسة بايدن في هذه المنطقة المتقلبة.

قصة جذور

كانت هناك شجرة كبيرة وكانت هناك ليزا.

(ليزا امرأة أمريكية مسيحية).

أحبت ليزا الأشجار وشاهدت شقوقاً في اللحاء وتخيلت ماء يتدفق منها وهي تتبعها بأصابعها. تخيلت الماء يتدفق إلى الأرض وإلى الجذور، فهي شيء حي، شيء جيد، شيء أكيد ومستقر. في يوم من الأيام، كانت هناك عاصفة. سقطت الشجرة وتشقق جسدها وكشف بأن تعفنها وتجوّفها. وضعت ليزا ذراعها داخل الشجرة وشعرت بما يدور في جوف تلك الشجرة وأخذت قبضة من أحشائها في يدها. عندما سحبت ذراعها من الشجرة وفحصت محتويات قبضتها، كانت خشنة وجافة. كانت رماداً، دون ماء أو عناصر غذائية أو تلك الطاقة المحسوسة بالكاد للحياة المجهرية. ما كان بيدها كان هادئاً، ولكن ليس بطريقة جيدة. فتحت أصابعها وسقط الرماد من حيث أتى، تاركاً نوع من صبغة على يدها لا يغير لون البشرة فحسب، بل يبلّد الحواس أيضاً.

كانت كل جذور الشجرة منفصلة عن الأرض إلا جذر واحد، وانقلبت الجذور المكشوفة مثل عنكبوت قد انقلب على ظهره وترك يتلوى، تتباطأ حركاته في الوقت، تصبح أرجله منكمشة وملتوية كما لو أنه استسلم حتى الموت. كانت هناك حفرة كبيرة في التراب حيث كانت الجذور، ونزلت ليزا في الحفرة وركلت التراب في الهواء. شعرت بتلطّيح التراب في ملابسها و رثتها وعينيها، وكان التراب صباعاً من النوع الذي لا تغير اللون لما تلمسه فحسب، بل تبلّد الحواس أيضاً. سعلت، كان التراب جافاً. حدقت، وهي تتحسس بالأرض وجدران الحفرة وعثرت على براعم صغيرة أو أنقاض الشجرة، ولكن بدون ماء أو عناصر غذائية أو الطاقة المحسوسة بالكاد للحياة المجهرية. كانت هادئة ولكن ليس بطريقة جيدة.

(كانت ليزا امرأة أمريكية مسيحية).

حاولت ليزا أن تتسلق خارج الحفرة، ولكن محاولاتها لتسلق الجدران الترابية أدت إلى انزلاقها إلى القعر مرة أخرى. شعرت بجذور الشجرة الساقطة في متناول يدها وحاولت إمساكها، بدا كل من الجذور كثيفاً ولكن كان كل منها هشاً و مشوّهاً حتى انكسر كل منها تحتها. ولكنها وجدت جذراً ثابتاً وحيّاً، أمسكته وتسلقت، وما زالت عيناها مملوءة بالتراب.

زحفت إلى النهر واغتسلت. غسلت يديها فذراعيها فعينها، غسلتها غسلًا يحيي الحواس. بمرور الوقت، أسرها النهر وأحياها تماماً: كان هناك ماء، كانت هناك عناصر غذائية و حياة مجهرية وسمك ونباتات من كل الألوان والأوزان، ولم يكن ما شعرت به هادئاً ولكنه كان جيداً، كان أفضل مما شعرت به من قبل.

عادت ليزا إلى الشجرة مع فأس، فصلت الحي عن الميت. أخذت الجذر الوحيد وزرعته قريباً من النهر. أعطته ماء وعناصر غذائية وهمست له بوعدها بقدوم الحياة المجهرية، صناعة المخلوقات التي تدندن في الباطن، معالجة ومنمية.

كانت هناك شجرة صغيرة وكانت هناك ليزا.

(ليزا امرأة أمريكية مسيحية، كلمات كانت تعني شيئاً، أما الآن فهي تعني شيئاً آخر.)

ما زالت ليزا تحب الأشجار. جلست بجانب البرعم وتنفست. كان كل شيء هادئاً وكان أمراً حسناً

